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ABSTRACT 
Since the emergence of professional ethical codes, researchers have been preoccupied with 
understanding their role and function together with the motives and rationale behind their 
creation and operation. Literature on the sociology of professions describes an ongoing and 
persistent debate between the functionalist (or public interest) perspective and critical-theorist 
(or private interest) perspective with respect to the role and function of professional ethical 
codes. The purpose of this research thesis is to decipher the underlying motivation and latent 
rationale that underpins the accounting profession’s ethical codes and its disciplinary process 
by investigating how and to what extent professional ethical codes are enforced by professional 
accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in protecting the public interest as compared to 
protecting their private interest. 
Data was retrieved from 1,547 disciplinary cases published by Certified Practicing Accountants 
(CPA) Australia and Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ) over the 
period from 1988 to 2013 inclusive. The research findings indicate that, in the absence of 
perceived external threats, the Australian accounting profession operates its disciplinary 
process according to a predominantly private interest rationale, with emphasis on protecting its 
private interest at the expense of the public interest. However, in the face of an external threat 
to the Australian accounting profession’s legitimacy and authority, disciplinary committee 
members become psychologically preoccupied and emotionally concerned with protecting the 
accounting profession’s private interest and the public interest and respond by imposing greater 
severity of penalties on both private interest offences and public interest offences.  
Additionally, the research findings suggest that, only when the external event is: (a) specific to 
Australia; (b) specific to the Australian accounting profession; (c) takes the form of government 
legislation that specifically applies to the Australian accounting profession; and (d) imposes 
onerous legislative requirements on the Australian accounting profession, does the Australian 
accounting profession perceive it to be of such a serious threat to its legitimacy and authority 
as to necessitate a change in the manner in which its ethical codes are enforced. Taken together, 
the research evidence does not bode well for the public interest. The private interest is so well-
entrenched and pervasive within the accounting profession’s disciplinary process such that 
even when its legitimacy and authority is threatened, the private interest of the accounting 
profession still features strongly in the operation of its disciplinary process. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE:   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Chapter overview 
This research thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the underlying motivation and 
latent rationale that underpins the accounting profession’s ethical codes and its disciplinary 
process. Specifically, it sets out to investigate how and to what extent professional ethical codes 
are enforced by professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in protecting the public 
interest as compared to protecting their private interest. This chapter introduces the research 
context and background, presents the primary and subsidiary research questions, describes the 
research method and discusses the significance of the research together with its contributions 
to literature, before concluding with an outline of its overall structure. 
1.2 Research context and background 
In common with all established professions, the professional accounting bodies have been self-
regulatory since their inception (Lee 1995). As part of this self-regulatory process, professional 
accounting bodies typically impose strict requirements on the individual and collective 
behaviour of their members in the form of a professional Code of Ethics or ethical codes. These 
professional ethical codes are subsequently enforced by the professional accounting bodies by 
way of their respective disciplinary processes through the imposition of disciplinary sanctions 
formulated to promote adherence to the promulgated ethical codes (Maurice 1996). 
Professional accounting bodies typically promote these professional ethical codes as serving a 
public interest role in that they serve to “protect the economic interests of professional 
members’ clients and of third parties who place reliance on the pronouncements and advice 
delivered by both the professional body and its members” (Parker 1994, p. 509). 
However, the widespread publicity surrounding the series of spectacular global corporate 
collapses at the turn of the century, such as Enron and WorldCom in the United States as well 
as HIH Insurance in Australia, has triggered massive public outcries in some parts of the world. 
The ensuing public outcries have prompted the global community to publicly question and 
openly challenge the ability and willingness of the accounting profession to serve and protect 
the public’s interests. This rapid and drastic change in public mood has arguably caught the 
accounting profession by surprise, with the accounting profession today having to engage in a 
continuous struggle to demonstrate its value and relevance to the community that it supposedly 
serves. Naturally, this crisis of public confidence poses a serious threat to the accounting 
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profession in that it directly challenges the core privileges of self-regulation and autonomy that 
have long been cherished by the profession. Consequently, both accounting practitioners and 
accounting institutions today are subjected to increasing public scrutiny (Lee 1995) and are 
under constant pressure to continually demonstrate their willingness and capacity “to 
‘responsibly’ and ‘reliably’ regulate the quality of … [their] valued services” (Willmott 1986, 
p.558).  
Response of national governments  
In response to the spate of corporate collapses and accounting scandals that occurred at the turn 
of the century, several national governments around the world introduced regulatory reforms 
involving the establishment of independent oversight bodies tasked with monitoring and 
regulating the activities of the accounting profession within their respective jurisdictions. 
Notable examples include the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) in the United States in 2002 (Anantharaman 2012), the Canadian Public 
Accountability Board (CPAB) in Canada in 2003 (Malsch & Gendron 2011), the Haut Conseil 
du Commissariat aux Comptes (H3C) in France in 2003 (Hazgui & Gendron 2015) and the 
Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA) in Ireland in 2003 (Canning & 
O’Dwyer 2013). Although the actual powers delegated to  independent oversight bodies vary 
according to their respective jurisdictions - ranging from the authority to supervise and 
intervene in the regulatory functions of the professional accounting bodies to the authority to 
inspect and review public accounting firms directly - the establishment of these independent 
oversight bodies do, however, signal the demise of self-regulation while at the same time 
marking the onset of a system of co-regulation for the accounting professions that operate 
within these jurisdictions. 
In the context of Australia, the national government responded to the series of corporate 
collapses and accounting scandals by introducing regulatory reforms that led to the removal of 
auditing standards setting from the Australian accounting profession in 2004. Coupled with the 
removal of accounting standards setting in early 2000, this meant that the Australian accounting 
profession no longer controlled the process of accounting standards setting nor auditing 
standards setting in Australia. Instead a statutory board called the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) became responsible for overseeing the process of accounting standards setting and 
auditing standards setting in Australia. 
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However, although the Australian accounting profession is no longer responsible for 
accounting standards setting nor auditing standards setting in Australia, this is not the case for 
ethical (or professional) standards setting nor its enforcement in Australia. Specifically, the 
process of ethical standards setting remains firmly in the hands of the Australian accounting 
profession by way of the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (an entity that 
is wholly-controlled and funded by the Australian accounting profession), with enforcement of 
the said standards occurring at the level of the Australian professional accounting bodies by 
way of their respective disciplinary processes (Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards 
Board 2013). As a result, this differentiates the Australian accounting profession from that of 
other developed nations such as the United States, Canada, France and Ireland, thus making 
the institutional arrangements in Australia unique. 
Response of the Australian accounting profession 
Given the nature of the regulatory reforms undertaken by the Australian government, just how 
has the Australian accounting profession responded to this unprecedented challenge to its 
autonomy cum authority? Arguably, part of the answer to this predicament, at least from the 
perspective of the Australian accounting profession, lies with formulating and implementing a 
comprehensive professional Code of Ethics for its members. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the Australian professional accounting bodies collaborated to undertake a series of review 
activities that eventually culminated in two new initiatives: (1) the establishment of the 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB) in early 2006; followed by (2) 
the introduction and implementation of the APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants in June 2006. This revised Code of Ethics served to emphasize and reiterate the 
accounting profession’s responsibility to act in the public interest through the provision of 
fundamental principles as well as detailed guidelines governing the professional behaviour of 
members (Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 2013). 
But, what exactly is the role and function of this professional Code of Ethics as established by 
the professional accounting bodies? And perhaps more importantly, how effective is it in 
ensuring that members serve and protect the public’s interests, thereby helping to ultimately 
restore the public’s faith and confidence in the accounting profession? Obviously, the answers 
to these questions have profound implications for the professional accounting bodies as they 
attempt to “re-establish their credibility and legitimacy” (McPhail & Walters 2009, p. 6) in the 
wake of the crisis of public confidence that afflicts the accounting profession today. 
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Accordingly, these and other related issues are examined in this research thesis to better 
understand the role of professional ethical codes in protecting the public interest and in 
ultimately securing the faith and confidence of the public. 
 
Sociological perspectives of professions 
Two major schools of thought exist within the context of the sociology of professions – the 
‘Harvard school’ and the ‘Chicago school’ (Newton 1982). Both sociological schools adopt 
distinctive and fundamentally divergent philosophical approaches in their perceptions of the 
motives behind the organization and formation of ‘professions’ that are summarized by Newton 
(1982, pp. 33-34) as follows:  
The Harvard school is functionalist in approach, seeing a profession as an analytically 
and empirically distinct type of occupation, characterized by the complex technical 
knowledge possessed by its practitioners, the extensive education required to obtain it, 
the social importance of their work (in its relation to urgent social needs) and the high 
degree of uncertainty, responsibility, and consequent stress that accompanies practice.  
[Conversely,] [t]he Chicago school begins with the assumption that the category of 
professional is a semi-mythic construct, fashioned by members of an occupation for the 
purpose of obtaining social and economic advantages, who then successfully persuade 
the rest of society to accept their construct and honor their claim for special protection 
and privileges. In their view, the “profession” fulfils no special function in society, 
beyond whatever social territory its members have managed, historically, to control.  
 
Sociological perspectives of professional ethical codes 
Accordingly, systematic and fundamental differences also exist between both sociological 
schools in their interpretations of the perceived role and function of professional ethical codes. 
As Newton (1982, pp. 34-35) explained: 
To the functionalist [belonging to the Harvard school], the professional [ethical] code 
is the institutionalized manifestation of the ‘service ideal’ …. and colleague control; by 
means of the code, the practitioners and the profession police themselves, and this self-
policing is an essential clause in the “bargain” struck between profession and society.  
[Conversely,] [f]or the … [critical]-theorist [belonging to the Chicago school], 
[professional ethical] codes are just part of the professional “ideology”, a carefully 
polished image to win elite support, designed for public relations and justification for 
the status and prestige which professions assume vis-à-vis more lowly occupations, 
devices used to dupe both the government and the public into thinking that the 
occupation is a worthy recipient of professionalism’s autonomy and prestige.  
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Public and private interest roles of professional ethical codes 
In his journal article on professional accounting ethics, Parker (1994) adopted the terms ‘public 
interest’ and ‘private interest’ to depict the contrasting and potentially conflicting roles of 
professional ethical codes. Specifically, Parker (1994, p. 509) defined public interest as “both 
a manifest and latent motivation of ethical codes to protect the economic interests of 
professional members’ clients and of third parties who place reliance on the pronouncements 
and advice delivered by both the professional body and its members”. These third parties may 
include both existing and potential corporate shareholders, borrowers and lenders, regulators, 
government, social interest groups, or any other member of the public (Parker 1994). In this 
sense, Parker’s definition of the public interest role of professional ethical codes is consistent 
with the functionalist perspective adopted by the Harvard school.  
On the other hand, private interest is defined by Parker (1994, p. 509) as the “latent motivation 
of ethical codes to protect the interests of the professional accounting body corporate and its 
individual members”. These interests include the professional body’s social status, political 
power, and influence over economic activity as well as the social standing and income-
generating capacity of its members (Parker 1994). In this sense, Parker’s definition of the 
private interest role of professional ethical codes is consistent with the critical-theorist 
perspective adopted by the Chicago school.  
On their part, professional accounting bodies typically promote professional ethical codes as 
serving a public interest role. However, prior research has questioned the proclaimed public 
interest role of professional ethical codes and the respective disciplinary processes put in place 
to enforce them, specifically in the Australian (Parker 1987, 1994), American (Loeb 1972; Lee 
1995; Moriarity 2000; Jenkins et al. 2016), British (Mitchell et al. 1994; Sikka & Willmott 
1995; Fisher et al. 2001), Canadian (Bédard 2001; Mescall et al. 2017), French (Lesage et al. 
2016) and Irish (Canning & O’Dwyer 2001, 2003, 2006; O’Dwyer & Canning 2008) contexts. 
In fact, the accounting literature on professional discipline suggests that the public interest is 
not always the primary concern (Paisey & Paisey 2012), with the literature describing an 
ongoing conflict between rhetoric that promotes the public interest and actions that instead 
promote primarily the private interest (Paisey & Paisey 2012). In other words, while 
professions regularly refer to their role in protecting the public interest, the profession’s stated 
support for the public interest may not be evident in their actions which often prioritize self-
interest (Hooks 1991).  
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Empirical evidence in the accounting literature suggests that, while disciplinary procedures are 
typically promoted by the professional accounting bodies as evidence of their professional 
claim and responsibility to protect the public interest, these same disciplinary procedures have 
also acted to protect the interests of the profession (Paisey & Paisey 2012). Specifically, prior 
research indicates that professional ethical codes, together with the disciplinary processes that 
accompany them, are in effect part of a strategy involving the use of explicit professional 
signals in order to give a public interest face to what is essentially a process driven by private 
(and economic) interests (Lee 1995). Furthermore, professional ethical codes are often 
expressed in altruistic tones such that, on the one hand, they encourage a sense of social 
responsibility on the part of the professional member, but on the other hand, they also assist in 
justifying professional self-interest in the sense that the demonstration of an effective and 
accountable disciplinary process may reduce the chances of a profession losing its self-
regulatory status (Parker 1994). It is little wonder, therefore, that professional ethical codes, 
together with the disciplinary processes that accompany them, are seen to act as “a proven 
mechanism for diffusing criticisms, restoring the aura of independence and professionalism 
and in this way, protecting the profession’s jurisdiction” (Sikka & Willmott 1995, p. 561). 
On this basis, professional ethical codes are described as serving a dual and complex role, with 
both public and private interests being ostensibly pursued (Parker 1994). However, while “the 
public interest is readily declared … the private interest remains submerged yet powerful … 
[such that] the role of ethics in protecting the private interest represents a vital component of 
the accounting profession’s ongoing commitment to ensuring its own survival” (Parker 1994, 
p. 508). This necessarily implies the existence of an ongoing conflict or tension between the 
public interest and private interest roles of professional ethical codes within the accounting 
profession - one in which the private interest appears to largely dominate at the expense of the 
public interest despite the accounting profession’s increasingly loud and public proclamations 
to the contrary.   
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1.3 Research questions 
The sociological literature describes a dichotomy between the functionalist and critical-theorist 
perspectives with respect to the role and function of professional ethical codes that has led to 
persistent disagreements and dialectical debates between both sociological schools of thought. 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this research thesis is thus to decipher the underlying 
motivation and latent rationale that underpins the accounting profession’s ethical codes and its 
disciplinary process. This is achieved by investigating how and to what extent professional 
ethical codes are enforced by professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in 
protecting the public interest as compared to protecting their private interest.  
Accordingly, the primary research question for this research thesis is stated as: 
• Do professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes serve the interests of the 
public or the private interests of the accounting profession? 
 
In addressing the primary research question, the following subsidiary research questions are 
examined: 
• Subsidiary research question 1: 
What offences and outcomes are associated with the disciplinary cases dealt with by 
the Australian accounting profession during the period from 1988 to 2013 inclusive? 
 
• Subsidiary research question 2: 
Is there a relationship between the offences and outcomes for the disciplinary cases 
dealt with by the Australian accounting profession during the period from 1988 to 2013 
inclusive? 
 
• Subsidiary research question 3: 
What influence (if any) did major past external events that threatened the accounting 
profession’s legitimacy and authority have on the outcomes for the disciplinary cases 
dealt with by the Australian accounting profession during the period from 1988 to 2013 
inclusive? 
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1.4 Research method 
In order to address the stated research questions and achieve the stated research objective, this 
research thesis employs a quantitative research design involving the creation of a numerical 
database by recording relevant data retrieved from the outcomes for all disciplinary cases 
published by the two major Australian professional accounting bodies – CPA Australia and 
Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ) – between the years 1988 to 
2013 inclusive.   
Relevant offence-related variables and outcome-related variables are then analyzed using 
descriptive analysis to provide a general picture of the relative distribution of major offences 
and penalty outcomes associated with the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian 
accounting profession over the period of investigation. This is followed by inferential analysis 
to establish whether or not a significant relationship exists between the offences and penalty 
outcomes for the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting profession over the 
period of investigation. Event analysis involves selecting specific external events that may have 
threatened or challenged the legitimacy and reputation of the Australian accounting profession 
in the past, followed by statistical testing of specific hypotheses in order to determine whether 
or not the occurrence of each selected event has had a significant influence on the severity of 
penalties imposed for the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting profession 
over the period of investigation. Finally, the collective results and findings from each analysis, 
in turn, form the basis for an overall conclusion as to whether professional accounting bodies’ 
disciplinary processes fulfil a predominantly public interest or private interest role, thus 
achieving the research objective.   
1.5 Research rationale and significance 
The degree or extent to which disciplinary procedures are prescribed and acted upon as well as 
the manner of their actual execution provides valuable insights into the public interest and 
private interest roles of professional ethical codes. Following Parker’s (1994) analysis of 
published outcomes for all Australian disciplinary cases up to 1987, this research extends his 
work by reviewing the published outcomes for all Australian disciplinary cases from 1988 to 
2013 inclusive. Specifically, this research thesis reveals observable changes in the public 
interest and private interest roles of the Australian accounting profession’s disciplinary process 
over an extended period of time.  
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Although the accounting literature describes several past research studies that have examined 
professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in a number of geographical contexts, 
the disciplinary procedures of professional accounting bodies have, in general, received only 
limited attention in the academic literature (Paisey & Paisey 2012). Prior research studies had 
focused exclusively on either: (1) reviewing published disciplinary cases (e.g. Loeb 1972; 
Parker 1994; Moriarity 2000; Canning & O’Dwyer 2001; Bédard 2001; Fisher et al. 2001; 
Lesage et al. 2016; Jenkins et al. 2016; Mescall et al. 2017); or (2) interviewing representatives 
from the professional accounting bodies (Canning & O’Dwyer 2003, 2006); or (3) interviewing 
complainants involved in the disciplinary process (O’Dwyer & Canning 2008); or (4) narrating 
selected case studies surrounding specific critical events (Mitchell et al. 1994; Sikka & 
Willmott 1995).  
However, this research thesis differs from prior research studies described in the accounting 
literature in three significant ways. Firstly, in light of the crisis of public confidence afflicting 
the accounting profession today, this research thesis extends and builds on the work of Parker 
(1994) to provide an updated account of changes in the public interest and private interest roles 
of Australian professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes over the past two decades. 
In so doing, this research thesis provides a better understanding of the actual role and function 
of professional ethical codes as they apply to the accounting profession today.   
Secondly, unlike prior research studies that focused solely on the internal enforcement of 
professional ethical codes by professional accounting bodies, this research thesis is innovative 
as it also examines if and how the enforcement of professional ethical codes by both Australian 
professional accounting bodies are linked to and influenced by major past external events that 
threatened the accounting profession’s legitimacy and authority. Through an analysis of the 
published outcomes for disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting profession 
over an extended period of time, this research thesis is able to document not only the aftermath 
of significant historical events such as the collapse of Enron and the demise of Arthur Andersen 
at the turn of the century, but also the impact of significant recent events such as the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis. This allows for the creation of a robust and comprehensive database 
that, in turn, forms the basis for a thorough and in-depth analysis of the public interest and 
private interest roles of the Australian accounting profession’s disciplinary process. In so 
doing, this research thesis provides more detailed and far richer insights into the actual rationale 
and motives that underpin the accounting profession’s ethical codes and its disciplinary process 
than prior research studies.  
11 
 
Finally, this research thesis employs an alternative theoretical framework to conceptualize the 
motives and rationale that underpin the operation of professional ethical codes within the 
disciplinary architecture established by the professional accounting bodies. By deploying a new 
theoretical lens based on the ‘social identity perspective’ and incorporating the concepts and 
principles espoused by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) and Self-Categorization 
Theory (Turner et al. 1987) as well as research evidence pertaining to the ‘black sheep effect’ 
(Marques et al. 1988) and the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ (Abrams et al. 2000; 
Marques et al. 1998a; Marques et al. 2001a), this research thesis provides a coherent framework 
that not only predicts disciplinary outcomes for statistical testing of specific hypotheses, but 
also facilitates interpretation of the statistical results and research findings as well as proffering 
possible reasons that might potentially account for the observed findings. In so doing, this 
research thesis fills an important void in the academic literature on professional discipline, 
while at the same time providing valuable insights into the underlying motivation and latent 
rationale that underpins the accounting profession’s ethical codes and its disciplinary process.  
1.6 Research contributions 
This research thesis contributes to the academic literature in four important ways. Firstly, by 
providing an updated account of changes in the public interest and private interest roles of 
professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in light of the crisis of public confidence 
afflicting the accounting profession, this research thesis contributes to the accounting literature 
by providing a better understanding of the actual role and function of professional ethical codes 
as they apply to the accounting profession today.   
Secondly, by documenting changes to the public interest and private interest roles of Australian 
professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes, this research thesis also serves as a 
valuable resource for cross-cultural comparisons of disciplinary practices within the global 
accounting profession. This will, in turn, allow for the construction of a more comprehensive 
and nuanced understanding of the role and function of professional ethical codes within the 
accounting profession.  
Thirdly, by incorporating an event analysis that examines the published outcomes for 
disciplinary cases dealt with by the accounting profession over an extended period of time, this 
research thesis contributes to the accounting literature by documenting the accounting 
profession’s response (in terms of its enforcement of professional ethical codes) to not only 
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significant historical events such as the collapse of Enron and the demise of Arthur Andersen 
at the turn of the century, but also significant recent events such as the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis. This, in turn, offers rich insights into the actual rationale and motives that underpin the 
accounting profession’s ethical codes and its disciplinary process.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this research thesis fills an important void in the 
academic literature on professional discipline by employing a new theoretical lens based on 
the ‘social identity perspective’ to provide a coherent framework that not only predicts 
disciplinary outcomes for statistical testing of specific hypotheses but also facilitates 
interpretation of the statistical results and research findings. This, in turn, provides valuable 
insights into the actual rationale and motives that underpin the accounting profession’s ethical 
codes and its disciplinary process.  
 
1.7 Organization of thesis 
This research thesis is organized into seven chapters described as follows:  
Chapter One: Introduction introduces the research context and background, articulates the 
research objective and research questions as well as discusses the research significance and 
research contributions; 
Chapter Two: Literature Review discusses the sociological perspectives and the public interest 
and private interest roles of professional ethical codes as well as provides an overview of the 
accounting literature with regards to the development and enforcement of ethical codes within 
the accounting profession; 
Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework outlines the principles of Social Identity Theory and 
Self-Categorization Theory as well as discusses the ‘black sheep effect’ and existing research 
on deviance. This is followed by the proposal of an alternative framework to conceptualize the 
motives and rationale that underpin the operation of professional ethical codes within the 
disciplinary architecture established by the professional accounting bodies; 
Chapter Four: Research Methodology introduces the quantitative research design and the 
contextual background surrounding the source of the data, with specific emphasis on the 
structure of both CPA Australia and CAANZ’s disciplinary processes. This is followed by 
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details on data collection and data analysis together with an explanation of how the results 
collectively serve to answer the research questions and achieve the research objective; 
Chapter Five: Descriptive and Inferential Analysis describes the data source and sample size 
as well as presents the results and discusses the findings for descriptive analysis followed by 
inferential analysis; 
Chapter Six: Event Analysis presents the results and discusses the findings for event analysis 
of six major past external events; and 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion summarizes the main findings and overall conclusion derived from 
the descriptive, inferential and event analyses. This is followed by a discussion of the 
theoretical implications for scholars and researchers as well as the practical implications for 
governments and policymakers. This chapter concludes with an explanation of the research 
limitations together with some suggestions for future research.   
  
1.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter introduces the research context and background as well as the primary and 
subsidiary research questions for this research thesis. Specifically, this research aims to provide 
a better understanding of the underlying motivation and latent rationale that underpins the 
accounting profession’s ethical codes and its disciplinary process by investigating how and to 
what extent professional ethical codes are enforced by professional accounting bodies’ 
disciplinary processes. Importantly, this research thesis contributes to the academic literature 
by: (1) providing an updated account of changes in the public interest and private interest roles 
of professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in light of the crisis of public 
confidence afflicting the accounting profession; (2) serving as a valuable resource for cross-
cultural comparisons of disciplinary practices within the global accounting profession;                        
(3) incorporating an event analysis that documents the accounting profession’s response to 
significant historical events and significant recent events in terms of its enforcement of 
professional ethical codes; and (4) deploying a new theoretical lens that provides a coherent 
framework that not only predicts disciplinary outcomes for statistical testing of specific 
hypotheses but also facilitates interpretation of the statistical results and research findings. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first section introduces the sociological 
perspectives as well as the public interest and private interest roles of professional ethical 
codes; and the second section describes the main findings and key conclusions from prior 
research within the accounting literature with regards to the development and enforcement of 
ethical codes within the accounting profession in order to provide an understanding of where 
this research thesis is situated within the existing literature. This is followed by a discussion of 
the conceptual limitations that are associated with prior accounting research on professional 
ethical codes. 
2.2 Nature of professions 
In the context of this research thesis, the term ‘profession’ is used to denote occupations that 
are organized in institutional forms, whose practitioners are committed explicitly to serving the 
public interest and who offer client services related directly to an intellectually-based body of 
knowledge (Willmott 1986). Professions are typically characterized by a knowledge base, a 
commitment to public service, autonomy and education as opposed to mere training (McPhail 
& Walters 2009). As a result, a member of a profession is perceived as an independent and 
knowledgeable practitioner with an explicit obligation to act in the public interest (Lee 1995). 
Historically, professions emerged as institutionalized occupations as a direct result of the social 
and economic changes that accompanied the advent of the industrial revolution (Lee 1995), 
with the organized professions becoming the means by which the middle class exercised 
cultural control and established its social status (Bledstein 1976, cited in Lee 1995). 
2.3 Sociological perspectives of professions 
Since the 1930s, a variety of contrasting approaches derived from the sociology of professions 
have emerged to explain how and why particular occupations, such as accounting, have 
successfully undergone the process of professionalization to become ‘full-fledged’ professions. 
In this regard, Willmott (1986) has been widely cited in his work in which he broadly 
categorized all sociological studies of the professions into the ‘functionalist’, the ‘interactionist’ 
and the ‘critical-theorist’ perspectives of professions.  
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With this in mind, I shall now briefly review the literature and broadly describe the assumptions 
that underpin the functionalist, the interactionist as well as the critical-theorist perspectives of 
professions. 
2.3.1 Functionalist perspective 
The functionalist perspective of professions dominated early research on the sociology of 
professions and has traditionally provided the main theoretical orientation or ‘lens’ for viewing 
and understanding the professions (Carr-Saunders & Wilson 1964; Walker 1991). The 
functionalist perspective views professions as integrated communities of learned individuals 
whose members undertake highly skilled tasks that are crucial to the smooth operation and 
overall betterment of society (Carr-Saunders & Wilson 1964; Greenwood 1957). Within this 
paradigm, the existence of a checklist of distinctive attributes that are unique to all professions, 
such as the possession of esoteric knowledge, autonomy, altruism and self-regulation, are 
presumed, emphasized and largely unquestioned (Barber 1963; Ritzer 1972, cited in Yapa 
1999) such that they can be applied to distinguish between professional and non-professional 
occupations (Greenwood 1957; Millerson 1964; Moore 1970, cited in West 1996). In other 
words, the functionalist perspective views professions as a special category of occupations that 
possess unique traits or attributes which are beneficial to the wider society (Roberts & Coutts 
1992).    
In modern industrial societies, it is anticipated that the public will accede to the authority of 
the professions due to the unique and exclusive attributes that members of professions are 
deemed to possess (Canning & O’Dwyer 2001). Functionalists acknowledge that professional 
status delivers benefits to those individuals possessing it, in that the professionalization process 
is depicted in terms of a “bargain struck between society and [professional] occupations, where 
the knowledge and education necessary to perform complex occupations act as resources … 
which are then exchanged … for the power and privileges associated with high 
professionalism” (Cullen 1978, p. 48, cited in Newton 1982) such as self-regulation, protection 
from competition from unqualified practitioners, as well as high social status and remuneration 
(West 1996). In other words, with the functionalist interpretation, professions are granted the 
exclusive franchise by society to use their specialized knowledge responsibly to resolve issues 
within their specialist spheres in return for a commitment by the professions to act in the best 
interests of society (Lee 1995). In fact, high levels of social prestige and economic rewards are 
seen as a necessary and fair exchange for the provision of technical skills and knowledge by 
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the members of professions (Willmott 1986), along with their professed commitment towards 
public service ideals.  
With the functionalist approach, “the professional association is seen to provide a functionally 
appropriate means of regulating the competence and conduct of those possessing the talent to 
undertake such socially essential and beneficial activities” (Willmott 1986, p. 557). In other 
words, professional associations act not only as the protectors of the interests of their members 
but also as the guardians of standards and of at least a measure of their service orientation 
within their professions (Halmos 1970, cited in Black 1981). Within this paradigm:  
Our professional associations are … an important stabilizing factor in our whole society 
and through their international associations they provide an important channel of 
communication with the intellectual leaders of other countries, thereby helping to 
maintain world order (Lynn 1963, p. 653, cited in Black 1981).   
Therefore, it follows that, from a functionalist perspective, a failure to professionalize may be 
the result of a failure, on the part of the occupation, to adequately perform its functions to 
society’s expectations, or to otherwise achieve or demonstrate the existence of professional 
attributes, be it due to the inadequacies of the professional body or otherwise (Yapa 1999). 
2.3.2 Interactionist perspective 
The interactionist perspective of professions emerged as a direct response to some of the 
problems and inadequacies of the functionalist approach in explaining how particular 
occupations become professions. The primary criticism of the functionalist perspective of 
professions is that it adopts an outcomes-based approach in distinguishing between 
professional and non-professional occupations through the identification of a checklist of 
specific attributes that are deemed to be unique and exclusive to all professions. However, 
limiting the achievement of professional status to essentially that of a process of acquiring a 
checklist of specific attributes is perhaps too simplistic and unrealistic in that it fails to consider 
the actual process or journey by which professional status is achieved – a journey that is 
typically long and arduous, and more often than not, fraught with hidden obstacles and 
incessant frustrations. The interactionist approach is thus borne out of the belief that there are 
often more lessons to be learnt from the journey itself rather than from merely reaching the 
intended destination.        
The interactionist perspective views professions as interest groups that strive to convince other 
groups of the legitimacy of their claim to professional recognition (Roth 1974; Haug & 
Sussman 1963, cited in Willmott 1986). As with the functionalist paradigm, it is the emphasis 
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on professional competence and public service ideals within the interactionist paradigm that 
forms the cornerstone of the professions’ claim to legitimacy. However, unlike the 
functionalists who identify a checklist of specific attributes as the critical determinant in 
achieving professional status, the interactionists identify the politicization of the 
professionalization process, as evidenced by various political lobbying activities on the part of 
the professional bodies, as the critical determinant in achieving professional recognition. 
Within this paradigm, a profession is not an occupation but rather an “institutionalized form of 
control” of an occupational activity (Johnson 1972, p.38, cited in Bédard 2001), with the 
professionalization process perceived as a political process involving groups of individuals 
vying with each other for political status and economic rent (Sikka & Willmott 1995).  
Under the interactionist approach, the professional body or association assumes a significant 
and central role, as it becomes the basic organizational instrument by which the profession’s 
social identity is defined and secured (Becker et al. 1961, cited in Willmott 1986). Or, as 
Willmott (1986, p. 559) aptly puts it, “professional associations are seen primarily as political 
bodies established and maintained to define, defend and enhance the symbolic and material 
value of their member’s skills”. Therefore, it follows that, from an interactionist perspective, a 
failure to professionalize may be a reflection of the poor political skills of an occupation’s 
leadership or its inability to achieve community sanction for its activities (Yapa 1999). 
2.3.3 Critical-theorist perspective 
The sentiment echoed by the critical theorists is perhaps best encapsulated in the writings of 
Adam Smith (1776, p.55, cited in West 1996) who remarked that “People of the same trades 
seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
conspiracy against the public or in some contrivance to raise prices”. 
Since the 1970s, researchers have sought to further extend and develop the self-interest 
rationales that have hitherto only been subtly alluded to in the interactionist perspective. This 
critical approach to professionalization is rooted in Marxist and Weberian philosophies, which 
begin with the assumption that “the category of ‘professional’ is a semi-mythic construct, 
fashioned by members of an occupation for the purpose of obtaining social and economic 
advantages, who then successfully persuade the rest of the society to accept their construct and 
honour their claim for special protection and privileges” (Swazey & Fox 1982, cited in Newton 
1982) such that “the ‘profession’ fulfills no special function in society, beyond whatever social 
territory its members have managed, historically, to control” (Newton 1982, p. 34). This radical 
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shift in thinking stems predominantly from an “appreciation of the significance of the 
underlying structure of power relations in facilitating the process of professionalization and, in 
particular, in enabling or constraining the formation and development of [professional] 
associations” (Willmott 1986, p. 559), such that “the organization of the professions should be 
understood as a medium of, as well as an outcome of, the pervasive forces of the market and 
the centralized power of the State” (Yapa 1999, p. 331).   
The critical-theorist perspective depicts professions as monopolies based on occupational self-
interest that act to maintain control without emphasis on possessing specific professional 
attributes or behaving in the public’s best interests (Hooks 1991). Instead, the critical-theorist 
perspective emphasizes “how occupational groups mobilize resources and use power and 
influence … to attain the occupational traits usually associated with highly developed 
professionalism, and consequently, to obtain the benefits of professionalism such as high 
income and high prestige …” (Cullen 1978, pp. 58-59, cited in Newton 1982). Within this 
paradigm, professionalization is perceived as a strategy developed by occupations aimed at 
enhancing their mystique through consolidating and increasing the social distance between the 
members and their clients (Willmott 1986), in an ongoing “attempt to translate one order of 
scarce resources – special knowledge and skills – into another – social and economic rewards” 
(Larson 1977, p. xvii). Crucially, it is this ability to exert market control and power that is the 
key to unlocking and extracting social and economic rewards. For in the words of Larson (1977, 
p. xvii), “To maintain scarcity implies a tendency to monopoly: monopoly of expertise in the 
market, monopoly of status in a system of stratification”.  
As such, professionalism is not regarded as a reflection of some distinctive technical or social 
functions performed by professional members, but rather it is perceived as a complex and over-
arching strategy employing explicit mechanisms such as credentialism, solidarity and closure, 
with the sole and express purpose of achieving market power by way of control and influence 
over the supply and demand for skilled labour (Willmott 1986). Put it another way, with the 
critical-theorist perspective, “a profession attains and maintains its position by virtue of the 
protection and patronage of some elite segment of society which has been persuaded that there 
is some special value in its work (Newton 1982, p. 34). Obviously, it was from the critical-
theorist perspective that George Bernard Shaw (1932, p.106, cited in Black 1981) famously 
remarked, “All professions are conspiracies against the laity”.              
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With the critical-theorist interpretation, the professional body or association assumes a crucial 
and central role as a “symbol of the elitism of the professions as well as an instrument of 
monopoly and exploitation, implying as it does ‘status’-based activities such as the distinction 
between the qualified and the unqualified …” (Heraud 1973, p. 89, cited in Black 1981). Within 
this paradigm, “professional associations are appropriately viewed as private interest 
governments that emerge in response to tensions within and between civil society and the 
State” (Willmott 1986, p. 564), with the monopoly and privileges granted to professions being 
more a reflection of their position and role within the social division of labour rather than an 
acknowledgement of any distinctive, politically neutral technical attributes or competences 
they may possess (Johnson 1980, cited in Willmott 1986). In other words:  
The high social, economic, and legal position enjoyed by the professionals would be 
seen to result from their monopolistic position which professional groups maintain by 
controlling entry to the profession through arbitrary educational requirements as well 
as other barriers (Lindblom & Ruland 1997, p. 574). 
As such, professional associations are perceived as inescapably political bodies whose power 
derives from their organizational capacity to continuously secure from the market and the State 
the right to control and regulate the supply of, and influence the demand for, skilled labour 
(Willmott 1986). Therefore, it follows that, from a critical-theorist perspective, a failure to 
professionalize may be attributed to a failure to close out competitors from valuable markets 
or a failure to gain the support of powerful clients or the State, all while maintaining some form 
of autonomy from both the market and the State (Yapa 1999).    
2.4 Self-regulation and professional discipline  
The functionalist perspective views professions as a special category of occupations, with 
members of professions possessing unique traits or attributes that enable them to fulfil certain 
special functions in society. In fact, the existence of a system of self-regulation is often 
identified as the hallmark attribute that distinguishes professions from other non-professional 
occupations (Barber 1963; Greenwood 1957; Millerson 1964).  
Bayles (1986, p. 34) referred to self-regulation as “an institutional arrangement knowingly 
permitted or adopted by society of legislators … allowing members of the profession to 
establish and enforce the norms of professional conduct”. According to Bayles (1986), self-
regulation of the professions primarily occurs in two ways. Firstly, the professions exercise 
direct control over the admission or certification process, with new entrants to the profession 
typically having to possess an academic degree, fulfil certain periods of apprenticeship as well 
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as passing further examinations. Secondly, the professions also regulate the conduct of existing 
members, which is manifested in three principal ways: (a) ‘norm-setting’ involving the 
formulation and adoption of norms for professional conduct; (b) ‘norm-applying’ involving the 
utilization of these norms in guiding professional conduct; and (c) the reporting of suspected 
violations of these norms.   
The notion that a profession must possess a system of self-regulation becomes increasingly 
important when one considers the fiduciary nature of the trust relationship that exists between 
a profession and its clients. In the parlance of Economics, the peculiar issue that occurs in this 
situation is referred to as ‘moral hazard’. The issue of moral hazard is perhaps best captured by 
Greenwood’s (1957, pp. 47-48) observation that, while “a non-professional occupation has 
customers; a professional occupation has clients”. In other words, whereas a customer is able 
to determine what services and/or products s/he wants and shop around until s/he finds them, 
a client is deemed neither able to diagnose his/her own needs nor select from the range of 
possibilities that meet those needs (Velayutham 2003). Or, as Greenwood (1983, p.23, cited in 
Bayles 1986) aptly summarized: 
In a professional relationship … the professional dictates what is good or evil for the 
client, who has no choice but to accede to professional judgement”.  
 
Moral hazard, therefore, is an essential feature of professional-client relationships (Jamal & 
Bowie 1995), as it arises from the unequal or asymmetric nature of the typical professional-
client relationship. Since the professional possesses knowledge or expertise that is not available 
to the client, a situation typically ensues where there is necessarily asymmetric informational 
flows between the professional and the client, thus precipitating the issue of moral hazard. In 
other words, since the professional typically possesses superior information and expertise to 
the client, there is always the possibility of a conflict of interest - the professional might exploit 
the (asymmetrical) information for his or her own benefit rather than in the interest of the client, 
or alternatively, as in the case of the accounting profession, unduly benefit the client or some 
other third party at the expense of the public (Jamal & Bowie 1995).  
As a result of this asymmetry of information and expertise between the professional and the 
client (or between the professional and the public, in the case of the accounting profession), 
“the client is thought to be a poor judge of the professional product” (Goode 1957, p.197, cited 
in Bédard 2001). Consequently, since it is thought that the professional’s peers are best 
equipped to judge whether a professional has performed satisfactorily (Bédard 2001), the 
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public and the State require and demand that professions be self-regulated, with the result that 
the typical professional “is thus mainly accountable for his or her performance to professional 
peers” (Bédard 2001, p. 401). In this sense, the notion of professional “self-regulation is 
consistent with both the tradition of limited government and the moral dimension of the 
professions” (Frankel 1989, p. 113).  
Accordingly, with the functionalist interpretation, the primary reason why self-regulation is 
such an integral part of all professions is due to the existence of moral hazard in professional-
client relationships, which arise as a result of the asymmetry of information and expertise 
between the professional and the client. As Jamal and Bowie (1995, p. 705) explained:  
[It is] [t]hus the presence of moral hazard [that] serves as the primary justification for 
the regulation of the professions. The professions agree to self-monitor their members 
conduct and to promote ethical behavior in return for control over licensing of members 
and for exclusive jurisdiction over certain areas of practice.  
The accounting profession, in particular, deserves special mention, as there is an added layer 
of complexity vis-à-vis the issue of moral hazard that is unique to the accounting profession. 
As Lindblom and Ruland (1997, p. 573) commented: 
Professionalism in the context of accounting is dissimilar to that of the legal or medical 
setting because of the disparate nature of the professional obligation. While there is a 
profession-client relationship in accounting, because an inherent aspect of the practice 
of accounting involves disclosure to the public, the public assumes a role which is 
distinct from that of the client and which may be incompatible with that of the client. 
Professionalism, in accounting, then should be viewed in the context of a triad, 
consisting of the professional, the client, and the public (emphasis added).  
 
Therefore, it follows that, for the accounting profession, the issue of moral hazard not only 
exists between the accountant and the client, but perhaps more importantly, it also exists 
between the accountant and the public. In other words, the justification for self-regulation lies 
in the knowledge and expertise of members of the accounting profession in protecting both the 
client and the general public (Loeb 1984).  
At this point, it is important to appreciate that, from the perspective of the general public and 
the State, the power and privilege of self-regulation was afforded and delegated to the 
professions in recognition of and as a solution to the problem of moral hazard that exists 
between professionals and clients. There is thus an expectation that professional self-regulation 
will effectively address and resolve, or at the very least, control the resultant “peculiarly 
exploitative opportunities” (Goode 1957, p. 196, cited in Bédard 2001) on the part of 
professional members. 
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In response, the professions have taken up the task of self-regulation at the level of the 
professional bodies, with each professional body organizing and implementing its own system 
of self-regulation. It is thus within the context of this system of self-regulation at the level of 
the professional bodies that I now turn my attention to professional ethical codes. 
2.5 Nature of professional ethical codes 
Conceptually, professional ethical codes underpin and thus go hand-in-hand with the system 
of self-regulation that characterizes all professions. Professional ethical codes are often 
expressed in altruistic tones (Parker 1994) and are typically presented as the application of 
generally accepted social standards to particular spheres of conduct (Harris-Jenkins 1970, cited 
in Parker 1994). In fact, professional ethical codes are perhaps the most visible and explicit 
enunciations of professional norms by a profession (Frankel 1989) such that they “are the most 
concrete cultural form in which professions acknowledge their societal obligations” (Abbott 
1983, p. 856).  
Bayles (1986, p. 35) distinguished and categorized professional ethical codes into three distinct 
types according to their actual functions: (1) codes that serve to control the economics of the 
profession; (2) codes concerned with professional ethics; and (3) technical codes concerned 
with professional competence in the performance of tasks, with some professional ethical codes 
involving “mixtures of these functions or are on the borders of two of them.” Similarly, Frankel 
(1989, p. 111) identified three types of professional ethical codes: (a) the aspirational code that 
articulates the ideals to which professionals should strive; (b) the educational code that offers 
guidance in dealing with ethical problems; and   (c) the regulatory code in the form of detailed 
rules that govern professional conduct and adjudicate grievances, while, at the same time, 
acknowledging that “although conceptually distinct, in reality any single code of professional 
ethics may combine features of these three types”.    
 
2.6 Sociological perspectives of professional ethical codes 
While the nature of professional ethical codes is rather obvious and straightforward, the same 
cannot be said of its function and purpose. In fact, over the years, such a wide variety of 
competing approaches were proposed to explain why professional ethical codes exist that 
Lindblom and Ruland (1997, p. 574) concluded “the very reason for the existence of such 
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[professional ethical] codes is subject to [much] debate”. In his detailed analysis of professional 
ethical codes, Abbott (1983, p. 863) explained the reason why this is the case: 
Since most theorists analyze professional ethics within general discussions of 
professional evolution, theories of professional ethics divide along the lines dividing 
those general discussions.  
 
In his analysis of professional ethical codes, Abbott (1983) began by identifying and describing 
two major competing approaches - the ‘functionalist’ and ‘monopolist’ perspectives of 
professional ethical codes – that are, in turn, derived from the functionalist and critical-theorist 
perspectives of professions respectively. He then proposed a third approach – the ‘status’ 
perspective of professional ethical codes - and concluded that all three approaches are not 
mutually exclusive in that “a phenomenon like professional ethics is invariably involved in 
maintaining several effects at once” (Abbott 1983, p. 872). 
 
2.6.1 Functionalist perspective 
The functionalist or ‘control of expertise’ perspective of professional ethical codes represents 
the traditional view of the role and function of professional ethical codes. It perceives 
“professional ethics as being required by the emerging fiduciary character of professional 
services” (Abbott 1983, p. 863), with the functionalists interpreting “professional ethics as 
deriving ultimately from the inherent social danger of uncontrolled expertise” (Abbott 1983, p. 
864). In other words: 
To the functionalist, the professional [ethical] code is the institutionalized manifestation 
of the ‘service ideal’ and colleague control; by means of the code, the practitioners and 
the profession police themselves, and this self-policing is an essential clause in the 
‘bargain’ struck between profession and society (Newton 1982, p. 34). 
In fact, Frankel (1989, p. 110) argued that, “for the professions, the collectivization of 
appropriate professional norms and their transmission to individual practitioners [in the form 
of professional ethical codes] are the cornerstones of the trust relationship between individual 
practitioners and clients (Wolfson, Trebilock & Tuohy 1980, cited in Frankel 1989).  
At this point, it should be evident that what this statement refers to is this same issue of moral 
hazard that I have discussed in the preceding section. This is confirmed by Beach’s (1984,                  
p. 312) comment that: 
As it is difficult at best for the average person to adequately assess the quality of service 
rendered by an accountant, it seems appropriate that a code exist to give reassurances 
of fair and honest treatment. 
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Accordingly, from the functionalist perspective, the primary purpose of professional ethical 
codes is to “foster and support professionals acting in the interests of their clients or the public” 
(Bayles 1986, p. 30) by serving as major components of control mechanisms (Bédard 2001) 
devised to address and control the problem of moral hazard in the profession-client 
relationship. Specifically: 
… [professional] ethical codes are promulgated with the manifest objective of 
facilitating professional self-control as well as expressing and strengthening the 
community orientation of profession members (Parker 1994, p. 508) … [with] the 
formal disciplinary process held out as being a potent force towards ensuring members’ 
conformity with ethical codes and rules (Parker 1994, p. 516). 
 
As such, in the eyes of the functionalists, professional ethical codes serve as the vehicle with 
which the profession assures the public, clients and colleagues that members are competent, 
have integrity, and that the profession intends to maintain and enforce high standards (Ward et 
al. 1993). Within this paradigm, professional ethical codes embody the collective conscience 
of a profession and bear testimony to the professional group’s recognition of its moral 
dimension (Frankel 1989). It is little wonder then that professional ethical codes generally 
require members to maintain a higher standard of conduct than that called for by law (Backof 
& Martin 1991).  
Black (1981, p. 151) summarized Durkheim’s (1957) argument that changes in the social 
structure have driven the need for and reliance on ethical codes by professional associations:  
Whereas society had previously been bound together by a shared moral order based 
upon a common lifestyle, this order had disintegrated as a result of the increasing 
division of labour; [hence] the only way in which moral order can now be fostered in 
economic life is through guilds or professional associations which exercise control over 
their members (Durkheim 1957, cited in Black 1981).  
 
As a result, professional ethical codes are depicted as a means to assist the profession in its 
ongoing relationship with society as well as its desire for self-regulation (Cohen & Pant 1991) 
by addressing the tension between the profession’s pursuit of autonomy and the public’s 
demand for accountability (Frankel 1989). As Loeb (1984) explained: 
An occupation that has been granted self-governance and a monopoly in a particular 
area has to be concerned that public policy makers do not become dissatisfied with the 
independent status of the profession. Thus, through a code of ethics, a profession 
governs the professional behaviour of its members and attempts to constantly reassure 
public policy makers that the profession’s independent status is in the best interest of 
the society (Goode 1957, cited in Loeb 1984, p. 1).  
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Therefore, in this way, “the public interest is said to be served both by the professional 
regulation of its members’ behaviour and by protecting the public from unscrupulous and 
unqualified practitioners” (Preston et al. 1995, p. 508).  
In summary, the functionalist perspective of professional ethical codes can be viewed as a 
natural extension of the functionalist perspective of professions in that professional ethical 
codes “provide a moral foundation for the profession [as well as] serve as a basis for self-
policing of the profession” (Lindblom & Ruland 1997, p. 575), with its claim of social benefit 
forming the functional foundation and the ultimate justification for its professional authority 
(Abbott 1983).  
 
2.6.2 Monopolist perspective 
Unlike the functionalist interpretation, the monopolist perspective of professional ethical codes 
perceives the intent and function of professional ethical codes as having more to do with 
aggrandizement rather than professional control (Citron 2003). In other words, the monopolists 
focus on the anticompetitive functions of professional ethical codes and “attribute to 
professional ethics the function, not of control, but of aggrandizement” (Abbott 1983, p. 864). 
As such, in the eyes of the monopolists: 
[Professional ethical] codes are just part of the professional “ideology”, a carefully 
polished image to win elite support, designed for public relations and justification for 
the status and prestige which professions assume vis-à-vis more lowly occupations, 
devices used to dupe both the government and the public into thinking that the 
occupation is a worthy recipient of professionalism’s autonomy and prestige (Newton 
1982, pp. 34-35).   
 
Accordingly, with the monopolist interpretation, the primary purpose of professional ethical 
codes is not to control the “peculiarly exploitative opportunities” (Goode 1957, p. 196, cited in 
Bédard 2001) resulting from the asymmetry of expertise, but rather to serve as public relations 
devices intended “to legitimize self-serving arrangements in the name of professionalism” 
(Lindblom & Ruland 1997, p. 575). As Parker (1994, p. 516) explained: 
[T]he appropriate machinery for ensuring ethical codes are respected is largely absent 
… [which is thus seen as a manifestation of his] doubts [as to the] professions’ sincerity 
and genuine interest in rigorously complying with their codes of ethics. Rather, he sees 
the ethical codes and any associated disciplinary processes as structures designed to 
legitimize the autonomy of professions and ensure their independence from outside 
scrutiny and control. 
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Similarly, this notion of professional ethical codes serving as public relations devices is also 
echoed by Mitchell et al. (1994, p. 48) who noted that: 
Ethical statements and disciplinary apparati … are not what they claim to be …  
[Rather] they are little more than a smokescreen, or fig-leaf, for the pursuit and 
protection of sectional interests … [In fact,] the claims to act ethically and to support 
such claims with a disciplinary apparatus form an integral part of a strategy motivated 
by the desire to raise and secure the value of [professional] accounting labour.   
As such, within this paradigm, professional ethical codes represent a major and important 
component of the public relations effort by the profession to convince the public and the State 
that accountants possess integrity and are trustworthy, thus establishing its legitimacy and 
maintaining its privileges (Neu 1991; Preston et al. 1995). As Parker (1994, p. 508) noted, 
“[p]rofessional ideology, as embodied in the code of ethics, is converted into a form of social 
power that can be wielded in the interests of the profession and to the benefit or detriment of 
the public interest”. Clearly, it is evident that: 
… the general version of this monopoly theory finds the functional cause of 
[professional] ethics code in their deliberate and latent economic effects (Abbott 1983, 
p. 864) (emphasis added).      
In summary, the monopolist perspective of professional ethical codes can be viewed as a 
natural extension of the critical-theorist perspective of professions in that professional ethical 
codes “promote the self-interest of the profession … [as well as] serve as public relation tools” 
(Lindblom & Ruland 1997, p. 575), with its claim for social legitimacy enabling the collective 
upward mobility of its members (Abbott 1983). 
2.6.3 Status perspective 
The status perspective of professional ethical codes, as proposed by Abbott (1983), perceives 
professional ethical codes as determining both extra-professional and intra-professional status 
concurrently. It is derived from the connection or relationship that is said to exist between 
professional ethical codes and social status. As Abbott (1983) explained: 
Ethical compliance is a particular type of compliance with social rule. [Since] [s]tatus 
is position in some socially-generated ranking … claims of superior ethicality, as claims 
of superior compliance with socially-generated rules, are essentially claims of superior 
status or honour (Abbott 1983, p. 865) 
In competitive status systems, ethics codes are universally distributed because the 
claims of service they contain are claims to high social status. Service confers status 
because through it, a group claims corporate necessity or even irreplaceability within 
society (Abbott 1983, p. 866) 
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If service claims assert status by asserting functional importance or necessity, claims of 
disinterested service augment this assertion by purifying it of ulterior goals. They 
remove the ambiguity of motive inherent in service for profit or personal gain (Abbott 
(1983, p. 867) (emphasis added).  
Of course, this ‘ambiguity of motive’ that Abbott (1983) refers to is the same issue of moral 
hazard in the professional-client relationship that I have discussed previously. Next, he took on 
a monopolist tone and perspective in explaining that:  
The corporate nature of service claims implies two things: First, it implies that the 
group is the unit of extraprofessional status – individuals receive that status only by 
virtue of membership. Second, it implies that the corporate group itself must take 
control of individuals within it – it must make the claims good. In contexts where 
occupational groups are in competition for status, both of these conclusions imply that 
the group requires sharp boundaries in order to deny its status to outsiders and to avoid 
the responsibility for their failures … The charlatans provide the foil necessary to 
internal professional unity. Where the two groups could not be differentiated by actual 
degree of service, ‘ethical’ professionals could at least set themselves apart by 
proclaiming economic disinterest (Abbott 1983, p. 868) (emphasis in original). 
At the same time, in the absence of bureaucratic controls [imposed by the State] ... the 
need to make good the service claims requires some kind of internal mechanisms of 
control. These internal mechanisms are of three types – entry controls, formal 
behavioural controls (the formal rules in ethics codes), and everyday informal controls 
(Abbott 1983, p. 868). 
In other words, from Abbott’s (1983) status perspective, professional ethical codes, by way of 
their claims of disinterested service, essentially act as a profession’s claims of high social 
status, which, in turn, enhances its professional ideology and elitist image as part of the 
profession’s calculated effort aimed at aggrandizing the profession, establishing its social 
legitimacy, and ultimately maintaining its power and privileges. It is in this way that 
professional ethical codes play a central role in determining both the extra-professional status 
of the profession as well as the intra-professional status of its members concurrently.                    
As Abbott (1983) explained: 
By offering explicit guarantees of professional behaviour, the new controls placed an 
intermediary between the individual professional and the general service claims of the 
profession … The group as a whole explicitly claimed status for its disinterested 
service. But its members claimed extraprofessional status explicitly, through their 
membership in the group. This membership was underlined and celebrated by 
allegiance to professional controls … The preeminence of colleague relations in ethics 
codes thus reflects the function of the codes in asserting the solidarity of members [in 
their claim for extraprofessional status] (Abbott 1983, p. 869). 
If the colleague obligations of ethics codes serve principally to affirm membership and 
solidarity, then violators impugn the group itself and [therefore] must take a lower rank 
within it, [thereby adversely affecting their intraprofessional status] (Abbott 1983,          
p. 871). 
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Therefore, it is apparent that the status perspective of professional ethical codes builds on and 
extends the monopolist perspective of professional ethical codes by detailing how professional 
ethical codes play a crucial role in determining both the extra-professional status of the 
profession as well as the intra-professional status of its members concurrently. As Abbott 
(1983, p. 872) aptly stated: 
Professional ethics thus helps determine extra- and intra-professional status by 
measuring, in effect, the purity of motives – the motives of profession towards society 
and of professional toward profession. It defines the relation of the profession to society 
as being important without expectation of undue return. It defines the relation of 
individual to profession as one of allegiance and collegiality. 
 
In summary, within the context of the sociological literature, the role and function of 
professional ethical codes is determined by either the ‘functionalist perspective’ or the 
‘monopolist and status perspectives’, which are, in turn, underpinned by the ‘functionalist 
perspective of professions’ and the ‘critical-theorist perspective of professions’ respectively 
(see Figure 2.1).  
2.7 Public and private interest roles of professional ethical codes 
Within the context of the accounting literature on professional ethical codes, however, the role 
and function of professional ethical codes is perceived as either protection of the ‘public 
interest’ or protection of the ‘private interest’. For example, Loeb (1971, 1972) envisioned the 
professional accountant as having obligations to three distinct groups: (1) obligations to one’s 
clients; (2) obligations to one’s colleagues; and (3) obligations to the public (or society).  
In his journal article tracing the development of ethical pronouncements by the early 
professional accounting bodies in Australia, Parker (1987) extended this concept further and 
conceptualized all ethical pronouncements as primarily focused upon either protecting the 
profession or protecting society. Parker (1987, p. 129) defined ‘protection of the profession’ 
and ‘protection of society’ as follows: 
Protection of the profession … includes ethical pronouncements which attempt to avert 
potential threats to the profession’s reputation and market, to counter any potential 
infringements upon its scope of services by non-members, and to avoid any potentially 
destructive internal competition within the profession for resources and markets.  
Protection of society … includes ethical pronouncements which attempt to prevent 
manipulations, incompetence, inefficiency, fraud, or other actions by members of a 
professional accounting body that may prove harmful to clients or the business 
community in general (emphasis added). 
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In his follow-up journal article on professional accounting ethics, Parker (1994) further refined 
this concept by adopting the terms ‘public interest’ and ‘private interest’ to depict the 
contrasting and potentially conflicting roles of professional ethical codes. It is to this concept 
vis-à-vis the public interest versus private interest roles of professional ethical codes that I shall 
now turn my attention to.   
 
2.7.1 Definition of public interest 
The public interest is defined by the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 
(APESB)1 as “the collective well-being of the community of people and institutions that the 
members serve” (APESB 2013, p. 2). The accounting profession’s ‘public’ includes clients, 
credit grantors, governments, employers, employees, investors, the business and financial 
community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of members to assist in the 
maintenance of the orderly functioning of commerce (APESB 2013; Davenport & Dellaportas 
2009). Within the context of the accounting profession, the public interest can be generally 
defined as “the collective well-being of people and institutions the profession serves and to 
protect the economic interests of third parties by facilitating an efficient and effective economic 
decision-making process through the provision of relevant and reliable economic data” 
(Dellaportas & Davenport 2008, p. 1093). 
Since the accounting profession’s ‘public’ comprises multiple stakeholders, the “public interest 
is rarely a homogenous set of ideals and there may well be competing interests” (Kaidonis 
2008, p. 4). As such, the public interest can be more accurately thought of as “an amalgam of 
many competing views” (Kaidonis 2008, p. 2) derived from individuals, groups, and even 
corporations. As Dellaportas and Davenport (2008, p. 1088) noted: 
The definition of the public interest emphasizes an interest higher than the interest of 
any individual stakeholder extending members’ responsibility beyond the needs of an 
individual client or employer. Consequently, the obligation to serve the public interest 
is not to any particular group but to all stakeholders. This is a far-reaching definition 
which ostensibly includes all parties to which the member owes a duty of care, even in 
the absence of a direct contractual relationship. 
 
                                                          
1  Within the context of Australia, the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB)  
    is responsible for developing and reviewing the appropriate ethical and behavioural standards  
    integral to the Australian accounting profession. The ethical standards applicable to the Australian  
    accounting profession is known as the APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants.  
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Similarly, Parker (1994, p. 509) defined public interest as: 
… both a manifest and latent motivation of ethical codes to protect the economic 
interests of professional members’ clients and of third parties who place reliance on the 
pronouncements and advice delivered by both the professional body and its members. 
Those third parties may include corporate shareholders (or intending shareholders), 
borrowers and lenders, regulators, government, social interest groups, or any other 
member of the public. 
Therefore, it is apparent that Parker’s (1994) definition of public interest is in keeping with his 
earlier conceptualization of professional ethical codes focusing primarily upon ‘protection of 
society’ (Parker 1987), which is, in turn, congruent with the functionalist perspective that 
professional ethical codes serve as control mechanisms aimed at addressing the tension 
between the accounting profession’s pursuit of autonomy and the society’s demand for 
accountability.  
Accordingly, as Figure 2.1 demonstrates, the public interest role of professional ethical codes 
can be considered as a derivative of the functionalist perspective of professional ethical codes 
that is, in turn, underpinned by the functionalist perspective of professions whose ultimate 
objective is the protection of society. 
 
2.7.2 Definition of private interest 
The private interest can be defined as “interests pursued in the absence of consideration to 
others” (Cassinelli 1958, p. 57, cited in Dellaportas & Davenport 2008). Specifically, Parker 
(1994, p. 509) defined private interest as: 
… the latent motivation of ethical codes to protect the interests of the professional 
accounting body corporate and its individual members. Those interests include the 
professional body’s social status, political power, and influence over economic activity 
and business activity. They also include the social standing and income-generating 
capacity of the members.  
 
Therefore, it is apparent that Parker’s (1994) definition of private interest is in keeping with 
his earlier conceptualization of professional ethical codes focusing primarily upon ‘protection 
of the profession’ (Parker 1987), which is, in turn, congruent with the monopolist and status 
perspectives that professional ethical codes serve as public relations devices aimed at 
legitimizing the accounting profession’s self-serving arrangements in the name of 
professionalism.  
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Accordingly, as Figure 2.1 demonstrates, the private interest role of professional ethical codes 
can be considered as a derivative of the monopolist and status perspectives of professional 
ethical codes that is, in turn, underpinned by the critical-theorist perspective of professions 
whose ultimate objective is the protection of the profession itself.  
 
       
                  PROFESSIONAL ETHICAL CODES  
       
   Public interest role versus Private  interest role  
       
 Objective/   Protection of   Protection of   
 rationale:  society  profession  
       
 Derived  Functionalist perspective  Monopolist & status perspectives  
 from:  of professional ethical codes  of professional ethical codes  
       
 Underpinned   Functionalist perspective  Critical-theorist perspective  
 by:  of professions  of professions  
       
Figure 2.1: The public interest versus private interest roles of professional ethical codes.  
 
2.7.3 Parker’s private interest model of professional accounting ethics 
Building on the monopolist and status perspectives of professional ethical codes underpinned 
by the critical-theorist perspective of professions, Parker (1994) conceptualized five 
interrelated roles that professional ethical codes fulfil in serving the private interest of the 
accounting profession: (1) professional insulation; (2) interference minimization; (3) self-
control; (4) professional authority; and (5) socio-economic status preservation. Parker (1994) 
then linked these five interrelated roles together to form his proposed ‘private interest model 
of professional accounting ethics’ as depicted in Figure 2.2. 
In the model, professional insulation is identified as the primary private interest role served by 
professional ethical codes whereby the accounting profession is insulated from inspection and 
assessment by external parties through its creation of ‘professional mystique’, which requires 
“the work to be seen as esoteric, incomprehensible and consisting of doing things that ordinary 
mortals cannot do” (Burns & Haga 1977, cited in Parker 1994, p. 510). Such mystique has the 
effect of “elevating the [accounting] profession above the apparent ability of outsiders to 
scrutinize, understand or evaluate its activities” (Parker 1994, p. 514), thereby rendering 
professional insulation possible.  
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Figure 2.2:  Parker’s (1994) private interest model of professional accounting ethics.  
                      Source: Parker (1994, p. 514). 
 
Professional insulation, in turn, allows the accounting profession to operate with minimum 
outside interference (interference minimization) and grants the accounting profession the 
freedom to control its own activities and members (self-control) (Parker 1994). As such, the 
model depicts professional insulation as facilitating both interference minimization and self-
control but not vice versa (Canning & O’Dwyer 2003). Interference minimization and self-
control, however, are seen to be interrelated in that “self-control can only exist where 
interference by outside parties in the [accounting] profession’s activities is minimized and 
interference minimization will only be granted where the profession can demonstrate the 
adequate operation of self-control (Canning & O’Dwyer 2003, p. 163). The model depicts the 
roles of professional insulation, interference minimization and self-control as targeting the 
maintenance of professional authority, which Parker (1994, p. 512) defined in terms of the 
accounting profession’s ability “to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over the technical knowledge 
base and public trust and approbation with respect to its claimed service ideals”. As such, “the 
roles of professional insulation, interference minimization and self-control are seen to be 
subordinate and contributory to professional authority” (Canning & O’Dwyer 2003, p. 163), 
with the consequent presumption that professional authority cannot be attained without first 
fulfilling the roles of professional insulation, interference minimization and self-control 
(Canning & O’Dwyer 2003).  
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The underlying intention of maintaining professional authority is to preserve the accounting 
profession’s socio-economic status “in terms of its social legitimacy and perceived social 
standing of the profession and the level of economic rewards achievable by members” (Parker 
1994, p. 515). Equally, however, “socio-economic status preservation is seen to reinforce the 
public’s perception of the authority of the [accounting] profession (Canning & O’Dwyer 2003, 
p. 163) such that both professional authority and socio-economic status preservation are 
perceived to be “mutually reinforcing and together serve as the focal private interest roles of 
professional accounting body ethical codes” (Parker 1994, p. 515). 
 
In summary, within the context of the accounting literature on professional ethical codes, 
professional ethical codes are perceived as either fulfilling a ‘public interest’ role or a ‘private 
interest’ role, with the definition of each role derived from the ‘functionalist perspective of 
professional ethical codes’ and the ‘monopolist and status perspectives of professional ethical 
codes’ respectively (see Figure 2.1). Furthermore, Parker’s (1994) ‘private interest model of 
professional accounting ethics’ describes how professional ethical codes serve to ultimately 
protect the private interest of the accounting profession in terms of five interrelated roles:                  
(1) professional insulation; (2) interference minimization; (3) self-control; (4) professional 
authority; and (5) socio-economic status preservation (see Figure 2.2). 
 
2.8 Accounting research on professional ethical codes 
In order to gain an understanding and appreciation of where this research thesis is situated 
within the vast body of literature, it is necessary to provide an overview of prior research studies 
that have investigated and examined the role and function of professional ethical codes within 
the context of the accounting profession (see Figure 2.3 for an overview of the accounting 
literature pertaining to professional ethical codes).  
As Figure 2.3 demonstrates, prior accounting research on professional ethical codes have 
focused exclusively on the accounting professions in various developed countries, specifically 
Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, United Kingdom and United States of America, and can be 
broadly divided into two main branches: (1) research on the development of professional 
ethical codes; and (2)  research on the enforcement of professional ethical codes.  
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Figure 2.3: An overview of the accounting literature on professional ethical codes. 
With this in mind, I shall now turn my attention to reviewing and describing some of the 
important research studies that have examined the development and enforcement of 
professional ethical codes in the accounting profession. For ease and convenience, I have 
summarized the key findings and the main conclusions of these research studies according to 
their respective national contexts and presented them below in alphabetical order. 
2.8.1 Development of professional ethical codes 
Over the years, there have been several research studies that have sought to investigate and 
examine the historical development of professional ethical codes in the accounting profession. 
Taken together, the collective findings from these research studies allow for the construction 
of a more complete and detailed picture of the actual historical circumstances that surround the 
origin and subsequent evolution of professional ethical codes, which, in turn, enhances our 
understanding and appreciation of the true nature and intended purpose of ethical codes as they 
pertain to the accounting profession. 
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Australia 
Parker (1987) traced the development of ethical pronouncements (comprising ethical codes, 
charters, by-laws, memoranda and articles of association as well as relevant published papers) 
by the early professional accounting bodies in Australia from 1885 to 1983 and identified the 
apparent factors that influenced their development over time as well as the general rationale 
that underpinned the nature and occurrence of these pronouncements. He found evidence 
suggesting that the issue of advertising was a significant contributor to the impetus for the 
development of ethical codes in the Australian accounting profession, which stemmed from 
“accountants’ perceptions of competitive threats to their professional survival and their 
dilemma concerning their own attitude to advertising” (Parker 1987, p. 136). From the results 
of his historical analysis, Parker (1987, p. 136) concluded that “protection of the profession 
may have been a primary rationale underpinning many ethical issues and that such issues 
attained acceptance or publicity earlier than many issues concerned with protecting society … 
[thus suggesting that] self-protection through ethical pronouncements presented itself as a 
legitimate strategy to a profession seeking to ensure its long-term survival”.   
Canada 
Neu and Saleem (1996) investigated the emergence of written ethical codes in Canada by 
documenting the trajectory of the ethical code for the largest professional accounting body in 
Canada - the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario (ICAO) - from its incorporation in 
1883. They discovered that, over time, several shifts had occurred in how the written ethical 
code spoke of, and conceptualized professional ethics such that “the initial code and the 
subsequent revisions to it appear to be responses to professional crises confronting the ICAO 
at different junctures in time” (Neu & Saleem 1996, p. 66). In fact, their historical analysis 
identified and highlighted four different aspects of the ideological effect of ICAO’s ethical 
codes: 
First, it illustrates the ways in which ethical codes universalize the public accountant, 
thereby masking tensions and stratification within the profession itself. Second, it also 
makes visible how the mimicry of the ethical codes of high status and visible referent 
professions has the effect of supporting claims to professional status. Third, the analysis 
highlights how ethical codes … serve to distract attention from not only the financial 
scandals but also the underlying ‘business of accounting’ that encourages practitioners 
to push the bounds of acceptable behaviour … Finally, the analysis makes visible the 
effacement of history and the ways in which revisions to the ethical code attempt to 
distract our attention from both current and previous financial scandals (Neu & Saleem 
1996, p. 66).    
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As a result, Neu and Saleem (1996, p. 65) concluded that “the ideological effect of ethical 
codes has been to provide [the Canadian accounting profession with] compelling reasons for 
claims to professional status and privilege”.  
United Kingdom 
Sikka and Willmott (1995) explored the establishment, expansion and defence of the 
jurisdiction of the accounting profession in the United Kingdom (UK) by examining three case 
studies that focused on the UK accounting profession’s response to three major challenges 
relating to events in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s that had threatened to “damage its 
credibility and imperil control of [its] lucrative jurisdictions” (Sikka & Willmott 1995, p. 550). 
Their analysis of the three case studies revealed evidence suggesting that:  
Reforming the ethical guidelines offered the [UK accounting] profession a way of 
signalling their responsiveness to criticisms without incurring any significant costs or 
exposing auditing regulation to more sustained scrutiny (Sikka & Willmott 1995,                      
p. 561). 
As a result, Sikka and Willmott (1995, p. 561) concluded that the underlying intent of the UK 
accounting profession in revising or reforming their ethical codes was to serve merely as a 
“proven mechanism for diffusing criticisms, restoring the aura of independence and 
professionalism and, in this way, protecting the [UK accounting] profession’s jurisdiction”.  
 
Using the historical biographies of two villainous accounting practitioners, Walker (1996) 
analysed the circumstances that resulted in the formulation of a disciplinary code by the Society 
of Accountants in Edinburgh (SAE) in 1883. He uncovered evidence suggesting that the rules 
for member expulsion devised by the SAE during the 1880s “were largely concerned with 
protecting their members from the adverse status consequences of publicised cases of 
misconduct” (Walker 1996, p. 28). As Walker (1996, p. 29) explained: 
When a formal statement on disciplinary matters was later devised by the SAE, it was 
a defensive mechanism necessitated by the publicised activities of a member whose 
criminal behaviour conflicted with the contemporary perception of the professional 
ideal. In this sense, Parker’s (1994) assertion that the propagation of codes is primarily 
motivated by the protection of the accounting profession’s self-interest is supported 
(emphasis added). 
A similar emphasis on professional insulation was also discovered in the English and Scottish 
accounting professions during the 1890s, thus confirming “the particular relevance within 
Parker’s (1994) ‘private interest model’ of the professional insulation and status preservation 
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functions of organisational pronouncements” (Walker 1996, p. 30). His analysis also revealed 
the emblematic or symbolic nature of disciplinary codes in that the SAE’s regulation for the 
expulsion of members “stood as a symbol to the public that the association would not tolerate 
unbecoming and discreditable behaviour (Walker 1996, p. 30).  
Finally, a comparison between the SAE’s contrasting responses to the actions of both 
practitioners led Walker (1996, p. 30) to conclude that there was strong evidence of ‘offence 
visibility’ in that “organisational responses were positively correlated to the volume of adverse 
publicity which resulted from the activities of dishonourable practitioners”. However, as 
Walker (1996, p. 30) noted, “[i]n this instance, the conspicuousness of the offence was not a 
determinant of the punishment meted out to the individual miscreant … [but] rather, it 
determined the formulation of the behavioural standard by which misconduct would be 
subsequently judged”. 
United States of America 
Lee (1995) reviewed the early histories of the accounting professions in both the United 
Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (US) and discovered a “phenomenon of 
economic self-interest driving the professionalization process in the name of a public interest” 
(Lee 1995, p. 55) that was common to both nations. Specifically, his analysis of the histories 
of standard-setting in both the UK and US accounting professions yielded evidence suggesting 
that professional ethical codes were, in effect, part of a strategy involving the use of explicit 
professional signals to provide a public interest face to what is essentially a process driven by 
private economic interests (Lee 1995). As Lee (1995, p. 59) explained:  
What the histories of UK and US standard-setting suggest is a delicate process, 
managed by the professional accountancy bodies, of balancing economic self-interest 
against public interest … [with] professional accountants … [having] persistently 
attempted to retain control over standards and standard-setting … by maintaining a 
dialogue with the agents of the state sufficient to give comfort to the latter that standards 
can be prescribed by accountants in the public interest.   
As a result, Lee (1995, p. 64) concluded that: 
The history of professional accountancy … is an economic text with a public interest 
cover. Originally written in the mid nineteenth century, it has been reworded on 
numerous occasions without changing the underlying emphasis. The fundamental 
influence driving professionalization throughout its entire history has been economics. 
Professional accountants came together to provide an institutional structure to protect a 
threatened economic monopoly. The process has repeated over several decades, with 
the institutional structure elaborated to maintain and expand service monopolies. 
Professional rivals were defeated or eventually absorbed by merger, and successful and 
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unsuccessful attempts were made to obtain a state monopoly by registration. A strategy 
of using explicit signals of professionalism was practised, and the range of services 
increased. The size of the profession grew, accompanied by a concentration of practice 
units and institutional organizations.  
 
Preston et al. (1995) sought to locate ethical codes in their societal context by comparing the 
contents of the accounting profession’s first set of written ethical codes that emerged in 1905 
with that of the revised Code of Professional Conduct introduced in 1988 in the United States 
of America (US). They demonstrated that the changes in the content and discourses 
surrounding each set of ethical codes were, in fact, both a translation of the challenges to the 
legitimacy of the US accounting profession as well as a representation of the wider 
transformation of US society. As Preston et al. (1995, p. 510) explained:   
The promulgation of professional codes of ethics is an activity intended to confer 
legitimacy upon the professional body. The success of legitimation activities rests upon 
the acceptance of the professions’ exclusive expertise by powerful institutional 
bodies … perhaps most importantly, the state and its agencies … Moreover, it is clear 
that the content of the accountants’ codes of ethics and the discourses surrounding them 
not only have been shaped by, but also have been used in attempts to shape, the 
profession’s relationship with powerful institutions [that are instrumental in conferring 
legitimacy upon the profession]. 
 
This notion that ethical codes act “as symbolic systems used to legitimize accountants’ claims 
to professional status and privilege” (Preston et al. 1995, p. 510) is further reinforced by Preston 
et al.’s (1995) analysis of the turbulent circumstances surrounding the 1988 introduction of the 
Code of Professional Conduct in the US. In contrast to the early ethical codes at the beginning 
of the twentieth century that focused exclusively on “the ten commandments, right and wrong, 
the virtues of courage, loyalty, integrity, duty, responsibility and the professional state of mind” 
(Preston et al. 1995, p. 536), the 1988 Code of Professional Conduct was predominantly rule-
based, with an “increasing specificity of rules” (Preston et al. 1995, p. 526) to such an extent 
that: 
… we see in 1988 a story of the professional accountant as one who, follows the rules 
of the code; as a technically competent expert in his or her understanding and 
application of the escalating number of standards; and as committed to projecting the 
image of quality and excellence (Preston et al. 1995, p. 535). 
 
They argued that this marked shift in the contents and focus of the 1988 Code of Professional 
Conduct was a reflection of both the phenomenon where “legitimation through character was 
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replaced by the legitimacy of technique” (Preston at al. 1995, p. 522) as well as the wider 
transformation of US society. As a result, Preston et al. (1995, p. 536) concluded that: 
The transformations in the code of ethics and the discourse surrounding it, therefore, 
are not merely a reflection of opportunistic response to the wider changes in U.S. 
culture. As a profession of some size and visibility, changes in the way it seeks to 
legitimize itself become, in part, constitutive of, or reproduce and reinforce, the wider 
society. 
 
In summary, prior research on the development of professional ethical codes suggests that 
professional ethical codes act as symbolic systems aimed at reinforcing and legitimizing the 
accounting profession’s claims to professional status and economic privileges. This is 
supported by prior research findings that: (a) the inception and propagation of professional 
ethical codes appears to have been primarily motivated by the protection of the private interest 
of the accounting profession (e.g. Parker 1987; Lee 1995; Walker 1996); and (b) subsequent 
changes and revisions to professional ethical codes appear to have been responses to financial 
scandals and professional crises that directly challenged the legitimacy of the accounting 
profession (e.g. Preston et al. 1995; Sikka & Willmott 1995; Neu & Saleem 1996).  
 
 
2.8.2 Enforcement of professional ethical codes  
As with the case for the development of professional ethical codes, the degree or extent to 
which disciplinary procedures are prescribed and acted upon as well as the manner of their 
actual execution provides valuable insight into the public and private interest roles of 
professional ethical codes as it allows us to infer and deduce the latent rationale as well as the 
underlying motivation that underpins the accounting profession’s ethical codes and the 
disciplinary processes that purportedly enforce them. In fact, over the years, there have been 
several research studies that have sought to examine the enforcement of professional ethical 
codes by way of the disciplinary processes conducted at the level of the respective professional 
accounting bodies.  
Taken together, the collective findings from these research studies provide a rare glimpse into 
the inner workings of the accounting profession’s disciplinary processes, which, in turn, 
provides the means by which to objectively evaluate the relative merit and overall credibility 
of the functionalist (or public interest) versus the critical-theorist (or private interest) 
perspectives with respect to the role and function of professional ethical codes within the 
context of the accounting profession. 
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Australia 
Parker (1994) sought to provide empirical evidence for his proposed model [see section on 
Parker’s private interest model of professional accounting ethics] by reviewing the history of 
disciplinary actions undertaken by the two major Australian accounting bodies at the time –  
(1) the Australian Society of Accountants (ASA)2 from 1961 to 1987; and (2) the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA)3 from 1974 to 1987.  
Using Australian disciplinary case statistics up to 1987, Parker (1994) demonstrated the private 
interest roles that professional ethical codes and the accompanying disciplinary process serve 
in securing the autonomy and authority of the accounting profession, and in ultimately 
safeguarding the economic rewards and social status enjoyed by its members. Specifically, his 
study revealed that almost half of the disciplinary cases involved suppression of the offending 
member’s name, thus providing evidence of the Australian accounting profession’s significant 
reluctance to adopt complete disclosure. As Parker (1994, p. 520) explained:   
It is arguable that such non-disclosure of identity may represent the impact of the 
private interest roles of socio-economic status preservation for the members involved 
and of interference minimization in terms of reducing the possibility of such members 
being targeted for investigation by other authorities. Where the offence is felt to be 
satisfactorily dealt with by the Disciplinary Committee, it may stop short of publicising 
the member’s name and consequently the member losing clients through a “tarnished” 
reputation, or being further investigated by outside parties. Both of these consequences 
might otherwise adversely impact on the profession’s public reputation. 
 
This lack of complete disclosure suggested an attempt by the Australian accounting profession 
to “insulate itself from outside observation and evaluation (professional insulation) through the 
exercising of some restrictions on disciplinary cases disclosure in an apparent attempt to strike 
a balance between disclosure levels that might cause a loss in public confidence and a fall in 
members’ morale as against levels that might build public confidence and strengthen members’ 
ethical consciences” (Parker 1994, p. 520). 
Additionally, as part of his analysis, Parker (1994) classified all 518 disciplinary offences into 
either ‘private interest offences’ (307 offences) or ‘public interest offences’ (211 offences) 
based on the nature of the underlying offence for each disciplinary case. He discovered that 
there was a predominance of private interest offences for the disciplinary cases prosecuted by 
both Australian professional accounting bodies, which led him to conclude that: 
                                                          
2  Now called CPA Australia. 
3  Now called Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ). 
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The … [private interest] role of members’ socio-economic status preservation is 
indicated by the predominance of private interest offences prosecuted by the Australian 
accounting profession … [which] also suggest a concern to maintain professional 
solidarity among members. The solidarity concern of the profession also appears to be 
indicated by the somewhat greater number of private interest offences (than public) that 
have been subject to the severest sanctions of suspension and exclusion from 
membership (emphasis added) (Parker 1994, pp. 520-521). 
 
Finally, Parker’s (1994) analysis of Australian disciplinary cases also revealed that reprimands 
and costs were the most frequently invoked disciplinary sanctions – comprising 45% of total 
sanctions - thus demonstrating “symptoms of the [accounting] profession being reluctant to 
impose financial penalties that will unduly harm members’ economic interest … [such that] for 
offences deemed to be less than ‘major’… the penalties are allocated with a view to members’ 
socio-economic status preservation” (Parker 1994, p. 521).  
As a result, based on these findings, Parker (1994, p. 508) described professional ethical codes 
as serving a dual and complex role in that “while encouraging a sense of social responsibility 
in the professional member, they also provide justification for professional self-interest”. 
Furthermore, he also described the operation of the Australian professional accounting bodies’ 
disciplinary processes as ‘disciplinary symbolism’ in that: 
At the manifest level, disciplinary processes and actions provide the means of 
supporting and enforcing members’ adherence to the profession’s ethical rules. At the 
latent level, the disciplinary processes and actions serve as a symbol whose main intent 
is to project an image of the accounting profession’s ethical attitudes, commitment and 
behaviour (Parker 1994, p. 516).   
Canada 
Bédard (2001) examined the public and private interest roles of the disciplinary process for a 
specific professional accounting body in Canada - the Québec’s Chartered Accountants’ 
association (OCAQ) – located in the Canadian province of Québec whose jurisdiction is 
characterized by a high level of State government and public involvement in both the 
organization and management of the professional bodies as well as the establishment and 
operation of their respective disciplinary processes. By examining all disciplinary cases 
published in the OCAQ newsletters and annual reports from 1974 to 2000, Bédard (2001, p. 
431) concluded that “[o]verall the results … suggest that both public and private interests play 
a role in the disciplinary process of the Québec’s Chartered Accountants’ association (OCAQ) 
but that the preponderance of the public interest depends on the degree of regulation and public 
involvement”. He explained why this is the case: 
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At the complaint and inquiry stages of the disciplinary process, where the level of 
regulation and public participation is lower ... [the results] indicate that private interest 
plays a preponderant role in the [Secretary’s] decision of whether or not to lodge a 
complaint or a charge. At the trial stage, where the level of regulation and public 
participation is higher … [the results] indicate that the public interest plays a 
preponderant role in the Disciplinary Committee’s decisions. The results regarding the 
public disclosure of the Committee’s decisions suggest, however, that when not 
explicitly required by regulations, concerns over potential damage to the profession and 
its members prevail over the protection of the public. On the whole, these results 
suggest that government regulations and public participation may restrain the role of 
private interest in the accounting profession’s self-regulatory system (emphasis added) 
(Bédard 2001, p. 431).   
 
Furthermore, Bédard’s (2001, p. 431) analysis also highlighted the key roles played by the 
complaint and inquiry stages of the OCAQ’s disciplinary process in “filtering the cases and 
protecting the public or private interests” where: 
… the ability to control the agenda may be more important than the power to influence 
the decision. Controlling the agenda can be achieved through a system that acts as 
institutional filters by preventing conflicts or events from becoming an issue and 
through people that act as individual filters preventing currently observable conflicts or 
events from becoming an issue. For the disciplinary process, the regulatory system in 
place is the institutional filter that may predispose the process toward public or private 
interests. In the Québec environment, the Syndic [i.e. OCAQ Secretary] is the 
individual filter of the issues that will be made public and for which a decision by the 
Disciplinary Committee is required (Bédard 2001, p. 431).   
 
In order to investigate how the accounting profession responds to increased public scrutiny, 
Mescall et al. (2017) compared reported member offences and disciplinary sanctions imposed 
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario (ICAO) on members for professional 
misconduct before and after the establishment of the Canadian Public Accountability Board 
(CPAB) in 2003. Using data retrieved from 403 disciplinary cases published by the ICAO from 
1984 to 2014, their analysis revealed that “disciplinary sanctions administered by the ICAO 
increased in regard to the severity of disciplinary sanctions, rehabilitation demands, and 
subsequent monitoring after increased public scrutiny of the Canadian accounting profession” 
following the establishment of the CPAB in 2003, with the severity of punishments increasing 
across both public interest and private interest offences (Mescall et al. 2017, p. 286). As they 
explained: 
First, we noted that disciplinary punishments and threats of even more severe 
punishments were greater in the post-CPAB era than in the pre-CPAB era. These 
punishments tended to be financial in nature, resulting in more frequent fines, of greater 
(constant dollar) amounts, and with added charges that would allow the profession to 
recover costs of investigating the misconduct. We found that this increase in 
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punishments was not more severe for violations of private interest codes than public 
interest codes, contrary to Parker’s private interest theory but consistent with Fisher et 
al.’s (2001) empirical results (Mescall et al. 2017, p. 304). 
 
However, while the severity of punishments for public interest and private interest offences in 
the post-CPAB era did not differ from the pre-CPAB era, there was evidence that “the 
profession has been increasingly using rehabilitation tactics to protect the public interest versus 
monitoring sanctions to protect the accounting profession’s private interest” (Mescall et al. 
2017, p. 305). Specifically, there was: 
… greater propensity in the post-CPAB era to recommend rehabilitation through 
continuing professional education for offenders of conduct codes aimed at protecting 
public interests. Violations of private interest codes were met more frequently in the 
post-CPAB era with additional subsequent monitoring by professional conduct 
committees (Mescall et al. 2017, pp. 304-305). 
Furthermore, Mescall et al. (2017, p. 286) also reported an increase in the extent of internal 
reporting, but with no corresponding increase in external reporting, which “is consistent with 
a latent motivation for the profession to emphasize protection of its private interest over that of 
the public interest”. As they explained: 
… disciplinary actions and outcomes were more likely in the post-CPAB era than in 
the pre-CPAB era to be reported in publications and outlets aimed internally within the 
profession. Reporting in externally targeted communications, such as newspapers, did 
not increase with greater public scrutiny during the post-CPAB era (Mescall et al. 2017, 
p. 304). 
France 
In order to investigate whether the enforcement of ethical codes by professional accounting 
bodies in a code law country4 is different from that of professional accounting bodies in Anglo-
American countries, Lesage et al. (2016) examined the disciplinary practices of statutory 
auditors in France. By analyzing 148 disciplinary decisions issued against statutory auditors by 
the French disciplinary bodies from 1989 to 2006, Lesage et al. (2016) found that, while the 
French disciplinary bodies issued a greater number of disciplinary sanctions for private interest 
offences than public interest offences (52 versus 37), higher rates of sanction were imposed for 
public interest offences than for private interest offences (84.1% versus 60.5%). As a result, 
                                                          
4  Unlike Anglo-American countries with regulatory regimes based on common law, code law 
   countries follow a codified system of rules heavily influenced by Roman law (Baïada-Hirèche &  
   Garmillis 2016). As a result, code law countries are said to possess a more bureaucratic form of  
   professional regulation that is characterized by a high level of State and public involvement in both  
   the organization and management of the professional bodies as well as the establishment and  
   operation of their respective disciplinary processes (Bédard 2001). 
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Lesage et al. (2016, p. 11) concluded that “in a code law country such as France, the auditing 
profession tends to defend both the public interest as well as its private interests”. As they 
explained: 
This result reveals the importance attached to violations of the public interest by the 
disciplinary bodies in France. Thus, the protection of the public interest does not appear 
to be a pretext to better defend the private interests of the profession (as argued by the 
neo-Weberian perspective). These results also demonstrate that the profession punishes 
violations related to the private interests of the profession. A purely functionalist 
perspective is therefore not supported in our study because the functionalist perspective 
rejects the idea that a profession wishes to protect its own interests. Thus, our results 
reflect the possibility that the auditing profession in a code law country like France has 
a dual role: to protect the public interest and also to protect the private interests of the 
profession (Lesage et al. 2016, pp. 28-29).  
    
Furthermore, the results of Lesage et al.’s (2016, p. 12) analysis also demonstrate and confirm 
the ‘visibility effect’, with more severe sanctions imposed for offences of greater visibility such 
that “the visibility of an offence leads to a higher level of sanction regardless of whether it is a 
public interest offence or a private interest offence”. Importantly, their analysis provides 
evidence of an interaction effect between the visibility of an offence and the public interest 
versus private interest nature of the offence such that:  
… public interest offences are more severely sanctioned than private interest offences 
only when they are not visible … When they are visible, public interest offences are 
less heavily sanctioned than private interest offences (Lesage et al. 2016, p. 30).     
 
Ireland 
In a series of four research studies, Canning and O’Dwyer (2001, 2003, 2006, 2008) engaged 
in a sustained scrutiny and critical examination of the operation of the disciplinary process for 
a specific professional accounting body in Ireland - the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Ireland (ICAI), with specific emphasis and focus on understanding and appreciating the 
motives and rationale underpinning the operation of the ICAI’s disciplinary process. 
 
Canning and O’Dwyer (2001) critically examined the public interest proclamations of the 
accounting profession with particular reference to the supposed role of disciplinary procedures 
in protecting the public interest. By reviewing all disciplinary cases reported by the ICAI from 
1990 to 1999, they sought to assess whether its disciplinary process was operating in the public 
interest in terms of its accountability, transparency, fairness and equity. From the results of 
their analysis, Canning and O’Dwyer (2001, p. 726) concluded that “the public interest and an 
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attendant concern for accountability and transparency is merely used as a convenient 
mechanism for avoiding criticism and state regulation by members of the profession” to such 
an extent that “without greater transparency and accountability in the reporting process, 
concerns remain that the private interest is smouldering the widely proclaimed concern for the 
public interest” (Canning & O’Dwyer 2001, p. 744). Furthermore, in their concluding remarks, 
Canning and O’Dwyer (2001, p. 744) also acknowledged the symbolic role fulfilled by the 
ICAI’s disciplinary process: 
[Although] the existence of a disciplinary process may demonstrate concern for 
complainants and symbolize a concern to encourage ethical attitudes among members 
… in the case of the ICAI’s disciplinary process … the paucity of the reporting 
regarding disciplinary decisions allied to the exclusion of complainants from direct 
involvement in the disciplinary process suggests that a proclaimed concern for 
transparency and accountability in the public interest is somewhat debatable …       The 
ICAI disciplinary process appears to form part of the plethora of symbols, procedures 
and assorted props that resonate with a claim to act in the public interest … The 
evidence presented here suggests this system is more concerned with enhancing the 
power and control of the ICAI as opposed to focusing on augmenting the legitimate 
public interest in its members’ activities. In fact, the ICAI appears to use this system to 
shield its members from any form of public scrutiny.  
 
In a separate research study, Canning and O’Dwyer (2003) examined the descriptive power of 
Parker’s (1994) ‘private interest model of professional accounting ethics’ within a changing 
Irish context by subjecting elements of the model to critical scrutiny in relation to three critical 
events that occurred in Ireland between 1994 and 2001. Their analysis focused on whether 
Parker’s (1994) model adequately described the operation of the ICAI’s disciplinary process 
over time in response to the three critical events that occurred outside the ICAI’s disciplinary 
process but nonetheless had direct impact on its operation. Based on the results of their analysis, 
Canning and O’Dwyer (2003, p. 180) concluded that, while there was “evidence of some 
support for the descriptive power of the Parker model in the Irish context … Parker’s model 
appears overly static and therefore cannot encapsulate potential trade-offs between individual 
roles or any degree of latitude within each separate role”. Specifically, they found evidence 
that directly challenged the interrelationships between the private interest roles depicted in 
Parker’s (1994) model in three respects:  
Firstly, Parker identifies the relationship between professional insulation and 
interference minimisation as being one of facilitation, whereas the evidence suggests 
an apparent tension in this relationship … This tends to indicate the need for the 
recognition … of some form of tension between professional insulation and interference 
minimisation in Parker’s model. 
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Secondly, while Parker considers the relationship between interference minimisation 
and self-control as contributory, the evidence suggests that interference minimisation 
may actually work against self-control … This suggests the need for Parker’s model to 
recognise a tension between these private interest roles …  
 
[Thirdly,] [w]hile we accept that professional insulation facilitates professional 
authority given that professional authority may not exist without professional 
insulation, our evidence suggests that once some level of professional authority is 
established, this in itself can contribute to further or enhanced professional insulation 
… Hence, using this evidence we suggest … a reciprocal contributory relationship 
between professional authority and professional insulation (Canning & O’Dwyer 2003, 
p. 181). 
Consequently, in light of their findings, Canning and O’Dwyer (2003) proposed a 
reconceptualization of Parker’s original model as depicted in Figure 2.4 below. 
 
Figure 2.4:  Canning and O’Dwyer’s (2003) reconceptualization of Parker’s private interest model 
         of professional accounting ethics. Source: Canning & O’Dwyer (2003, p. 180). 
 
In a subsequent follow-up study, Canning and O’Dwyer (2006) sought to explore the tensions 
between profession protection (or private interest) and society protection (or public interest) 
motives in the ICAI’s disciplinary decision-making process in an effort to understand how 
these conflicting tensions were resolved in arriving at eventual decisions. By interviewing and 
analyzing the perceptions of five lay members and three ICAI members who had previously 
served in the various committees of the ICAI’s disciplinary apparatus up until December 1999, 
Canning and O’Dwyer (2006, pp. 41-42) discovered that:  
Within the decision-making process … with less troublesome or “easy” decisions (i.e. 
those which had little potential impact on the member being complained against), there 
was little evidence of even a moderate level of tension between [profession protection 
(or private interest) and society protection (or public interest)] logics of action being 
played out between the decision-makers as consensus tended to reign … For more 
“difficult” decisions, however, our evidence suggests that a society protection [(i.e. 
public interest)] logic of action was totally denied any legitimising space in decision-
making. The promotion of profession protection [(i.e. private interest)] was unrelenting 
and explicit and [to such an extent that] lay members concerned to promote society 
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protection [(i.e. public interest)] in decision-making were, in some cases, totally denied 
a voice … With these more difficult decisions … the role of the ICAI Secretary … is 
crucial in minimising potential tensions in these difficult cases as it operates, in some 
instances, to ensure that lay members are removed from the decision-making process.   
 
Furthermore, in relation to the role afforded to complainants in the ICAI’s disciplinary 
decision-making process, Canning and O’Dwyer (2006, p. 41) found that: 
The primacy of profession protection [(i.e. private interest)] pervaded the treatment of 
complainants at the initial stage of the decision-making process … active lay members 
… were worried that they only got to see a limited ‘screened’ number of complaints 
and expressed some concern that the system might actually deter complainants. These 
members perceived … the role ascribed to complainants in the disciplinary process … 
as possessing the potential to promote an exclusive emphasis on profession protection 
[(i.e. private interest)]. 
 
Finally, Canning and O’Dwyer (2006, p. 41) highlighted the crucial importance and the central 
role of the ICAI Secretary within the ICAI’s disciplinary decision-making process: 
… the role of the ICAI Secretary supports a strong perception of the promotion of a 
prevailing profession protection [(i.e. private interest)] logic of action with some limited 
space being allowed for the expression of views concerned with society protection [(i.e. 
public interest)]. Active lay members expressed concern that they had, in some 
instances, been overly guided by the Secretary. This created a perception that some 
form of censorship of complaints was possible. The Secretary’s guidance on cases was 
clearly designed to give primary consideration to a profession protection [(i.e. private 
interest)] logic of action in decision-making.  
 
In their final research study, O’Dwyer and Canning (2008) examined the operation of the 
ICAI’s disciplinary process from the complainant’s perspective by way of a detailed case study 
that followed the passage of a specific complaint through the ICAI’s complaints process over 
a five-year period. Their case study analysis highlighted the inter-dependent relationship 
between the private interest roles of professional authority and professional insulation fulfilled 
by the ICAI’s disciplinary process, with the case revealing “how high levels of professional 
authority and professional insulation worked in tandem to prevent complaints entering the 
complaint process and deny the complainant reasons for decisions taken” (O’Dwyer & Canning 
2008, p. 663). As O’Dwyer and Canning (2008, pp. 663-664) explained: 
[Although] [s]ubsequent to the post-1999 complaint process changes, an erosion of 
professional insulation was unveiled ... this proved fleeting and, in response to 
persistent complainant challenges to heightened demonstrations of professional 
authority, the degree of professional insulation intensified further … This short-lived 
erosion of professional insulation suggests that many of the post-1999 changes evident 
in this case merely supported an image of change and bear many of the hallmarks of 
disciplinary symbolism. Furthermore, while Parker (1994) suggests that professional 
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authority is dependent on the initial establishment of professional insulation, our 
analysis suggests that established and presumed professional authority can be used to 
justify further insulation of the disciplinary decision-making process.   
 
Furthermore, the case “demonstrates how a key structural barrier in the complaint process – 
the screening role of the ICAI secretary - operated to encourage a complainant impression of a 
process concerned primarily with protecting ICAI members’ interests” (O’Dwyer and Canning 
2008, p. 663). As O’Dwyer and Canning (2008, p. 664) remarked: 
This private system was not only private in the sense that there was little accountability 
to the complainant for decisions taken, it was also private in the sense that the 
complainant was placed in a position of having to effectively ‘prove’ misconduct with 
little information provided to him as to what type/ level of evidence would support his 
case or how this evidence, if available, was to be assessed. This privacy was reinforced 
by the absence of any systematic case law which gave greater power to the impulses of 
the Secretary and the various committees in making decisions. This professional power 
also operated to repel the enormous and costly efforts of … [the complainant] to have 
his complaints considered. 
 
As a result, based on these findings, O’Dwyer and Canning (2008, p. 645) concluded that 
“complainants using professional body complaints procedures may, often by virtue of the 
structures in place, feel that profession protection [(i.e. private interest] motives are overriding 
purported concerns for society protection [(i.e. public interest)]”.   
United Kingdom 
Mitchell et al. (1994) scrutinized the ethical and disciplinary claims of the accounting 
profession in the United Kingdom (UK) by examining the disciplinary actions taken against 
auditing firms for alleged unprofessional conduct in relation to audit failures from 1971 to 
March 1992. They discovered that, although for this period, nearly 2,600 investigations were 
conducted by the UK’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) under the Companies Act, 
only 77 DTI reports have been published as “due to the policies of the state, a large number of 
reports are not published” (Mitchell et al. 1994, p. 42). However, despite the fact that 45% of 
these 77 published DTI reports were critical of the standards of work performed by the auditing 
firms, “the professional bodies have failed to investigate the overall standards of any of these 
firms” (Mitchell et al. 1994, p. 44). Furthermore, “the professional bureaucracy has taken on 
average 1,110 days to report its findings, long enough for cases to disappear from the public 
view” (Mitchell et al. 1994, pp. 42-44).    
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Based on their findings, Mitchell et al. (1994, p. 48) concluded that the ethical statements and 
disciplinary apparatus of the UK accounting profession are, in fact, “little more than a 
smokescreen, or fig-leaf, for the pursuit and protection of sectional interests … [such that] the 
claims to act ethically and to support such claims with a disciplinary apparatus form an integral 
part of a strategy motivated by the desire to raise and secure the value of accounting labour”. 
They also directly implicated the British state by highlighting its explicit and active role in 
protecting the UK accounting profession: 
To attain this [professional] status, it has been necessary [for the UK accountancy 
industry] to engage a discourse in which a distinction is made between ‘self-interest’ 
and ‘public interest’. A ‘public interest’ identity is pursued by developing or adopting 
a variety of symbols, procedures and assorted props that resonate with this claim … 
The claim to act in the public interest can be sustained so long as no effective challenge 
is mounted that disputes or scrutinizes its basis. Even when something happens – such 
as series of corporate collapses or audit failures – that may cast doubt upon this claim, 
diversionary tactics to preserve the ‘public interest’ identity are employed, for example, 
by denying all responsibility for its occurrence … or, when recalcitrance is found, by 
ensuring that reports are suppressed or delayed so long that their impact is cushioned … 
This protection of the [UK] accountancy industry is not achieved by its associations, 
but is actively facilitated by the sponsoring Ministry of the British state, the Department 
of Trade and Industry (Mitchell et al. 1994, p. 49).  
 
Fisher et al. (2001) sought to explore the balance between the public and private interest 
motives that underpin the operation of the accounting profession’s disciplinary process by 
examining the disciplinary outcomes for a specific professional accounting body in the United 
Kingdom (UK) - the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) – between the 
years 1978 to 1995. Their analysis showed that there was a statistically significant increase in 
the number of disciplinary cases surrounding and following the introduction of the Companies 
Act in early 1989, when compared with another professional accounting body not affected by 
the Companies Act. This finding strongly suggested that “the increase in enforcement was 
evidenced only by the entity most likely to feel threatened” (Fisher et al. 2001, p. 203), thereby 
indicating that the increased enforcement post-1989 was, in part, a response to external threats 
to the ACCA. However, their analysis yielded no evidence of a disproportionate increase in the 
number of private interest offences as compared to public interest offences. In fact, “the 
increased number of cases [post-1989] appears to be the result of a general stepping up of the 
discipline process [by the ACCA]” (Fisher et al. 2001, p. 200).  
Additionally, their analysis also yielded evidence suggesting that “the Association discipline 
process is much less active outside the United Kingdom and Irish Republic” (Fisher et al. 2001, 
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p. 201) and that “employed [members] are disproportionately disciplined for offences against 
the public (primarily criminal offences), in comparison to those [members] who were in public 
practice” (Fisher et al. 2001, p. 205). As a result, Fisher et al. (2001, p. 205) concluded that:  
These results are consistent with the proposition that the disciplinary process operates 
both in the public interest and in the Association’s private interest. There is moderate 
support for the notion that the level of discipline activity increased in 1989 which would 
serve the private interests of ACCA. This was achieved by a general increase in the 
volume of discipline activity rather than a concentration on specific types of offences. 
The discipline process is focused on members in public practice and on members in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland.      
 
Chandler et al. (2008) investigated the disciplinary process of the accounting profession in 
England and Wales by analysing the disciplinary actions taken against some of the less 
meritorious founder members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) for breaches of ethical principles. Their archival analysis of the internal records of 
the ICAEW and its predecessor bodies revealed that, of the 598 ICAEW founder members, 
only 26 cases involved disciplinary actions “where membership was terminated or suspended 
as the result of the commission of a more serious offence [other than failure to pay subscriptions 
on time]” (Chandler et al. 2008, p. 833), with all member expulsions or suspensions having 
“followed either conviction before a court of law or the disappearance or bankruptcy of the 
accountant concerned” (Chandler et al. 2008, p. 830). In fact, in all 26 cases:        
The hand of the ICAEW was forced by external events. Names were only removed 
from the list of members following the disappearance of the accountant, his conviction 
by a court or the declaration of his bankruptcy. This suggests that those at the head of 
the ICAEW were not inclined to impose their own qualitative judgements about 
professional etiquette and ethics on members who had paid not insignificant sums in 
admission and membership fees. Some of the cases examined suggested a certain 
tension between the ICAEW’s self-proclaimed role of protecting the public interest and 
the less explicit but nevertheless obvious need it felt to serve the private interests of its 
members (Chandler et al. 2008, p. 828). 
 
Furthermore, their analysis uncovered evidence indicating that there were early grounds for 
doubting the honesty and integrity of some founder members who were subsequently 
disciplined. However, despite evidence of inappropriate activity by some founder members:  
… no disciplinary action appears to have been taken until the external stimulus …  
[warrants] an institutional response. Such reluctance to be pro-active suggests that the 
ICAEW’s leaders were not confident of their mandate to police their members’ 
behaviour (Chandler et al. 2008, p. 828). 
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Finally, based on the results of their analysis, Chandler et al. (2008, p. 845) acknowledged the 
symbolic nature of the ICAEW’s disciplinary actions in concluding that:  
Successful professional bodies are aware of the value of propaganda and use it to help 
achieve their ends. The ICAEW was not keen at first to publicise the taking of 
disciplinary action … Later, while not trumpeting the expulsion of a member, publicity 
was sometimes given, albeit in brief, to disciplinary measures which had been taken.  
 
United States of America 
Loeb (1972) was one of the earliest researchers to examine how professional ethical codes were 
enforced by the accounting profession’s disciplinary process. He analyzed all disciplinary cases 
handled by both the state board of accounting (from 1913 to 1969) and the state society (from 
1905 to 1969) of a large Midwestern state in the United States of America (US) and found that, 
over the study period, there were very few charges against certified public accountants for both 
the state board of accounting as well as the state society. Furthermore, by classifying all 
disciplinary offences into either: (1) client violations; (2) colleague violations; or (3) public 
violations, Loeb (1972, p. 4) discovered that, of all the disciplinary offences that resulted in 
convictions, “offences against colleagues appear to be the predominant violation punished (90% 
of state society cases and 65% of state board cases), while client violations seldom appear to 
be disciplined”.  
However, his analysis of the disciplinary sanctions imposed by both the state board and the 
state society indicated that the nature of the offence appeared to affect the severity of sanctions 
imposed such that both “client and public violations appear to result in the heaviest penalties” 
(Loeb 1972, p. 6). Interestingly, his analysis also showed that “the severity of the punishment 
imposed was not related to the number of times a practitioner had been previously sanctioned 
for an ethical violation” (Loeb 1972, p. 10). In addition, Loeb’s (1972) analysis also revealed 
that highly publicized violations appear to attract stiffer disciplinary sanctions. By defining 
notoriety as “the presence of one or both of a record of public inquiry and coverage in the mass 
media” (Loeb 1972, p. 8), he found evidence suggesting that: 
… the severity of the sanction is related to the amount of notoriety. It appears that 
violations that receive notoriety in one or more of the ways described above are much 
more likely to result in expulsion, suspension, or even censure by the state society, or 
revocation of the certificate, suspension of the certificate, or censure by the state board 
than are violations to which no notoriety is attached (Loeb 1972, p. 8).  
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In fact, with further analysis, Loeb (1972, p. 8) concluded that “public violations with notoriety 
lead to heavier sanctions than public violations without notoriety [while] [c]olleague violations 
with notoriety are more likely to receive an official censure than those that are not accompanied 
by notoriety, [with] [t]he latter … more likely to receive a warning”.  
Finally, the results of Loeb’s (1972) historical analysis suggests that, while colleague violations 
appear more likely to occur during a practitioner’s early years of practice (especially soon after 
acquiring a proprietary interest in a firm), public violations appear more likely to occur in later 
years such that “in the few instances when public type violations occurred, the offenders tended 
to be older practitioners” (Loeb 1972, p. 10). 
 
Moriarity (2000) investigated trends in the disciplinary sanctions imposed by the largest 
professional accounting body in the United States of America (US) - the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) – before and after its adoption of the Code of 
Professional Conduct in 1988. By examining all disciplinary reports published by the AICPA 
from mid-1979 to mid-1999, Moriarity (2000) found that, for the offences categorised as 
‘substandard professional service’, the average total sanction rate for the period after 1990 was 
2.8 times higher than that for the period before 1988. Furthermore, when compared to the pre-
1988 period, the average suspensions per member for the period post-1990 increased 5 times 
while the average expulsions per member for the same period jumped 7 times. In fact, the 
relative number of sanctions involving membership suspension had almost doubled from 33% 
of total sanctions prior to 1988 to 61% after 1990, with the average length per reported 
suspension increasing from 1.05 years before 1988 to 1.53 years after 1990 (Moriarity 2000). 
Based on these findings, Moriarity (2000, p. 438) concluded that, “[i]t appears that the [US 
accounting] profession, as represented by the actions of the AICPA, has made progress, 
particularly after the 1988 revisions to the Code and the enforcement process” such that “the 
AICPA’s 1988 procedural changes have resulted in the profession becoming more effective in 
identifying and disciplining lapses in the quality of professional service” (Moriarity 2000,                   
p. 433).  
 
Jenkins et al. (2016) sought to extend Moriarity’s (2000) study by examining the offences and 
disciplinary sanctions imposed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) on members whose conduct violates the profession’s Code of Professional Conduct 
(CPC) in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act era from 2008 to 2013. This period is particularly 
relevant in the United States of America (US) as there had been a major change in landscape 
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for the US accounting profession with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the 
subsequent creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the early 
2000s. Their analysis of 590 disciplinary sanctions revealed an upward trend in disciplinary 
sanctions that continues the sanctioning trend observed by Moriarity (2000), with the number 
of sanctions nearly doubling from 67 in 2008 to 115 in 2013.  
With respect to the types of offences associated with disciplinary sanctions, the most frequent 
offences related to ‘Acts Discreditable’, accounting for 54.1% of total disciplinary sanctions, 
followed by offences relating to ‘Criminal Convictions’ and ‘Substandard Professional Practice’ 
which accounted for 19% and 17.8% of disciplinary sanctions respectively. When the offences 
were classified according to whether they threatened the public interest or the private interests 
of the accounting profession, Jenkins et al. (2016, p. 24) found that the majority of sanctions 
imposed (85.94%) related to misconduct that threatened the public interest, thereby “providing 
evidence that suggests the AICPA CPC is largely enforced for matters of public interest”. As 
for the types of disciplinary sanctions imposed for member misconduct, Jenkins et al. (2016) 
discovered that the majority of sanctions resulted in member termination (48.3%), followed by 
suspensions (37.1%) and admonishments (14.6%).  
In fact, further analyses revealed that: 
… terminations and suspensions are used at nearly the same rate for public interest 
violations, but terminations are used at more than double the rate of suspensions for 
private interest matters … although terminations are used more in the case of private 
interests, suspensions are used at nearly the same rate as terminations for public interest 
matters but carry longer average suspensions (1.68 years) than private interest matters 
(1.50 years). Collectively, these findings show that while the majority of sanctions 
imposed under the AICPA CPC relate to protecting the public interest, terminations (i.e. 
the most severe sanction) are used most frequently for violations that threaten the 
private interests of the accounting profession (Jenkins et al. 2016, p. 18). 
 
As part of their analysis, Jenkins et al. (2016) also examined the response of AICPA to member 
misconduct following the Great Recession5 that spanned from December 2007 to June 2009 in 
the US. Specifically, they compared reported member offences and disciplinary sanctions in 
the ‘recessionary period’ from 2008 to 2010 with the ‘post-recessionary period’ from 2011 to 
2013 so as to investigate whether different types of misconduct were sanctioned and whether 
the severity of sanctions differed between the recessionary and post-recessionary periods. The 
results of their analysis revealed a lower proportion of terminations imposed in the post-
                                                          
5  The Great Recession refers to the period of global economic downturn that followed the 2008  
   Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
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recessionary period from 2011 to 2013 than in the recessionary period from 2008 to 2010. The 
converse is true for admonishments, with a higher proportion of admonishments in the post-
recessionary period from 2011 to 2013 as compared to the recessionary period from 2008 to 
2010. At the same time, their analysis also showed that a higher proportion of public interest 
matters were sanctioned during the recessionary period from 2008 to 2010 than in the post-
recessionary period from 2011 to 2013. As Jenkins et al. (2016, p. 24) explained: 
We find a higher proportion of terminations were imposed in the recessionary period 
than in the post-recessionary period; such severe sanctioning may indicate the 
accounting profession was working to rebuild public trust by showing that [member] 
misconduct would be severely disciplined. Further, we find that a higher proportion of 
public interest matters were sanctioned during the recessionary years than in the post-
recessionary years, which also suggests the accounting profession worked to rebuild 
public trust when most needed during the recessionary years. 
However, having said this, Jenkins et al. (2016, p. 3) also made the following qualifying 
remarks: 
… it is unclear whether the public interest focus during this time [i.e. the recessionary 
period from 2008 to 2010] was intentional to repair the profession’s tarnished 
reputation, or if it was simply the result of using limited resources to monitor the least 
tolerable behaviours of accountants. In either case, the result is the same: the accounting 
profession sanctioned a higher proportion of misconduct related to the public interest 
and imposed more severe sanctions, in the recessionary rather than post-recessionary 
years. 
 
France and United States of America 
With emphasis and focus on the fundamental differences between the regulatory regimes 
established by France and the United States of America (US), Baïada-Hirèche and Garmillis 
(2016) sought to investigate whether ethical judgements of accounting professionals are 
influenced by the structure of the disciplinary system established by the accounting profession 
in France and the US respectively. Using data retrieved from disciplinary cases in both France 
and the state of New York from 1994 to 2006 together with a survey of French and American 
accounting professionals, Baïada-Hirèche and Garmillis (2016) performed a comparative 
analysis to assess the perception of the seriousness of typical breaches of professional conduct 
by accounting professionals in France and the US. Their analysis revealed a significant 
correlation between accounting professionals’ perception of the seriousness of professional 
misconduct and the severity of disciplinary sanctions for the state of New York; but no such 
correlation was observed in France.  
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As a result, Baïada-Hirèche and Garmillis (2016, p. 640) concluded that “the [ethical] 
judgement of the American accounting professionals is more strongly influenced by the 
disciplinary decisions of the [state] accountancy board … [whereas] the [ethical] judgement of 
French accounting professionals seems to be more independent of the disciplinary context”. As 
they explained: 
… in the state of New York, our findings indicate that the stronger the misconduct is 
punished by the accountancy board (through [licence] revocation), the higher is the 
perception of its seriousness by the accounting professionals. Therefore, it appears that 
accounting professionals’ perception of misconduct’s seriousness is more closely 
associated with disciplinary decisions in the state of New York than in France (Baïada-
Hirèche & Garmillis 2016, p. 652).    
Given the structural differences between the respective disciplinary systems established by the 
French and US accounting professions, Baïada-Hirèche and Garmillis (2016, p. 655) identified 
the following factors that might potentially explain and account for the divergence observed 
between both countries:  
(a) Ease of the Procedure: 
As the US disciplinary system is less procedural than in France, a professional, client 
or peer can file complaints against a member directly with the state accountancy board. 
By contrast, in France, disciplinary proceedings against a member can be initiated only 
by government officials or by his peers; 
(b) Publication and Impact of Sanctions: 
In the state of New York (and the US in general), disciplinary cases are published on 
the internet. In France, however, disciplinary cases are publicized internally within the 
French accounting profession by way of a professional publication that is circulated 
exclusively among French accounting professionals. Furthermore, while the member’s 
name for all disciplinary cases is disclosed in the US, the member’s name for all 
disciplinary cases is withheld in France, except in cases involving suspension or 
revocation of membership where the member’s name is published externally; 
(c) Format of Rules: 
The US accounting profession adopts a ‘rules-based’ approach to professional 
discipline, with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) code 
of ethics comprising specific and numerous rules and norms. By contrast, the French 
accounting profession adopts a ‘principles-based’ approach to professional discipline, 
with the French code of ethics consisting of general principles rather than specific rules. 
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In summary, prior research on the enforcement of professional ethical codes can be sub-divided 
into two distinct groups: (1) earlier research studies that found evidence of ‘disciplinary 
symbolism’ with emphasis on protecting the private interest of the accounting profession rather 
than the public interest; and (2) subsequent research studies that portray a mixed picture that 
emphasize the protection of both the public interest as well as the private interest of the 
accounting profession.  
Specifically, earlier research studies point towards a phenomenon of ‘disciplinary symbolism’ 
where the operation of professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes is primarily 
driven by the accounting profession’s emphasis on protecting its private interest rather than the 
interests of the public. This is supported by various findings from earlier research studies that 
include: (a) evidence of professional insulation through restrictions on disclosure and reporting 
of disciplinary cases (e.g. Parker 1994; Mitchell et al. 1994; Canning & O’Dwyer 2001);                   
(b) evidence of accounting profession screening member complaints and influencing decision-
making within its disciplinary process in order to safeguard its private interest but at the 
expense of the public interest (Canning & O’Dwyer 2006, 2008); (c) evidence of offence 
visibility, with more severe penalties imposed for offences of greater public visibility (e.g. 
Loeb 1972; Lesage et al. 2016); (d) a predominance of private interest offences amongst 
members disciplined for professional misconduct (e.g. Loeb 1972; Parker 1994); and                            
(e) evidence of attempting to preserve members’ socio-economic status, with a predominance 
of light penalties (in the form of reprimands and costs) imposed on members for professional 
misconduct (e.g. Parker 1994; Chandler et al. 2008).  
However, depending on the nature of the regulatory regime as well as the structure of the 
disciplinary system that underpins each jurisdiction, subsequent research studies tend to 
portray a mixed picture, with the operation of professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary 
processes driven by an emphasis on the protection of both the public interest as well as the 
private interest of the accounting profession (e.g. Bédard 2001; Fisher et al. 2001; Lesage et al. 
2016; Jenkins et al. 2016; Mescall et al. 2017). It is thus within this latter body of literature that 
this research thesis is situated. 
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2.9 Conceptual limitations of prior accounting research 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that, within the context of the accounting profession, 
our current understanding of the ‘public interest’ versus ‘private interest’ roles of professional 
ethical codes is defined and framed by a rigid dichotomy between the functionalist and critical-
theorist perspectives as described in the sociological literature (known collectively as the 
‘sociological perspectives of professional ethical codes’). However, the existing framework 
based on the sociological perspectives of professional ethical codes is arguably associated with 
several conceptual limitations that restrict our understanding of the motives and rationale that 
underpin the operation of professional ethical codes by the accounting profession. 
2.9.1 Mutually exclusive philosophical arguments  
An important point to realize is that the functionalist and critical-theorist perspectives represent 
opposing worldviews or paradigms that emphasize their fundamentally divergent characters 
and their mutually irreconcilable differences. Conceptually, each sociological perspective 
represents a sort of ‘philosophical argument’ - a normative view that is based upon a set of core 
values and assumptions about the underlying motivation and rationale behind the creation and 
operation of professional ethical codes. Viewed in these terms, it is apparent that, from the 
outset, the functionalist perspective assumes a public interest motive and rationale, while the 
critical-theorist perspective assumes a private or self-interest motive and rationale.        
In addition, the dichotomous nature of the functionalist versus the critical-theorist perspectives 
implies not only that both are opposite and fundamentally divergent but also that both are 
mutually exclusive. The term ‘mutually exclusive’ refers to a situation where the existence or 
occurrence of one event necessarily precludes the existence or occurrence of another event. In 
the case of professional ethical codes, if the functionalist (or public interest) perspective were 
to prove accurate and hold true, this necessarily implies that the critical-theorist (or private 
interest) perspective cannot be true, and vice versa. In other words, either the functionalist 
perspective or the critical-theorist perspective can prove to be an accurate reflection of social 
reality, but not both - there can be no middle ground where both the functionalist and critical-
theorist perspectives hold true.   
As a result, by embracing the existing framework based on the sociological perspectives of 
professional ethical codes, researchers are forced to adopt and maintain either a functionalist 
(public interest) or critical-theorist (private interest) argument, with this sort of ‘binary’ 
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thinking curtailing the ability to switch between either argument based on the social context in 
question.           
So, what is the implication of this fact, taking into consideration the dual roles served by 
professional ethical codes as described by Parker (1994)? As mentioned in the preceding 
section, subsequent research studies provided strong empirical evidence that professional 
ethical codes protect both the public interest as well as the private interest of the accounting 
profession. In other words, the empirical evidence from subsequent research studies points 
towards a social reality consistent with both the functionalist (public interest) as well as the 
critical-theorist (private interest) perspectives (albeit to varying proportions) - a scenario that 
is clearly untenable within the existing framework based on the sociological perspectives of 
professional ethical codes.  
Given the strength of the empirical evidence and its incompatibility with the existing 
framework based on the sociological perspectives of professional ethical codes, there is a 
genuine need for an alternative framework to reconceptualize our understanding of the motives 
and rationale that underpin the operation of professional ethical codes by the accounting 
profession. Specifically, what is needed is a coherent and comprehensive conceptual 
framework that not only encompasses the public interest and private interest perspectives 
together with their interrelationships but also allows for the possibility of switching between 
either perspective depending on the social context in question.     
 
2.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed and summarized the relevant literature on professional ethical codes. 
The first section discussed the sociological perspectives as well as the public and private 
interest roles of professional ethical codes. The public interest role of professional ethical codes 
is derived from the functionalist perspective of professional ethical codes that is, in turn, 
underpinned by the functionalist perspective of professions whose ultimate objective is the 
protection of society. On the other hand, the private interest role of professional ethical codes 
is derived from the monopolist and status perspectives of professional ethical codes that is, in 
turn, underpinned by the critical-theorist perspective of professions whose ultimate objective 
is the protection of the profession itself.  
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The second section introduced the literature pertaining to research on professional ethical codes 
within the context of the accounting profession. The accounting literature on professional 
ethical codes can be broadly divided into two main branches:  
(1)   research on the development of professional ethical codes that examined the historical  
       circumstances surrounding the origin and subsequent evolution of ethical codes within   
       the accounting profession; and  
(2)   research on the enforcement of professional ethical codes that examined the inner  
       workings of professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes as well as the   
       underlying motivation and latent rationale that underpins their operation by the  
       accounting profession.  
 
Although professional ethical codes have the potential to protect the public interest and/or the 
private interest of the accounting profession, prior research on the development of professional 
ethical codes suggests that professional ethical codes act as symbolic systems aimed at 
reinforcing and legitimizing the accounting profession’s claims to professional status and 
economic privileges. On the other hand, prior research on the enforcement of professional 
ethical codes can be sub-divided into two groups:  
(1)   earlier research studies that found evidence of ‘disciplinary symbolism’ with emphasis  
       on protecting the private interest of the accounting profession rather than the public interest;  
(2)   subsequent research studies that portray a mixed picture that emphasize the protection of  
       both the public interest as well as the private interest of the accounting profession. It is  
       thus within this group of literature that this research thesis is situated. 
 
Within the context of the accounting profession, our current understanding of the ‘public 
interest’ versus ‘private interest’ roles of professional ethical codes is defined and framed by a 
rigid dichotomy between the functionalist and critical-theorist perspectives as described in the 
sociological literature. However, this existing framework based on the sociological 
perspectives of professional ethical codes is incompatible with the existing empirical evidence 
that professional ethical codes protect both the public interest as well as the private interest of 
the accounting profession. Accordingly, there is a genuine need for an alternative framework 
to reconceptualize our understanding of the motives and rationale that underpin the operation 
of professional ethical codes by the accounting profession. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE:   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter is divided into three sections: the first section outlines the principles of Social 
Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory within the overarching framework of the social 
identity perspective; the second section introduces the ‘black sheep effect’ and discusses 
existing research on deviance together with the motives for rejecting deviance in groups; and 
the final section proposes an alternative framework based on the ‘social identity perspective of 
professional ethical codes’ to conceptualize the motives and rationale that underpin the 
operation of professional ethical codes within the disciplinary architecture established by the 
professional accounting bodies.  
3.2 The social identity perspective 
The ‘social identity approach’ (Hogg & Abrams 1988) or ‘social identity perspective’ (Turner 
1999) comprises Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) and Self-Categorization 
Theory (Turner et al. 1987), and is one of the most influential and far reaching theories of group 
processes and intergroup relations in the field of social psychology (Abrams & Hogg 2010; 
Hornsey 2008). In fact, the ‘social identity perspective’ has been used as a theoretical 
framework in countless empirical investigations informing the analysis of a wide range of 
topics in intragroup processes and intergroup relations (Haslam et al. 2010), including identity 
salience (Oakes 1987); depersonalization and conformity and normative behaviour (Hogg & 
Turner 1987); depersonalization and social stereotyping (Oakes et al. 1994; Tajfel 1981); social 
attraction and group cohesiveness (Hogg 1993; Hogg & Hardie 1991); normative deviants and 
the ‘black-sheep effect’ (Marques & Paez 1994; Marques et al. 1988); deindividuation, crowd 
behaviour and rioting (Reicher et al. 1995; Reicher 1987); group polarization (Turner et al. 
1989; Wetherell 1987); as well as social influence, leadership and power (Turner 2005; Hogg 
& van Knippenberg 2003; Hogg 2001) to name but a few. 
Social Identity Theory adopts an external focus and is primarily concerned with intergroup 
behaviour and intergroup relations within a particular social context. On the other hand, Self-
Categorization Theory extends and complements Social Identity Theory by examining internal 
group dynamics and focusing specifically on the intragroup processes that underpin group 
formation and social identity. In this way, “social identity theory and self-categorization theory 
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can be considered to be different but compatible emphases within a general social identity 
approach” (Hogg 2004, p. 205) that encompasses internal group dynamics and intragroup 
processes as well as external intergroup relations and intergroup behaviour.  
With this in mind, I shall now turn my attention to describing the essential features and 
explaining the core principles that underpin both Social Identity Theory and Self-
Categorization Theory within the overarching framework of the ‘social identity perspective’ 
(Turner 1999).  
3.3 Social Identity Theory 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) was first proposed by social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John 
Turner in the late 1970s in an attempt to make sense of intergroup relations in real societal 
contexts (Tajfel & Turner 1979). SIT represents a comprehensive theory of intergroup relations 
and social change in socially stratified societies (Turner & Reynolds 2004) and it 
revolutionized the field of social psychology by completely redefining how we think of 
numerous group-mediated phenomena (Hornsey 2008). Indeed, SIT was “the first to theorize 
a distinct form of identity at the group level, and to accord ontological and explanatory 
significance to group identities” (Spears 2011).  
As a survivor of the Jewish Holocaust during the Second World War, SIT was inspired by 
Tajfel’s personal experiences of discrimination and intergroup conflict and driven by his desire 
and passion to understand the basic social cognitive processes of prejudice, discrimination and 
intergroup conflict (Abrams & Hogg 2010; Ellemers & Haslam 2011). This research into 
discrimination and intergroup conflict culminated in a series of controlled experiments in the 
early 1970s that subsequently became known as the ‘minimal group studies’ (Tajfel et al. 1971) 
or the ‘minimal group paradigm’ (Spears 2011; Hornsey 2008), which served as the intellectual 
crucible from which SIT was consequently born and forged.  
3.3.1 The minimal group studies 
In the minimal group studies conducted by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues, participants were 
informed that they had been assigned to one of two groups on the basis of meaningless or 
arbitary criteria (Tajfel et al. 1971) or on the basis of chance (Billig & Tajfel 1973). 
Furthermore, these participants did not know who else was present and they could not see or 
interact with others. The researchers also emphasized to the participants that the choices they 
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made could not affect their own outcomes in any way. After being informed of their group 
membership, the participants were then tasked with allocating points to one member of their 
own group - the so-called ‘ingroup’ – but excluding themselves, and to one member of the 
other group - the so-called ‘outgroup’ (Hornsey 2008). These ‘minimal’ conditions were 
originally intended to form a baseline or control condition for further experiments – as none of 
the known reasons to differentiate between a member of one’s own group and a member of the 
other group were present, participants were expected to divide the points equally between both 
groups (Ellemers & Haslam 2011). However, it soon became clear that this was not the case. 
As Hornsey (2008, pp. 205-206) explained: 
From the perspective of a participant, this is an absurd task. The groups had no content, 
in the sense that they were based on trivial criteria. There was no interaction among 
group members, and in fact, participants did not know who else within the session was 
in their group. The groups had no history and no future outside the laboratory. 
Furthermore, the participants could not benefit or lose in any way from their point 
allocation strategy …. 
Faced with this curious dilemma, one might expect the points allocation to be either 
random, or to be made on the basis of a strategy of fairness (equal numbers of points to 
members of each group). But this was not what was found. 
 
Accordingly, the historical significance of these minimal group studies lay in the observation 
that, even these very minimal conditions proved sufficient to induce ‘ingroup favouritism’, 
which is described as the “tendency to systematically allocate more points to a member of one’s 
own group than to a member of another group” (Ellemers & Haslam 2011, p. 380). In fact, 
there was some evidence that participants were prepared to award relatively few points to either 
group if this allowed them to maximize the extent to which they favoured their ingroup – the 
so-called maximum difference strategy (Spears 2011; Hornsey 2008). This effect subsequently 
became known as the ‘mere categorization effect’, which suggested that “the mere act of 
categorizing individuals into groups made people think of themselves and other in terms of 
“us” and “them”, and was sufficient to induce them to behave differently towards ingroup and 
outgroup members (Ellemers & Haslam 2011, p. 380). In other words, “in the minimal group 
paradigm, there were no clear conflicts of interest between the groups, and so the basis of 
discrimination seemed to be more symbolic or purely social” (Spears 2011, p. 204). 
Crucially, the provocative and radical nature of the findings that emerged from the minimal 
group studies were painfully at odds with the scientific understanding of the time. As Hornsey 
(2008, p. 206) further elaborated: 
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Although stripped of history and context, the experiments were not psychologically 
empty because participants were obeying a predictable pattern of responding, and one 
that was difficult to explain according to traditional theories of intergroup relations [at 
the time] … the mere process of making salient ‘us and them’ distinctions changes the 
way people see each other. 
 
As a result, after a series of publications in which Tajfel introduced and refined the concept of 
‘social identity’, and explained how the minimal group studies pointed to the fact that people 
sometimes behave as group members rather than as individuals (Tajfel 1974, 1975, 1978), he 
formulated and proposed Social Identity Theory together with his colleague, John Turner, 
presenting it as a ‘theory of intergroup relations and conflict’ (Tajfel & Turner 1979). 
3.3.2 Principles of Social Identity Theory 
Essentially, Social Identity Theory describes the cognitive process that underpins intergroup 
behaviour in terms of four interlinked and interrelated concepts - social categorization, social 
identification, social comparison and positive group distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner 1979; 
Tajfel 1974). Indeed, as Figure 3.1 demonstrates, this ‘social categorization-social 
identification-social comparison-positive group distinctiveness’ sequence (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel 
1978) or nexus represents the fundamental building block and forms the very essence of Social 
Identity Theory as originally conceived by Henri Tajfel and John Turner. 
Figure 3.1.  The social categorization-social identification-social comparison-positive group 
                      distinctiveness nexus represents the fundamental building block of SIT. 
Accordingly, it is to each of these four fundamental concepts that I shall now turn my attention 
to. 
3.3.2.1 Social categorization 
Social categorization is the process by which individuals are clustered into groups (Ellemers & 
Haslam 2011). Social categorization can be understood as an ordering of the social 
environment in terms of social categories or groupings of people in a manner that is meaningful 
to the individual (Tajfel 1974). In other words, social categorization “renders a multifaceted 
and infinitely varying perceptual field … contextually meaningful by segmenting it into a 
smaller number of categories” (Hogg 2004, p. 205). As Tajfel (1974, p. 69) explained, “social 
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categorization is a process of bringing together social objects or events in groups which are 
equivalent with regard to an individual’s actions, intentions, attitudes and system of beliefs”.  
In this way, the process of social categorization can be viewed as “a system of orientation 
which creates and defines the individual’s own place in society” (Tajfel 1974, p. 71) that 
renders the social environment more predictable, thereby allowing for effective planning and 
efficacious responses to complex social situations. Furthermore, the process of social 
categorization has been observed to exaggerate perceived similarities among individuals in the 
same group (by rendering them less easily identifiable) while accentuating differences between 
individuals in different groups, with this accentuation effect being more pronounced when 
distinguishing between groups is deemed subjectively important as well as when the perceived 
dimension is deemed subjectively important (Hogg 2004). As Ellemers and Haslam (2011, p. 
381) elaborated:  
Thinking of individuals in terms of a limited number of social categories provides a 
way of organizing socially relevant information, and helps in the process of both 
understanding and predicting behaviour. When individuals are categorized into the 
same group, they are thought to share some central-defining feature, which 
distinguishes them from others who do not possess this feature. 
As a result of such classifications, we tend to focus on similarities between individuals 
within the same category, and see them as interchangeable elements that share some 
representative common characteristics … At the same time, we accentuate differences 
between individuals who are classified into different categories … as a way of 
clarifying the meaning of the situation … Thus, when people are categorized into 
groups, they come to be seen in terms of characteristic group features that define their 
social identities, while neglecting individual traits which define their uniqueness. 
 
However, “the representation of social categories is influenced not only by properties of the 
category itself, but also by the wider social comparative context within which the category 
exists as well as by people’s motivational and strategic goals” (Hogg 2004, p. 207). Therefore, 
although the process of social categorization is an important component of understanding 
intergroup relations, taken on its own, it is insufficient because social categorization does not 
make clear the perceiver’s position in, and relation to, the social environment. As such, the 
process of social identification with the groups to which an individual belongs forms an 
important element that connects individuals to specific groups such that it tells us both who we 
are and who we are not (Spears 2011).    
65 
 
3.3.2.2 Social identification 
Tajfel (1974, p. 69) defined social identity in both cognitive and evaluative terms, as “that part 
of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social 
group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership”. 
Crucially, the process of social identification not only refers to the cognitive awareness that an 
individual is included in a particular group, but also incorporates the emotional significance 
and value of the group membership to that individual’s concept of self.  
In this way, an individual’s social identity forms a vital part of an individual’s self-concept and 
is the product of the process of social categorization into specific social groups as well as the 
process of social identification with those social groups that the individual belongs to (Spears 
2011). As Ellemers and Haslam (2011, p. 382) explained:  
When specific features are associated with a social group, or when these features are 
valued in a certain way, the process of social identification determines how this reflects 
upon the self. This can either imply that the self is identified with that group and 
presumably shares its characteristic features, or lead to the conclusion that the self is 
distinct from that group and its features.  
 
Therefore, it follows that, in the context of Social Identity Theory, a social group is defined 
simply as two or more people who share the same social self-definition (Abrams & Hogg 
2010). However, since groups are not islands, they become psychologically real only when 
defined in comparison to other groups (Hornsey 2008). Therefore, in order for an individual to 
be able to categorize social groups into ingroups and outgroups as well as identify with his or 
her own group via the process of social identification, the individual must first undertake a 
process of social comparison between groups. In fact, it is this comparative perspective that 
links and relates the process of social categorization with the process of social identification 
(Tajfel 1974). 
3.3.2.3 Social comparison 
Social comparison is “focused on the establishment of distinctiveness between one’s own and 
other groups” (Tajfel 1974, p. 72) and represents the process through which characteristic 
group features are interpreted and valued (Ellemers & Haslam 2011). Indeed, the process of 
social comparison is perhaps the only way we can assess the true meaning or value of our own 
group, since we tend to define our groups, and more generally who we are, partly by 
comparison with others (Spears 2011). As Ellemers and Haslam (2011, p. 381) noted:  
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[Since] there is no objective standard that enables us to assess the worth of different 
groups, we tend to decide whether a group is “good” or “bad” at something, by 
comparing the characteristics (e.g. traits, attitudes, behaviours) that are seen to define 
them to the characteristics ascribed to other groups … [Similarly,] groups and their 
features can also be evaluated by comparing them with other groups and their defining 
features … [Indeed,] [t]he constellation of different group traits and how these compare 
to the traits of most other groups in that context determines the social status or perceived 
prestige of that group. 
 
Indeed, as Tajfel (1974, p. 72) aptly stated, “a group becomes a group in the sense of being 
perceived as having common characteristics or a common fate only because other groups are 
present in the environment”. Viewed in these terms, an individual’s social identity can be 
understood as “deriving in a comparative and ‘relational’ manner from an individual’s group 
memberships” (Tajfel 1974, p. 77). Therefore, it is clear that, whereas the process of social 
categorization determines how individuals are classified into social groups, the process of 
social comparison defines the ways in which each social group is distinguished from relevant 
other groups (Ellemers & Haslam 2011). 
3.3.2.4 Positive group distinctiveness 
Although the individual’s concept of self at the intergroup level is grounded in relatively 
automatic social categorization processes accompanied by social identification, it is also guided 
by motivational processes and the individual’s specific goals (Abrams & Hogg 2004). 
Accordingly, Social Identity Theory proposes that group members are motivated by their quest 
for positive group distinctiveness at the intergroup level (Spears 2011). Striving for a positive 
social identity, group members are motivated to think and act in ways that achieve or maintain 
a positive distinctiveness between one’s own group and relevant outgroups. In fact, it is this 
collective quest for positive group distinctiveness at the intergroup level that was presumed to 
underpin real world instances of intergroup differentiation and outgroup derogation (Hornsey 
2008). As Ellemers and Haslam (2011, p. 382) observed: 
To the extent that people care about the groups they belong to (i.e. ingroups), they will 
be motivated to emphasize the distinct identity of those groups, and to uphold, protect, 
or enhance the value afforded to those groups and their members. On occasion (under 
conditions specified by the theory), this may occur at the expense of other groups and 
their members. 
 
Indeed, as Abrams and Hogg (2004) noted, while one motivation relates to self-enhancement, 
self-esteem and the pursuit of positive social identity, another motivation relates to the pursuit 
of meaning and subjective certainty. I shall now describe each motivation in turn. 
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3.3.2.4.1 Self-esteem hypothesis 
Tajfel originally proposed that social comparison processes in intergroup settings are designed 
to attain “positively valued distinctiveness from other groups” and to “achieve a satisfactory 
concept or image of the self” (Tajfel 1972, pp. 3-4, cited in Abrams & Hogg 2004). As Tajfel 
(1974, p. 74) explained, “it is the assumed need for differentiation (or the establishment of 
psychological distinctiveness between the groups) which seems to me to provide, under some 
conditions, the major outcome of the sequence social categorization-social identity-social 
comparison”. Referring to the minimal group studies, Tajfel (1974, p. 75) argued that:  
… the reason for this behavioural and evaluative intergroup differentiation is to be 
found in the need of the subjects to provide order, meaning and social identity to the 
experimental situation; and that this need is fulfilled through the creation of intergroup 
differences when such differences do not in fact exist, or the attribution of value to, and 
the enhancement of, whatever differences do exist. 
Subsequently, in their formal statement of their ‘theory of intergroup relations and conflict’, 
Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 40) proposed that “individuals strive to maintain or enhance their 
self-esteem; they strive for a positive self-concept”. Turner (1981, p. 80, cited in Abrams & 
Hogg 2004) further elaborated on the ‘self-esteem hypothesis’ (Abrams & Hogg 1988): 
… one’s self-esteem as a group member depends upon the evaluative outcomes of 
social comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Since it can be supposed that 
individuals desire positive self-esteem … there is a tendency to seek positive 
distinctiveness for the in-group in comparison with the out-group. Thus [the] hypothesis 
is that self-evaluative social comparisons directly produce competitive intergroup 
processes which motivate attitudinal biases and discriminatory actions. 
 
3.3.2.4.2 Uncertainty reduction hypothesis 
The basic premise of the uncertainty reduction hypothesis is that, as individuals, we all feel 
uncertain sometimes, and need to reduce this uncertainty. Accordingly, group membership is 
viewed as a powerful way of achieving this goal. Specifically, the uncertainty reduction 
hypothesis (Hogg & Mullin 1999; Mullin & Hogg 1998) states that the reason why we 
categorize others is so as to render the social world a meaningful and predictable place in which 
we can act efficaciously (Hogg 2004). In other words, the uncertainty reduction hypothesis 
views the reduction of subjective uncertainty as the underlying or core motivation for social 
categorization such that the more uncertain we are as individuals, the more likely we are to 
categorize people (Hogg 2000). As Abrams and Hogg (2004, pp. 167-168) explained:  
Groups are represented as prototypes that describe and prescribe perceptions, attitudes, 
feelings, and behaviors. Social categorization allows a complex and multifaceted social 
field to be reconfigured in terms of ingroup and outgroup prototypes. When a social 
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category is self-inclusive, the self becomes depersonalized, and thereby assimilated to 
the ingroup prototype. This gives direction to self-conception and associated attitudes, 
feelings, and behavior. Furthermore, collective self-conception provides consensual 
validation from fellow ingroup members for one’s identity and associated attitudes, 
feelings, and behaviours.   
Theoretically, the more uncertain one is, the stronger is the motivation to self-
categorize. Moreover, the motivation should be stronger if one is uncertain about 
something that is subjectively important in that context…It is also likely that, under 
uncertainty, people seek to identify with groups that are more effective at reducing 
uncertainty. Such groups would be expected to have consensual, concise, and clearly 
focused prototypes that are grounded in distinctive, highly entitative groups. 
 
Therefore, it is evident that, Social Identity Theory (SIT) is predicated on the notion that social 
comparisons between groups are focused on the establishment of positive group distinctiveness 
(Turner & Reynolds 2004). Specifically, SIT describes the process of social categorization 
where individuals are clustered into specific social groups, followed by social comparison 
between these groups by individuals who define and identify themselves as members of one of 
these groups by way of the process of social identification. Importantly, SIT proposes that we 
derive value from our group membership to the extent that we can compare our own group 
positively with other groups, and that we are therefore motivated to gain and maintain a sense 
of positive group distinctiveness from the other groups to which we do not belong (Spears 
2011).  
Essentially, SIT conceives specific processes of social categorization, social identification, and 
social comparison as ways in which individuals actively define social reality and their own 
position relative to others in that reality (Ellemers & Haslam 2011; Tajfel 1975, 1978). 
Furthermore, because the self is implicated in the group, individuals are motivated to 
emphasize and secure the ways in which their group is positively distinct from other groups 
(Ellemers & Haslam 2011; Tajfel 1978).  
3.3.2.5 The interpersonal-intergroup continuum 
Tajfel (1982) conceptualized social interaction as occurring along an ‘interpersonal-intergroup 
continuum’ situated between two hypothetical extremes. Tajfel (1982, p. 13) defined the 
‘interpersonal extreme’ as the “interaction between two or more individuals which is very 
largely determined by their individual characteristics and the nature of the personal relations 
between them” and the ‘intergroup extreme’ as the “interactions which are largely determined 
by group memberships of the participants and very little – if at all – by their personal relations 
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or individual characteristics”. In other words, this ‘interpersonal-intergroup continuum’ 
comprises personal identity - with the self defined exclusively in terms of ‘I’ and ‘me’ - at one 
extreme, and social identity - with the self defined exclusively in terms of ‘we’ and ‘us’ - at the 
opposite extreme, with movements or shifts along the continuum perceived as being a function 
of the interaction between psychological and social factors. 
Tajfel used this ‘interpersonal-intergroup continuum’ to explain when social identity processes 
were likely to come into operation and how social interaction differed qualitatively between 
both extremes. He argued that, as behaviour transitioned from the interpersonal to the 
intergroup extreme of the continuum, the attitudes and behaviour displayed by members of the 
ingroup towards the outgroup tended to become more uniform and consensual (Turner & 
Reynolds 2011; Tajfel 1982). Furthermore, this is accompanied by a “decrease in variability in 
the characteristics and behaviour of the members of the outgroup as they are perceived by 
members of the ingroup” (Tajfel 1982, p. 13) such that outgroup members became 
“undifferentiated items in a unified social category” (Tajfel 1981, p. 243, cited in Tajfel 1982) 
and therefore tended to be perceived as homogenous and undifferentiated members within their 
social category (Turner & Reynolds 2004). In this way: 
The phenomena of depersonalization, dehumanization, and social stereotyping which 
tend to increase in scope as and when intergroup relations deteriorate are no more than 
special instances of this wider principle of the increased undifferentiation of the 
outgroup (Tajfel 1982, p. 13; emphasis in original). 
 
In summary, Social Identity Theory (SIT) captures the “socially embedded, situated, shared, 
social, group-located properties of human beings” (Turner & Reynolds 2011, p. 400) by 
proposing that intergroup relations are governed by a complex interaction of cognitive, 
motivational and socio-historical factors (Hornsey 2008).  
3.4 Self-Categorization Theory  
After the death of Henri Tajfel in 1982, John Turner and colleagues aimed to move beyond the 
intergroup focus of Social Identity Theory by seeking to refine and elaborate on the intragroup 
cognitive processes that underpin group behaviour and group phenomena (Ellemers & Haslam 
2011; Hornsey 2008). This work culminated in the development of Self-Categorization Theory 
as an extension to Social Identity Theory and grew out of the same social identity tradition that 
John Turner had been involved in developing together with Henri Tajfel (Spears 2011).  
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As shown in Figure 3.2, with Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), John Turner and colleagues 
revisited the process of social categorization that was considered fundamental to Social Identity 
Theory (Hornsey 2008) and focused explicitly on the psychological basis of intragroup 
processes by delineating the psychological mechanisms underpinning group formation and 
social identity (Turner & Reynolds 2011, 2004). Accordingly, Hogg and Terry (2000, p. 123) 
described SCT as “that component of an extended social identity theory of the relationship 
between self-concept and group behaviour that details the social cognitive processes that 
generate social identity effects”.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Relationship between Self-Categorization Theory and Social Identity Theory, with                                      
                      Self-Categorization Theory focused explicitly on the process of social categorization. 
 
3.4.1 Functional antagonism 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) views interpersonal and intergroup dynamics as opposite extremes 
of a bipolar interpersonal-intergroup continuum (Tajfel 1982). However, unlike SIT, Self-
Categorization Theory (SCT) perceives identity as operating at different nested levels of 
inclusiveness or abstraction (Hornsey 2008). In their formal statement of SCT, Turner et al. 
(1987) characterized identity as belonging to either of three different levels of self-
categorization in which individuals can define or categorize themselves based on the various 
levels of inclusiveness or abstraction:  
(1)  at the interpersonal level, involving personal identity, where the self is defined as a    
 unique individual relative to other ingroup members, with attitude and behaviour   
 exclusively in terms of ‘I’ and ‘me’;  
(2)  at the intergroup level, involving social identity, where the self is defined as a   
 member of an ingroup relative to other relevant outgroups, with attitude and  
 behaviour exclusively in terms of ‘we’ and ‘us’; and  
(3)  at the superordinate level, involving human identity, where the self is defined as a   
 member of the human race relative to other life-forms (Turner & Reynolds 2011).  
Focus of  
Self-Categorization  
Theory (SCT) 
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Viewed in these terms, it is therefore apparent that: 
Self-categorization theory can be characterized as a hierarchical process … because the 
process generates the potential for the content of self to be determined by inferential 
cascades from categories to subcategories and other subordinate features (Abrams & 
Hogg 2004, p. 156). 
Furthermore, SCT also assumes that there is ‘functional antagonism’ between these different 
levels of self-categorization such that as one level of self-categorization becomes more salient 
and dominant, the other levels of self-categorization become less salient and dominant 
(Hornsey 2008). As Abrams and Hogg (2004, p.155) explained:  
The functional antagonism means that if self-categorization becomes salient at a 
particular level … self-categorization at the lower level … becomes less salient. Which 
level of categorization is salient is flexibly influenced by contextually bounded 
comparisons between potential ingroups and outgroups. 
Therefore, it is apparent that SCT argues that the definition of self is always relational and 
comparative (Spears 2011; Turner et al. 1994). In other words, the self can include and exclude 
attributes with great flexibility, but at any particular moment, the self is a specific product of a 
context-dependent comparison (Abrams & Hogg 2004). As a result, from a self-categorization 
perspective: 
The difference between personal and social identity is not a matter of the attributes that 
define the categories or of the abstract level of inclusiveness of the categories used to 
define self … What matters is how the self is actually being defined in a specific 
instance, the level of comparison and self-categorization that is actually taking place, 
and the subjective sense of self that results (Turner et al. 1994, p. 454).  
 
Accordingly, by reformulating the interpersonal-intergroup continuum espoused by SIT with a 
more hierarchical structure based on different levels of inclusiveness, SCTheory focuses and 
emphasizes more explicitly the fact that social categorizations can be made at various nested 
levels of inclusiveness or abstraction, and that the same individual can be included in multiple 
categories on the basis of different cross-cutting criteria (Ellemers & Haslam 2011).  
3.4.2 Identity salience 
Identity salience refers to the way a particular social context (that includes the self) is 
categorized and given ‘meaning’. It is based on the idea that the way a situation or social 
context is categorized and rendered meaningful by the perceiver will determine both self-
perception and behaviour (Turner & Reynolds 2011). Given the basic premise espoused by 
Self-Categorization Theory that identity operates at different nested levels of inclusiveness, the 
next issue was to address the factors that determine which identity - in terms of personal 
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identity, social identity or human identity as well as the content of that identity - will emerge 
in a given situation and to predict when individuals would define themselves in terms of their 
personal, social or human identities. In other words, given the constellation of identities to 
which individuals have access to, what factors determine which particular identity will become 
the basis for self-categorization in any one context? Specifically, the focus is on understanding 
when and how the group prototype becomes the psychologically salient basis for self-
conception, perception and behaviour. In this respect, Oakes’ (1987) research into self-
categorization and identity salience proved extremely insightful.   
Oakes’ (1987) notion of identity salience was adapted from Bruner’s (1957) analysis of 
categorization and perception. Bruner (1957, p. 124) had argued that “all perceptual experience 
is necessarily the end product of a categorization process” and used the formula of ‘relative 
accessibility x fit’ to describe the conditions under which a stimulus was captured by a category 
and given meaning by the perceiver, with the ultimate aim of providing the perceiver with the 
information needed to make sense of the stimulus and at the point when such information was 
required by the perceiver (Turner & Reynolds 2011). 
Oakes’ (1987) research into self-categorization and identity salience suggests an interaction 
between ‘category accessibility’ and ‘category fit’ that operates within the motivational 
framework provided by self-esteem and uncertainty reduction. Accordingly, SCT proposes that 
self-categorization and hence identity salience is the “function of an interaction between the 
‘readiness’ of a perceiver to use a particular self-category (its relative accessibility) and the 
‘fit’ between category specifications and the stimulus reality to be represented” (Oakes 1987, 
cited in Turner et al. 1994, p. 455). As Hogg and Terry (2000, p. 125) further elaborated: 
The cognitive system, governed by uncertainty reduction and self-enhancement 
motives, matches social categories to properties of the social context and brings into 
active use (i.e. makes salient) that category, rendering the social context and one’s place 
within it subjectively more meaningful. Specifically, there is an interaction between 
category accessibility and category fit so that people draw on accessible categories and 
investigate how well they fit the social field. The category that best fits the field 
becomes salient in that context … Once fully activated (as opposed to merely “tried 
on”) on the basis of optimal fit, category specifications organize themselves as 
contextually relevant prototypes and are used as a basis for the perceptual accentuation 
of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences, thereby maximizing separateness 
and clarity. Self-categorization in terms of the activated ingroup category then 
depersonalizes behaviour in terms of the ingroup prototype. 
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Therefore, it is clear that, SCT argues that self-categorization and hence the salience of a given 
identity is a product or outcome of an interaction between the relative accessibility or 
‘perceptual readiness’ of the individual to use a self-category in a given instance and the fit of 
that self-category to the underlying social reality (Oakes et al. 1991; Oakes 1987). 
3.4.2.1 Relative accessibility 
Relative accessibility or ‘perceptual readiness’ refers to an individual’s psychological 
predisposition to perceive a particular social category as salient (Spears 2011). It reflects not 
only perceiver variables such as an individual’s past experiences, present expectations, and 
current motives, values, goals and needs, but also “the active selectivity of the perceiver in 
being ready to use categories that are central, relevant, useful, or likely to be confirmed by the 
evidence of reality” (Gurin & Markus 1988, cited in Turner et al. 1994, p. 455).  
3.4.2.2 Fit 
Fit refers to the extent to which social categories are perceived to be diagnostic of real-world 
intergroup differences and thereby how accurately they reflect social reality (Hornsey 2008). 
It reflects the perceived level of consistency between the social stimuli and the social categories 
used to order them by evaluating how well the social categories capture or map out the social 
reality of a given context (Spears 2011). Fit can be considered in terms of two interrelated 
aspects - comparative fit and normative fit. 
3.4.2.2.1 Comparative fit and the meta-contrast principle 
Comparative fit is defined by the meta-contrast principle (Turner et al. 1987), which states that: 
… a collection of individuals tends to be categorized as a group to the degree inter alia 
that the perceived differences between them are less than the perceived differences 
between them and other people (outgroups) in the comparative context (Turner & 
Reynolds 2011, p. 404, emphasis in original).  
 
According to SCT, the formation of self-categories is partly a function of the meta-contrast 
between inter-category and intra-category differences (Ellemers & Haslam 2011) in that self-
categories form in such a way that maximizes intra-category similarities and inter-category 
differences (Hornsey 2008). In this way, individuals will tend to define themselves in terms of 
a specific self-category to the extent that the differences between members of that category on 
a particular dimension of judgment are perceived to be smaller than the differences between 
members of that category and others that are salient in a given context (Ellemers & Haslam 
2011). As Spears (2011, p. 209) explained: 
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The meta-contrast principle provides a way of calculating the fit in the context: meta-
contrast is maximized to the extent that between-group differences are large and within-
group differences are small on a given dimension. The higher the meta-contrast, the 
higher the likelihood that the categorization will become salient. Comparative fit refers 
to fit derived from these perceived differences in context.  
 
Put simply, individuals perceive a high level of comparative fit if the category distinction 
maximizes perceived inter-category differences and minimizes intra-category differences 
(Hornsey 2008).   
3.4.2.2.2 Normative fit 
Normative fit refers to the extent to which perceived similarities and differences between group 
members correlate with the social meaning of group membership and in a direction that is 
consistent with such meaning (Turner & Reynolds 2011). In other words, it is based on the 
meaning or the content associated with the social categories and whether or not such 
differences are typical of the social categorization based on prior expectations (Spears 2011). 
As Turner et al. (1994, pp. 455-456) explained: 
Normative fit refers to the content aspect of the match between category specifications 
and the instances being represented … Their similarities and differences must be 
consistent with [the perceiver’s] normative beliefs and theories about the substantive 
social meaning of the social category … There must be a systematic and meaningful 
correlation … between the perceived intra-group and inter-group differences and the 
relevant social categorization before individuals will be perceived in terms of that social 
categorization and their category identity accentuated (emphasis in original).   
Put simply, a category distinction is more likely to have a high level of normative fit if social 
behaviour and group membership are consistent and congruent with stereotypical expectations 
(Hornsey 2008).  
As such, SCT proposes that self-categorization and the salience of a given identity always 
reflects an interaction between comparative fit and normative fit as well as between fit and 
relative accessibility, with relative accessibility, in turn, reflecting cognitive, affective and 
motivational factors. In this way, SCT delineates and explains how self-categories and hence 
identity salience are “generated from an interaction among psychological principles of 
categorization, perceiver readiness, background knowledge and the social context of the 
perceiver” (Turner et al. 1994, p. 459). Importantly, by using the principles of relative 
accessibility and fit (comparative and normative), SCT renders it possible to explain and 
predict which identity will emerge to become salient, that will, in turn, determine and govern 
an individual’s self-perception and behaviour in any given context (Turner & Reynolds 2011).    
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3.4.3 Depersonalization and group prototypes 
One of the cornerstones of Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) is the notion of depersonalization 
(Hornsey 2008). Depersonalization refers to the psychological process in which individuals 
come to perceive themselves as an interchangeable exemplar of a social category (where self 
is defined in terms of social identity) rather than as a separate individual with unique traits and 
qualities (where self is defined in terms of personal identity) (Ellemers & Haslam 2011). 
Importantly, SCT views this depersonalization process as a psychological derivative of the 
meta-contrast principle (Turner et al. 1987) that governs both the formation of self-categories 
as well as the context-dependent representation of groups as prototypes (Hogg 2004). 
The meta-contrast principle states that both self-categories and group prototypes form in such 
a way that there is maximization of the ratio of inter-group differences to intra-group 
differences such that group prototypes maximize their similarities within groups, while at the 
same time, maximizing their differences between groups (Hogg 2004). Therefore, it follows 
that, when individuals are considered to be in the same class or category, they are cognitively 
grouped as similar and thus define themselves as members of a distinct social group. This 
similarity not only leads individuals within the same group to tend to agree, but also creates an 
expectation that they ought to agree and respond in the same manner (in terms of their reactions, 
judgments, attitudes and behaviour) which, in turn, further motivates ingroup members to bring 
about such agreement. As a result, individuals learn to develop the appropriate, expected and 
desirable behaviours that are correlated with ingroup membership, while, at the same time, 
differentiating these stereotypical ingroup norms from other relevant outgroups. Finally, 
through the process of depersonalization, individuals internalize these ingroup norms and 
assign these ingroup attributes to themselves such that, as their group membership and social 
identity becomes more salient, their behaviour also becomes more prototypical and normative 
(Turner 1987, cited in Turner & Reynolds 2011).  
Consequently, by way of the depersonalization process, individuals cognitively represent the 
defining and stereotypical attributes of their ingroups in the form of group prototypes. Group 
prototypes are “fuzzy-sets” (Hogg 1993) that are formed according to the meta-contrast 
principle and typically capture the context-dependent features of group membership, often in 
the form of: (a) representations of exemplary members (i.e. actual group members who best 
embody the group); or (b) ideal types (i.e. an abstraction of group features), such that it 
embodies all the attributes that characterize an ingroup (including its beliefs, attitudes, feelings 
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and behaviours), while, at the same time, distinguishing it from other relevant outgroups (Hogg 
& Terry 2000).  
Accordingly, SCT views ingroup members as perceptually depersonalized in that they are no 
longer represented as unique individuals, but rather as embodiments of the relevant group 
prototype (Hogg & Terry 2000) such that they are seen as possessing the same social identity 
and sharing the associated group attributes and norms (Abrams & Hogg 2010) as well as having 
a psychological essence that is reflected in the properties of their group prototypes (Hogg 
2004).  
Hornsey (2008, pp. 208-209) summarized the concept of depersonalization and group 
prototypes within the framework of SCT as follows:     
Proponents of SCT argue that people cognitively represent their social groups in terms 
of prototypes. When a social category or group becomes salient, people come to see 
themselves and other category members less as individuals and more as interchangeable 
exemplars of the group prototype. This group prototype is not an objective reality, but 
rather a subjective sense of the defining attributes of a social group that fluctuates 
according to context. [In this way,] [t]he group identity not only describes what it is to 
be a group member, but also prescribes what kinds of attitudes, emotions and 
behaviours are appropriate in a given context. 
 
In summary, SCT specifies the operation of the social categorization process as the cognitive 
basis of group behaviour (Hogg & Terry 2000). Specifically, it proposes that, as one moves 
from defining self as an individual (in terms of personal identity) to defining self as a group 
member (in terms of social identity), group behaviour becomes possible and emerges to the 
extent that when a shared social identity is psychologically operative or salient, there is 
prototype-based depersonalization of self-perception such that individuals’ perceptions of their 
mutual and collective similarities are enhanced and their behaviour becomes prototypical and 
normative (Turner & Reynolds 2004). Simply put, according to SCT, “the depersonalization 
of self-perception is the basic process underlying group phenomena” (Turner 1985, pp. 99-100) 
such that self-categorization cognitively assimilates the self to the ingroup prototype, thereby 
depersonalizing self-conception (Hogg & Terry 2000) and rendering the self and the ingroup 
psychologically one and the same (Abrams & Hogg 2004).  
Indeed, by bringing self-perception and behaviour in line with the contextually relevant ingroup 
prototype, the depersonalization process is thought to underpin a variety of group phenomena 
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such as normative behaviour, stereotyping, group cohesion, collective behavior and mutual 
influence (Hogg & Terry 2000). As Hogg (2004, p. 208) explained: 
… the critical contribution of self-categorization and social identity theory to the study 
of group processes is that they link social categorization to self-conception and 
psychological group membership. The core idea is that we categorize ourselves just as 
we categorize others, and thus we depersonalize ourselves (e.g. Turner et al. 1987). 
Prototype-based depersonalization of self is the process that makes group behaviour 
possible. It transforms self-conception so that we conceive of ourselves prototypically 
(prototypes define and evaluate the attributes of group membership), and our behaviour 
assimilates or conforms to the relevant ingroup prototype in terms of attitudes, feelings, 
and actions. Self-conception in terms of an ingroup prototype is a representation and 
evaluation of self in collective terms – a representation of self in terms of qualities 
shared with others … The collective self, or rather collective selves, is tightly tied to 
group membership.  
 
Viewed in these terms, it is evident that Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) represents a logical 
extension and an invaluable complement to the principles of Social Identity Theory (SIT) as 
originally formulated by Tajfel and Turner (1979). It is little wonder, therefore, that SIT and 
SCT - within the broad and overarching framework of the ‘social identity perspective’ (Turner 
1999) - have both been used as a theoretical framework in countless empirical investigations 
to inform and explain a wide range of group phenomena pertaining to both internal intragroup 
dynamics as well as external intergroup relations.    
Given the large amount of existing research into the various forms of intragroup and intergroup 
phenomena, a thorough and in-depth discussion of each phenomenon is obviously beyond the 
scope of this research thesis. As such, for the purposes of this research thesis, I shall limit my 
discussion to the existing research on social attraction and group cohesion, with specific 
emphasis on the research into deviance and the so-called ‘black sheep effect’, which I believe 
is directly relevant to understanding the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical 
codes’ framework introduced at the end of the chapter. 
 
3.5 Social attraction and group cohesion 
Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) views social identity as a natural consequence or outcome 
of an individual’s positive orientation towards the ingroup prototype by way of a process 
known as prototype-based depersonalization. Furthermore, as individuals assimilate 
themselves to an ingroup prototype, their attitudes and behaviour also conform to this prototype 
such that the ingroup prototype becomes internalized as a norm that defines the appropriate 
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features and behavioural standards of the social self (Marques et al. 1998b; Turner 1991). As 
Hogg (1992, pp. 90-91) explained: 
When a specific social identity is the salient basis for self-conception, self-perception 
and conduct become ingroup stereotypical and normative, perceptions of relevant 
outgroup members become outgroup stereotypical, and intergroup behaviour acquires 
– to varying degrees, depending on the history of relations between the groups – 
competitive and discriminatory properties.     
One of the key implications of SCT is captured by the ‘social attraction hypothesis’ (Hogg 
1987, 1992, 1993). The social attraction hypothesis draws a clear distinction between social 
attraction and personal attraction that parallels Social Identity Theory’s distinction between 
interpersonal and intergroup behaviour as originally formulated by Henri Tajfel (Hogg 1993). 
In other words, inter-individual evaluations, attitudes and feelings that are based on and 
generated by being members of the same group or members of different groups (i.e. 
depersonalized social attraction) are distinguished from those that are based on and generated 
by the idiosyncratic and complementarities of close and enduring inter-personal relationships 
(i.e. personal attraction) (Hogg & Terry 2000). Specifically, the social attraction hypothesis 
postulates that, when group membership becomes salient, the basis of evaluations of and 
feelings for other individuals is transformed from personal identity-based personal attraction 
to prototype-based depersonalized social attraction (Abrams & Hogg 2010). As Hogg (1993, 
pp. 94-95) explained: 
Social attraction – attraction among members of a salient social group – is different 
from genuine interpersonal attraction, in that it is depersonalized liking based upon 
prototypicality and generated by self-categorization. It is actually attraction to the group 
as that group is perceived to be embodied, in terms of its defining attributes, by specific 
group members. The object of positive attitudes and feelings is not actually the unique 
individual person, but the group prototype that he or she embodies. Targets are 
relatively interchangeable – they are depersonalized. How much individual group 
members are liked is thus a function of their perceived prototypicality and the degree 
to which the perceiver has a positive attitude towards the group as it is prototypically 
represented (emphasis in original). 
 
Therefore, based on the group prototype, individuals are able to assess the prototypicality of 
group members (including that of themselves) by assessing the extent to which a member is 
perceived to be close or similar to the group prototype (Hogg 1993). Accordingly, when group 
membership is salient, ingroup members are liked more if they embody the ingroup prototype 
such that where the prototype is consensual, certain individuals are consensually liked and 
where all members are highly prototypical, there is a tight network of social attraction (Hogg 
& Terry 2000). In other words, when social identity and group membership is salient, 
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individuals are judged as group members based on their closeness to ingroup and outgroup 
prototypes (Abrams & Hogg 2010), with groups becoming more cohesive to the extent that 
members are perceived to embody the core or prototypical features of the group (Wellen & 
Neale 2006).  
Viewed in these terms, it is evident that the notion of group cohesion and solidarity, together 
with the feelings that individuals have for one another within a social group, hinges on the 
perceived group prototypicality of members of the group (Hogg & Terry 2000). Indeed, prior 
research studies have provided much support for the social attraction hypothesis by 
demonstrating that prototypical group members are perceived as more attractive (Hogg & 
Hardie 1991; Hogg et al. 1995) and more competent (Scheepers et al. 2002) than atypical group 
members.  
3.6 Deviance and the black-sheep effect 
A key implication of the social attraction hypothesis is that less prototypical ingroup members, 
especially those who are prototypically marginal, will be liked and trusted less than ingroup 
members who are highly prototypical. In fact, in situations where group membership is salient, 
this process can be accentuated to the extent that prototypically marginal members may be 
entirely rejected by group members as so-called ‘negative deviants’ (Abrams & Hogg 2010).  
3.6.1 Negative deviants 
Deviance is defined as the violation of the norms of a group (Jetten & Hornsey 2014), or more 
specifically, a departure from the norms or values of a group resulting in behaviour that is 
deemed atypical or unusual (Marques et al. 1998a). Group norms act as standards that anchor 
judgments of what individuals believe ought to be consistent with ingroup membership 
(Marques et al. 2001b) and are responsible for defining the perceived content of the ingroup 
prototype which, in turn, prescribes the beliefs, perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of group 
members (Miller & Prentice 1996; Turner 1991).  
Therefore, in this sense, negative deviants can be viewed as group members whose behaviours 
diverge from group norms in a manner that has negative implications for the entire group as a 
whole. As Wellen and Neale (2006, p. 167) observed: 
These [deviant] behaviours may vary in seriousness, ranging from acts such as petty 
theft, tardiness, and gossip to sabotage and physical assault. Deviance is thus defined 
in relation to a normative standard for what is considered typical or expected behaviour 
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within a particular group … Norms reflect a consensual understanding of the core or 
prototypical features of a group. They describe patterns of behaviour that are regular, 
stable, and expected by members … As such, behaviour that departs from these norms 
will be seen as deviant by group members.    
 
Indeed, research evidence indicates that, negative deviants are disliked (Marques & Yzerbyt 
1988), viewed as less capable (Abrams et al. 2000), and are less likely to be selected as group 
leaders (Scheepers et al. 2002) than prototypical group members. Furthermore, prior research 
evidence has also established that individuals are generally more intolerant of ingroup deviants 
than of outgroup deviants - a phenomenon that has been termed the ‘black sheep effect’ 
(Marques et al. 1988).  
 
3.6.2 The black sheep effect 
The black sheep effect refers to the phenomenon where individuals judge likeable ingroup 
members more positively than similar outgroup members, while judging unlikeable ingroup 
members more negatively than similar outgroup members (Marques & Paez 1994). According 
to Social Identity Theory, in circumstances where social identity and group membership is 
salient, individuals who identify with the group are motivated by a desire to achieve and 
maintain positive group distinctiveness between their own group and relevant outgroups. As 
such, individuals engage in a process of intergroup differentiation based upon valued 
dimensions, resulting in a tendency towards ingroup favouritism that is manifested as 
concomitant ingroup bias as well as outgroup derogation (Hutchison et al. 2013).  
Indeed, this tendency to favour ingroup members over outgroup members even though they 
may be engaged in identical behaviours or hold similar attitudes and opinions is a well-
documented phenomenon that has been borne out by several research studies (e.g. Brewer 
1979; Mullen et al. 1992).  However, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, there is an important exception 
– known as the black sheep effect - where the opposite effect occurs and outgroup members are 
favoured over otherwise identical ingroup members.  
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Figure 3.3.  The ‘black sheep effect’ represents an important exception to the general tendency  
                       towards ingroup favouritism manifested as concomitant ingroup bias and outgroup  
                       derogation. 
 
 
In a series of psychological experiments, Marques and colleagues (Marques 1990; Marques & 
Yzerbyt 1988; Marques et al. 1988) demonstrated that desirable ingroup members were 
evaluated more positively than similarly desirable outgroup members, whereas undesirable 
ingroup members were evaluated more negatively than similarly undesirable outgroup 
members (see Marques & Paez 1994 for a review). As a result, Marques et al. (1988, p. 4) 
termed this phenomenon the black sheep effect to reflect the “simultaneous emergence of 
ingroup bias and outgroup bias” and concluded that:  
The black sheep hypothesis is thus in accordance with Social Identity Theory: The 
under-evaluation of dislikeable ingroup members may be an acceptable psychological 
strategy for preserving the group’s overall positivity. Therefore, the black sheep effect 
should be considered as a ‘sophisticated’ form of ingroup favouritism (Marques et al. 
1988, p. 5, emphasis in original).  
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3.6.3 Model of subjective group dynamics 
The black sheep effect demonstrated by Marques et al. (1988) raised an important and 
fundamental question: given that individuals generally favour ingroups over outgroups, why 
should they sometimes prefer an outgroup deviant over an ingroup deviant engaging in a 
similar type of behaviour? Accordingly, the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ (Abrams et 
al. 2000; Marques et al. 1998a; Marques et al. 2001a) focuses specifically on how and why, in 
an intergroup context, group members engage in intragroup differentiation by rejecting and 
derogating deviant ingroup members, as well as what the potential implications of this 
intragroup differentiation might be.  
Essentially, the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ (Abrams et al. 2000; Marques et al. 
1998a; Marques et al. 2001a) proposes that individuals evaluate deviant members as a function 
of whether they validate or undermine important ingroup norms, with their reactions shaped by 
their collective desire to enhance or maintain this subjective validity (Frings et al. 2012). 
Crucially, the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ emphasizes that the actions and attitudes 
of deviant members are not evaluated in isolation but rather in the context of a salient intergroup 
comparison (Jetten & Hornsey 2014). 
Specifically, the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ proposes that individuals subjectively 
exert control over the evaluative implications of their group memberships by way of a process 
known as subjective group dynamics that is aimed at simultaneously maintaining intergroup 
differentiation as well as intragroup differentiation (Marques et al. 1998a). Subjective group 
dynamics is defined as the process by which individuals maximize and sustain descriptive 
intergroup differentiation while simultaneously maximizing and sustaining the relative validity 
of prescriptive ingroup norms through intragroup differentiation (Abrams et al. 2000; Marques 
et al. 2001a). As Marques et al. (1998a, pp. 976-977) explained: 
We believe that even when participants have no interpersonal relationship with any 
individual group members, they are motivated to sustain a psychological representation 
of a cohesive, well-defined, and normatively legitimated group. In doing so, they may 
be able to bolster their own sense of subjective reality and self-worth. In this vein, 
category [or intergroup] differentiation and normative [or intragroup] differentiation 
operate jointly. The former establishes the category membership of group members 
(e.g. male or female), whereas the latter establishes the extent to which individual group 
members adhere to category norms (e.g. masculine and feminine traits or behaviours).   
 
Crucially, unlike Self-Categorization Theory that assumes functional antagonism between 
intergroup differentiation and intragroup differentiation (such that greater differentiation 
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between groups implies less differentiation within groups and vice versa), the model of 
subjective group dynamics argues that there is sometimes functional complementarity between 
intergroup differentiation and intragroup differentiation. Specifically, the model states that, in 
order to actively define and defend important ingroup norms that, in turn, determine and 
validate the positive distinctiveness of the group, individuals are likely to discriminate against 
deviant ingroup members who threaten ingroup norms (Marques et al. 1998a). Indeed, as 
Marques et al. (2001a, p. 406) commented: 
In other words, when group membership is the salient basis for self-regulation, the most 
relevant goal is, by definition, the subjective validation of social identity. Ingroup 
members who conform to the ingroup prototype validate people’s social identity and 
thus attract positive reactions. In contrast, deviant behaviour jeopardizes people’s 
confidence in the distinctiveness of the ingroup’s positive characteristics relative to 
relevant outgroups, and thus attracts negative reactions. Derogation of ingroup deviants 
is functional for the group – it protects positive social identity by enforcing normative 
solidarity. 
 
Accordingly, the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ proposes that group member’s 
reactions to deviant members involve two distinct but interrelated processes that occur at the 
intergroup and intragroup levels, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. As Marques et al. (2001a, p. 402) 
further elaborated: 
First, group members need to perceive the extent of deviation at the intragroup level. 
However, merely noticing that a group member has deviated is not sufficient to provoke 
negative evaluations and judgments. The critical issue is how the deviation affects the 
subjective validity of the ingroup norm. Consequently, group members also assess the 
meaning of the deviance in relation to that norm .… Specifically, evidence that is 
convergent with ingroup norms may increase these norms’ subjective validity, and 
evidence that is divergent decreases the norm’s validity. Therefore, people should 
dislike ingroup members who diverge from ingroup norms even more than they dislike 
outgroup members. Concomitantly, at least in certain conditions, individuals might 
actually like outgroup members whose relative support for ingroup norms boosts the 
relative validity of these norms (emphasis in original).   
 
Additionally, the model also distinguishes between ‘descriptive (or denotative) norms’ and 
‘prescriptive norms’ (Marques et al. 1998b; Marques et al. 2001a). ‘Descriptive norms’ define 
group prototypes. Therefore, in order to differentiate the ingroup from relevant outgroups, these 
group prototypes are framed by criteria that apply to both the ingroup and outgroups. In contrast, 
‘prescriptive norms’ perform a regulatory function within the ingroup, as they apply only in 
situations where group members behave in ways that conflict with ingroup expectations (but 
without necessarily decreasing intergroup distinctiveness). It follows, therefore, that while 
descriptive norm deviance reduces the clarity of group prototypes and thus of intergroup 
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boundaries, prescriptive norm deviance threatens the validity of the ingroup consensus at the 
intragroup level, thereby potentially jeopardizing the distinctiveness and legitimacy of positive 
evaluations for the ingroup (Abrams et al. 2000).  
Figure 3.4. The model of subjective group dynamics. Source: Marques et al. (2001a, p. 414).  
Consistent with this distinction between descriptive and prescriptive norms, the ‘model of 
subjective group dynamics’ proposes that, once intergroup distinctiveness is established by 
descriptive norms derived from the metacontrast principle, ingroup members will then devote 
attention to prescriptive norms that ensure consensus on the criteria for positive ingroup 
evaluation (Marques et al. 2001a). Therefore, according to the model, the black sheep effect 
entailing the derogation of ingroup deviants is a natural consequence of the following sequence 
of events.  
Firstly, consistent with Self-Categorization Theory, self-categorization and prototype-based 
depersonalization results in individuals establishing their respective category prototypes, 
assimilating to the ingroup prototype, engaging in ingroup prototypical conduct, and expecting 
other ingroup and outgroup members to match the prototypical expectancies ascribed to their 
respective groups. Descriptive norms serve to define the relevant properties that differentiate 
between groups, as well as features that the perceiver shares with or does not share with these 
groups. As a result, the ingroup member’s focus is restricted to a shared ingroup image that 
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generates perceptual interchangeability between self and ingroup, and perceptual discontinuity 
between self and outgroup, which provides ingroup members with not only a sense of 
distinctiveness of their social identity, but also with subjective validity of their beliefs relative 
to this social identity (Marques et al. 2001a).  
In the absence of deviant behaviour within the ingroup, the activated descriptive norms will 
suffice to generate intergroup differentiation and to legitimize the ingroup’s superiority and 
positive distinctiveness. This process corresponds to the intergroup level as depicted in the 
upper half of Figure 3.4 (Marques et al. 1998b). However, when deviant behaviour that could 
potentially threaten intergroup differentiation is perceived to be present within the ingroup, the 
process of subjective group dynamics is triggered such that individuals respond by derogating 
ingroup members who fail to adhere to the prescriptive norms of the group. This process 
corresponds to the intragroup level as depicted in the lower half of Figure 3.4. It represents a 
subjective effort to exert control over those members who threaten the overall positive 
distinctiveness of the group and its relative superiority over relevant outgroups. In this way, 
the process of subjective group dynamics is aimed at legitimizing intergroup differentiation 
between the ingroup and relevant outgroups by ensuring the ingroup’s uniformity with regards 
to the prescribed standards that sustain the ingroup’s superiority and positive distinctiveness 
(Marques et al. 1998b). 
3.6.4 Motives for rejecting deviance in groups  
In their summary review of prior research into the phenomenon of deviance and dissent within 
groups, Jetten and Hornsey (2014) identified five distinct motives that underpin the rejection 
and derogation of ingroup deviants by group members, as depicted in Figure 3.5.  
1. Restoring Threatened Group Positivity: 
Proponents of Social Identity Theory argue that, since deviant ingroup members reflect 
negatively on the group as a whole (Hutchison et al. 2011), rejecting and derogating ingroup 
deviants allows group members to maintain a positive and distinctive social identity by 
psychologically excluding deviants from the representation of the ingroup (Hutchison et al. 
2013; Yzerbyt et al. 2000). Marques and Paez (1994, p. 38) went even further by stating 
explicitly that, “derogation of unlikeable ingroupers is a cognitive-motivational strategy to 
purge from the group those ingroup members who negatively contribute to social identity”, 
thus in effect, “separating the ‘good representatives’ from the ‘black sheep’” (Marques & Paez 
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1994, p. 63). Viewed in these terms, it is thus evident that the ingroup deviant is portrayed in 
such an extremely negative light that he or she can no longer be seen as representative of the 
ingroup. Indeed, by psychologically excluding the deviant from the representation of the 
ingroup, the ingroup’s overall positive image is maintained or even enhanced (Hutchison et al. 
2013; Hutchison et al. 2008; Hutchison & Abrams 2003).  
This notion that individuals’ reactions to deviant ingroup members reflect a strategic goal of 
sustaining or even enhancing positive ingroup identity have gained much support from prior 
research studies which indicate that, undesirable ingroup members are derogated more: (a) by 
high identifiers than by low identifiers (Hutchison et al. 2008; Hutchison & Abrams 2003; 
Castano et al. 2002); (b) when the deviant behaviour relates to a dimension of comparison that 
is directly relevant to ingroup identity and thus intergroup differentiation (Chekroun & Nugier 
2011; Marques 1990; Marques et al. 1988); (c) when the value of the group’s identity is 
threatened (Branscombe et al. 1993); or (d) when the group’s position is unstable or challenged 
(Marques et al. 2001b). Furthermore, research evidence suggests that, the stronger the level of 
ingroup identification, the more negatively the deviant ingroup member was evaluated plus                 
(a) the greater the shift towards a more positive ingroup stereotype (Hutchison et al. 2008); and 
(b) the more homogeneous the ingroup was perceived to be by group members (Hutchison et 
al. 2013).  
In summary, since group members are motivated by their desire to perceive their group in a 
positive light, they are thus especially keen to purge their group of deviant members who 
behave in a dislikeable or incompetent manner. Accordingly, by distancing the group from 
qualities that reflect poorly upon it, the rejection and heightened derogation of ingroup deviants 
serves an important group identity-enhancing function. 
2. Restoring Threatened Group Cohesion: 
Besides being motivated to perceive their group as positive, group members are also motivated 
by their desire to perceive their group as tight, well-defined and cohesive (Jetten & Hornsey 
2014). One reason for this is that cohesive groups offer their members certainty and structure 
about what to think and how to behave (Festinger 1950). As such, the rejection and heightened 
derogation of ingroup deviants provides a way of protecting the subjective validity of one’s 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviour (Jetten & Hornsey 2014). 
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Interestingly, however, Hutchison et al. (2011) found that deviant ingroup members were 
evaluated more positively when the group was heterogenous compared to when it was 
homogeneous. In a follow-up experiment, they also found that deviant ingroup members were 
evaluated more positively when the group was homogeneous and group members valued 
heterogeneity, but were evaluated more negatively when the group was heterogeneous and 
group members valued homogeneity (Hutchison et al. 2011). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that deviant members will not be inevitably rejected by the group, but rather that group 
members’ reactions to deviance are shaped and guided by the dynamic relationship between 
how the group is perceived by its members and their ideological beliefs about what is good and 
valuable for the group in a particular context (Hutchison et al. 2011). As Hutchison et al. (2011, 
p. 1160) observed: 
When the group is heterogeneous and homogeneity is valued, deviant or dissenting 
opinions further undermine uniformity and group members expressing such opinions 
are therefore disliked. Conversely, when the group is homogeneous and the group 
values heterogeneity, deviant group members contribute positively to the amount of 
variability in the group and hostility towards such members is therefore attenuated.  
 
3. Restoring Threatened Group Distinctiveness: 
Apart from threatening within-group cohesion, deviant ingroup members may also undermine 
between-group distinctiveness by reducing the clarity of ingroup boundaries and diluting the  
ingroup’s ability to provide meaning and self-definition for members (Jetten & Hornsey 2014). 
As Hogg and Terry (2000, p. 127) explained: 
By being aprototypical, particularly in a direction that leans towards a salient outgroup, 
a marginal ingrouper jeopardizes the distinctiveness and prototypical clarity and 
integrity of the ingroup. This may introduce the threat of uncertainty. Thus, fellow 
ingroupers, especially those for whom uncertainty is particularly threatening, will 
strongly reject the deviant in order to consolidate a clear prototype to which they can 
strongly assimilate themselves through self-categorization.   
  
As such, by excluding deviant members that threaten important group norms from the rest of 
the group, the rejection and heightened derogation of ingroup deviants provides a way of 
restoring the clarity of ingroup boundaries, thereby maintaining between-group distinctiveness 
and thus ensuring intergroup differentiation (Jetten & Hornsey 2014). However, research 
evidence indicates that, it is not the particular actions or attitude positions adopted by a deviant 
member that determine whether he or she is favoured or derogated by other group members, 
but rather the implications of those actions for the subjective validity of the ingroup’s norms in 
the context of a salient intergroup comparison. Specifically, Marques et al. (2001b) found that 
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deviant ingroup members were derogated more extremely when the group was heterogeneous 
in terms of the group’s adherence to an important group norm as compared to when it was 
homogeneous, thus suggesting that the derogation of ingroup deviants is dependent on the 
extent to which group norms or values are validated or undermined in a social context. In fact, 
it is this notion that individuals subjectively exert control over the evaluative implications of 
their group memberships that forms the basis of the so-called ‘model of subjective group 
dynamics’ (Abrams et al. 2000; Marques et al. 1998a; Marques et al. 2001a) [see previous 
section on ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ for further details].     
4. Restoring Threatened Group Locomotion: 
Besides reducing the clarity of group boundaries and jeopardizing between-group 
distinctiveness, deviant ingroup members, by way of their violation and non-compliance with 
important group norms, may also cause emotional, cognitive and communicative stress for the 
group (Jetten & Hornsey 2014), thereby significantly undermining the ability of the group to 
achieve its goals [or what Festinger (1950) described as ‘group locomotion’]. Indeed, dealing 
with deviant members can be emotionally and cognitively taxing for the group, with cognitive 
resources needed to cognitively ‘fence off’ deviant members from the rest of the group (Coull 
et al. 2001). As a result, the actions of deviant members are met with frustration when they 
slow the group down and prevent it from achieving its goals. Accordingly, the rejection and 
heightened derogation of ingroup deviants serves the function of excluding those members who 
stand in the way of group achievement (Jetten & Hornsey 2014).  
5. Restoring Threatened Self-Image: 
Aside from the fact that deviant members may significantly undermine the ability of the group 
to achieve its goals, deviant members who conspicuously oppose a group norm, expectation or 
convention that they perceive to be immoral [what Monin et al. (2008) termed as ‘moral rebels’] 
can also represent a threat to group members on three fronts: (a) firstly, the rebel’s moral stance 
is seen as an implicit criticism of those who did not take the stance, with group members 
anticipating condemnation from the rebel; (b) secondly, the rebel’s actions makes one question 
one’s own assumptions and attitudes, leading to a dissonance-like state; and (c) thirdly, the 
rebel strips those group members who conspire in immoral acts from the rationalization that 
they had no choice, thereby forcing them to confront their own actions and leading to an 
existential crisis (Monin et al. 2008). In each case, these moral rebels arouse resentment by 
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other group members to such an extent that a solution to the threat posed by moral rebels is for 
the rest of the group to derogate them and deny that they are moral at all (Jetten & Hornsey 
2014).   
 
Figure 3.5.  Diagram depicting the possible motives that underpin derogation and punishment for  
                      ingroup deviant behaviour together with the specific factors that potentially influence its  
                      severity. Adapted from Jetten & Hornsey (2014).  
 
3.6.5 Mediating factors influencing severity of ingroup deviant punishment  
Aside from identifying the possible motives that underpin the rejection and derogation of 
ingroup deviants by group members, Jetten and Hornsey (2014) also identified specific factors 
that might potentially influence the severity of derogation and punishment for ingroup deviant 
behaviour by group members. As Figure 3.5 illustrates, these mediating factors include: 
 
1. Factors specific to ingroup deviant: 
These include personal considerations such as: 
(a)  past deviant behaviour, with repeat offenders receiving harsher and more severe      
 punishment for their actions than first-time offenders (Gollwitzer & Keller 2010); 
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(b)  certainty of guilt, with group members reacting more negatively to ingroup than    
 outgroup suspects when guilt was certain, but group members reacting more   
 negatively to outgroup than ingroup suspects when guilt was uncertain (Van Prooijen   
 2006); 
(c)  remorse and willingness to abandon deviant position, with group members’ intention   
 to punish diminishing considerably: (i) when suspects express remorse (e.g.   
 Carlsmith et al. 2002), and (ii) when they are willing to abandon their deviant  
 position (Chan et al. 2010); 
(d)  severity of actions and objective harm to the group, with violations of group norms  
 resulting in most severe derogation by high identifiers who are, by definition,  
 especially sensitive to the integrity of the group’s norms (Castano et al. 2002; 
 Hornsey & Jetten 2003); 
(e)  deviant member’s position within group hierarchy, with: (i) powerful group members  
 given the freedom to behave in a more idiosyncratic way than non-powerful members  
 (Galinsky et al. 2008), and (ii) dissenters and divergent thinkers being more tolerated  
  by group members when they are prototypical members of the group (Rijnbout &  
  McKimmie 2012); 
(f)  duration of group membership (‘old timer’ versus ‘new comer’), with group 
 members being more willing to embrace criticism when the critic has been a member  
 of the group for a long time than when the same criticisms come from a newcomer to  
 the group (Hornsey et al. 2007b); and 
(g)  constructiveness of intentions on the part of the deviant member, with ingroup critics            
       being tolerated only when their message is intended to be constructive and when it is   
       clear that they have the best interests of the group at heart (Hornsey et al. 2004). 
 
2. Factors specific to group: 
These include group considerations such as: 
(a) stage of group life, with: (i) strong pressures on members to conform with group norms 
in the initial phases when the group has just formed (Agazarian & Gantt 2003; Worchel 
1998), and (ii) dissent or independent thinking being more likely to be viewed with 
suspicion by group members in the early stages of group formation (Rink & Ellemers 
2009; Van Dyne & Saavedra 1996); 
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(b) cultural and societal norms (collectivist versus individualistic values), with greater 
conformity in collectivist cultures than in individualist cultures (Bond & Smith 1996), 
presumably because dissent is punished more harshly in groups with collectivist values 
(Hornsey et al. 2006); 
(c) extent of support received from group members, with group members being more 
dismissive of a sole dissenter than of a group of dissenters (Asch 1951; Haslam & 
Reicher 2012). 
 
3. Strategic factors: 
Group members are known to weigh up strategic considerations that take into account such 
questions as: who is watching? what can be gained? what can be lost? This is evidenced by the 
well-established phenomenon known as offence visibility in which the willingness of group 
members to confront and punish deviant behaviour changes or varies as a function of the nature 
and status of the audience (Jetten & Hornsey 2014).  
Indeed, when deciding upon the severity of derogation and punishment for ingroup deviant 
behaviour, group members typically take into consideration the audience in terms of:   
(a) the public versus private nature of the audience, with ingroup deviant behaviour  being 
rated more negatively when evaluations are public than when participants evaluate them 
privately (Hornsey et al. 2007a); and 
(b) the high versus low status of the audience, with: (i) low identifiers and newcomers 
tending to express conformity and confront norm violations by other group members 
only when they are being monitored by a high-status audience (Jetten et al. 2006, 2010), 
and (ii) high identifiers and old-timers tending to defend group norms and confront 
norm violations by other group members regardless of the status of the audience but 
especially when the group is vulnerable – either because they were communicating to 
an outgroup audience or because intergroup competition was particularly salient 
(Packer 2014). 
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3.7 Social identity perspective of professional ethical codes 
As previously discussed, the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ (Abrams et al. 2000; 
Marques et al. 1998a; Marques et al. 2001a) distinguishes between ‘descriptive norms’ and 
‘prescriptive norms’. Within the context of the accounting profession, professional ethical 
codes can be thought of as the real-world equivalent of ‘prescriptive norms’ in that they 
perform a regulatory function by serving as the benchmark standards for determining and 
assessing deviant behaviour within the ranks of the accounting profession. Typically, these so-
called negative deviants have adverse implications for the accounting profession as a whole, 
and thus warrant the attention of the accounting profession together with appropriate actions 
by the professional accounting bodies. However, the perceived role of professional ethical 
codes as well as the actual manner in which negative deviants are treated and dealt with by the 
professional accounting bodies differ according to whether professional accounting bodies’ 
disciplinary processes are driven by the accounting profession’s emphasis on protecting the 
public interest or the private interests of the accounting profession.  
Specifically, the public interest role of professional ethical codes, as defined by the 
functionalist perspective, views professional ethical codes as control mechanisms that facilitate 
self-policing of the profession in order to protect the public from unscrupulous and unqualified 
practitioners, thereby addressing the tension between the accounting profession’s pursuit of 
autonomy and the society’s demand for accountability. On the other hand, the private interest 
role of professional ethical codes, as defined by the monopolist and status perspectives, views 
professional ethical codes as: (a) public relations devices aimed at legitimizing the accounting 
profession’s self-serving arrangements in the name of professionalism; and (b) playing a 
central role in determining both the extra-professional status of the accounting profession as 
well as the intra-professional status of its members concurrently. As Abbott (1983) explained: 
By offering explicit guarantees of professional behaviour, the new controls placed an 
intermediary between the individual professional and the general service claims of the 
profession … The group as a whole explicitly claimed status for its disinterested 
service. But its members claimed extraprofessional status explicitly, through their 
membership in the group. This membership was underlined and celebrated by 
allegiance to professional controls … (Abbott 1983, p. 869).  
If the colleague obligations of ethics codes serve principally to affirm membership and 
solidarity, then violators impugn the group itself and [therefore] must take a lower rank 
within it, [thereby adversely affecting their intraprofessional status] (Abbott 1983,                  
p. 871). 
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Accordingly, the private interest role of professional ethical codes can be arguably better 
explained by way of the ‘black sheep effect’ together with the ‘model of subjective group 
dynamics’. Firstly, consistent with Self-Categorization Theory, self-categorization and 
prototype-based depersonalization results in accountants establishing and assimilating to the 
group prototype, engaging in prototypical behaviour, and expecting other members to match 
the prototypical behaviour as spelt out by the accounting profession’s ethical codes. Descriptive 
norms (such as an accounting versus non-accounting education) provide accountants with not 
only a sense of distinctiveness of their social identity, but also with subjective validity of their 
beliefs relative to this social identity. In the absence of deviant behaviour within the ranks of 
the accounting profession, these activated descriptive norms will suffice to legitimize the 
accounting profession’s positive distinctiveness and its relative superiority over other social 
groups, thus in effect helping to determine the extra-professional status of the accounting 
profession.  
However, when deviant behaviour is perceived to be present within the ranks of the accounting 
profession, the process of subjective group dynamics is triggered such that the professional 
accounting bodies respond by derogating and punishing those deviant members who violate 
the accounting profession’s ethical codes (or prescriptive norms). This represents a subjective 
effort to exert control over those negative deviant members by derogating and punishing them 
and forcing them to take a lower rank within the accounting profession, thus in effect adversely 
affecting their intra-professional status. In this way, the process of subjective group dynamics 
is aimed at sustaining the accounting profession’s overall positive distinctiveness and 
legitimizing its relative superiority over other social groups by ensuring uniformity with respect 
to the accounting profession’s ethical codes. 
Accordingly, by incorporating the concepts and principles espoused by Social Identity Theory 
and Self-Categorization Theory as well as research evidence pertaining to the ‘black sheep 
effect’ and the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’, I propose an alternative framework to 
conceptualize the motives and rationale that underpin the operation of professional ethical 
codes within the disciplinary architecture established by the professional accounting bodies. I 
term this alternative framework ‘the social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’. 
Figure 3.6 provides a diagrammatic representation of this alternative framework based on the 
‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ (bottom half) alongside the existing 
framework based on the ‘sociological perspectives of professional ethical codes’ (top half).  
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Figure 3.6.  Diagrammatic representation of existing framework based on sociological perspectives            
                      of professional ethical codes (top half) compared with proposed alternative framework    
                      based on the social identity perspective of professional ethical codes (bottom half). 
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As Figure 3.6 demonstrates, according to the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical 
codes’, whether professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes are motivated and 
driven by the public interest or the private interest of the accounting profession is dependent 
on the salience of identity adopted by members of the disciplinary committee tasked with 
enforcement of professional ethical codes. Consistent with the principles espoused by Self-
Categorization Theory, the salience of identity adopted by disciplinary committee members is 
contingent on their perceptions of the social context. Specifically, one would expect 
professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes to be driven by the public interest when 
the salience of identity is at the superordinate level, with disciplinary committee members 
adopting a human identity and thus motivated by their responsibilities and obligations as a 
member of the community or society. Conversely, one would expect professional accounting 
bodies’ disciplinary processes to be driven by the private interest of the accounting profession 
when the salience of identity is at the intergroup level, with disciplinary committee members 
adopting a social identity and thus motivated by their desire to sustain the accounting 
profession’s overall positive distinctiveness as well as to legitimize its relative superiority over 
other social groups.  
Furthermore, by drawing parallels between the ‘black-sheep effect’ and the attitudes and 
actions of disciplinary committee members in circumstances where social identity is salient at 
the intergroup level (i.e. the private interest argument), the social identity perspective not only 
identifies the five possible motives that underpin the private interest argument but also 
describes the specific psychological mechanisms that subconsciously occur within the minds 
of the disciplinary committee members for any given social context (see Figure 3.6). 
3.8 Why social identity perspective? 
This alternative framework based on the social identity perspective has several conceptual 
advantages over the existing framework based on the sociological perspectives of professional 
ethical codes. Firstly, unlike the sociological perspectives whose primary focus is on 
professional ethical codes per se, the social identity perspective is focused exclusively on the 
collective psychology of members of the disciplinary committee tasked with enforcement of 
professional ethical codes within the disciplinary architecture established by the professional 
accounting bodies. Since professional ethical codes are inherently neutral (with the potential to 
protect the public interest and/or the private interest of the accounting profession), it is human 
intervention, by way of the disciplinary committee within the professional accounting bodies’ 
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disciplinary processes, that is responsible for determining disciplinary outcomes. Therefore, it 
follows that disciplinary committee members represent a more appropriate level of analysis in 
determining whether disciplinary outcomes are based on a public interest or a private interest 
motive and rationale. After all, it is only through the disciplinary committee established within 
the professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes that the accounting profession is 
able to influence and prevail upon whether the public interest or the private interest will 
ultimately serve as the basis for deciding the disciplinary outcomes for those deviant members 
who have violated or otherwise failed to comply with the accounting profession’s ethical codes. 
Secondly, unlike the rigid ‘all-or-nothing’ binary thinking promoted by the sociological 
perspectives of professional ethical codes, the social identity perspective is highly flexible and 
versatile as it allows for the possibility of switching between either the public interest or private 
interest perspectives depending on the salience of identity of the disciplinary committee 
members, which is, in turn, contingent on their perceptions of the social context in question. 
By adopting a flexible approach as opposed to the philosophical and dogmatic approach 
advocated by the sociological perspectives of professional ethical codes, I believe that the 
social identity perspective will prove to be much more useful and valuable in enhancing our 
understanding of the actual motives and rationale that underpin the accounting profession’s 
ethical codes and its disciplinary process than the existing approach.  
Thirdly, the social identity perspective has the added benefit of being able to identify the 
possible motives as well as the specific psychological mechanisms that subconsciously occur 
within the minds of the disciplinary committee members in circumstances where social identity 
is salient at the intergroup level (i.e. the private interest argument). In so doing, the ‘social 
identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ provides a coherent framework that not only 
predicts disciplinary outcomes for statistical testing of specific hypotheses, but also facilitates 
interpretation of the statistical results and research findings as well as proffering possible 
reasons that might potentially account for the observed findings. This feature is clearly lacking 
with the existing framework based on the sociological perspectives of professional ethical 
codes. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, unlike the sociological perspectives, the social identity 
perspective is fully compatible with the empirical evidence from subsequent research studies 
that professional ethical codes protect both the public interest as well as the private interest of 
the accounting profession. This fact alone speaks for its conceptual rigour and underscores the 
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potential for the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ to revolutionize our 
understanding of the actual motives and rationale that underpin the operation of professional 
ethical codes by the accounting profession.  
3.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter described the theoretical framework that underpins the design and analysis of this 
research thesis together with a review of its origins and historical development. The first section 
outlined the principles of Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory within the 
overarching framework of the ‘social identity perspective’. Social Identity Theory proposes 
that, in circumstances where social identity and group membership is salient, individuals who 
identify with the group are motivated by a desire to achieve and maintain positive group 
distinctiveness between their own group and relevant outgroups. Self-Categorization Theory, 
on the other hand, views group members as perceptually depersonalized, with a psychological 
essence that is reflected in their group prototypes by way of a process known as prototype-
based depersonalization.  
The second section introduced the black sheep effect and discussed existing research on 
deviance together with the motives for rejecting deviance in groups. Social Identity Theory has 
established that, in circumstances where social identity is salient, prototypical behaviour that 
conforms to important group norms results in a tendency towards ingroup favouritism that is 
manifested as concomitant ingroup bias and outgroup derogation. However, there is an 
important exception - known as the black sheep effect - where the opposite effect occurs such 
that, in situations where group members exhibit aprototypical behaviour that violates or 
deviates from important group norms, the ingroup deviant is derogated and punished more 
severely than otherwise identical outgroup members. Prior research on deviance has identified 
five distinct motives that underpin the black sheep effect and the rejection of deviants in groups: 
(1) restoring threatened group positivity; (2) restoring threatened group cohesion; (3) restoring 
threatened group distinctiveness; (4) restoring threatened group locomotion; and (5) restoring 
threatened self-image. 
In order to address some of the conceptual limitations associated with the existing framework 
based on the sociological perspectives, the final section introduced an alternative framework 
based on the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ to conceptualize the 
motives and rationale that underpin the operation of professional ethical codes within the 
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disciplinary architecture established by the professional accounting bodies. By focusing 
exclusively on the collective psychology of members of the disciplinary committee tasked with 
enforcement of professional ethical codes, the social identity perspective proposes that, in 
circumstances where the salience of identity is at the intergroup level with disciplinary 
committee members adopting a social identity, professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary 
processes are motivated and driven by the private interest of the accounting profession. 
Conversely, in circumstances where the salience of identity is at the superordinate level with 
disciplinary committee members adopting a human identity, professional accounting bodies’ 
disciplinary processes are motivated and driven by the public interest. It is thus through this 
prism as defined by the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ that this 
research thesis is grounded in and predicated upon. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR:   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter is divided into three sections: the first section briefly introduces the nature of 
quantitative research in terms of its philosophical orientation and key assumptions followed by 
an explanation of the research design; the second section discusses the contextual background 
surrounding the source of the data, with specific emphasis on the structure of the disciplinary 
processes for the two major Australian professional accounting bodies; and the final section 
provides details on data collection and data analysis and explains how the findings collectively 
serve to answer the stated research questions and achieve the stated research objective. 
4.2 Quantitative research  
In order to fully address the stated research questions and achieve the stated research objective, 
this research thesis adopts a quantitative research approach. The quantitative research 
approach represents the procedure for collecting and statistically analyzing numerical data in 
order to test objective theories by examining the relationships among variables (Creswell 
2014), with the ultimate aim of developing causative explanations or laws that make prediction 
possible (Smith 1983). Specifically, quantitative research is the type of research that aims to 
distil complex social phenomena into simpler representations (O’Dwyer & Bernauer 2014) by 
combining deductive logic with precise empirical observations in order to discover and confirm 
a set of probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human activity 
(Neuman 2011). 
4.2.1 Philosophical orientation and assumptions 
Postpositivism is typically regarded as the philosophical partner of quantitative research. 
Postpositivism refers to the paradigm that arose historically after positivism and thus served as 
a replacement for positivism (Creswell 2014; Phillips & Burbules 2000).  
The principles of both positivism and postpositivism are based on the philosophical stance of 
the natural scientist, with the fundamental belief or assumption that the social world can be 
investigated in the same manner as the natural world, and that there is a method for 
investigating the social world that is objective and value-free that results in the production of 
causative explanations (often called ‘laws’) (Mertens 2010). However, where positivism and 
postpositivism differ is in their notions of the nature of truth or reality. Positivists possess a 
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narrow traditional viewpoint that there is only one reality and that knowledge is absolute and 
limited to only what can be observed (Mertens 2010). In contrast, postpositivists challenge this 
traditional notion of absolute truth and assert that knowledge is conjectural and that absolute 
truth can never be found, as the evidence established in research is always imperfect and fallible 
(Creswell 2014). In other words, while postpositivists concur that there is indeed only one 
reality, they argue that this reality can be understood only “imperfectly and probabilistically” 
(Guba & Lincoln 2005, p. 195, cited in Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009) such that researchers 
cannot be absolutely positive about their knowledge claims when studying the behaviour and 
actions of humans (Creswell 2014). As such, postpositivism may be defined as a replacement 
paradigm for positivism that allows for the possibility of prediction at the group level and in 
probabilistic form as well as the culture-boundness of research questions, methods and 
inferences (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009).  
Conceptually, postpositivism forms the philosophical underpinnings of the quantitative 
researcher’s belief that, “there are some reasonably stable relationships among social 
phenomena that may be known imperfectly or probabilistically” (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009, 
p. 93), with the development of knowledge predicated upon careful observation and 
measurement of the objective reality that exists ‘out there’ in the world (Creswell 2014). 
Therefore, it follows that, under the postpositivism research paradigm, research is the process 
of making knowledge claims and then refining or abandoning some of these claims for other 
claims that are more strongly warranted (Creswell 2014; Phillips & Burbules 2000). 
4.2.2 Research design 
Consistent with the philosophical approach espoused by postpositivism, this research thesis 
employs a quantitative research design, with the aim of generating relevant descriptive and 
inferential statistics that collectively provide a general picture of the public and private interest 
roles fulfilled by the accounting profession’s ethical codes and its system of disciplinary 
procedures in Australia.  
Since Parker (1994) had previously reviewed the outcomes of all Australian disciplinary cases 
up to the year 1987, this research thesis serves to directly extend his work by reviewing the 
published outcomes of all Australian disciplinary cases from the year 1988 onwards. 
Additionally, as the Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ) was only 
formed in 2014 following a merger between the Australian and New Zealand Institutes of 
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Chartered Accountants, the decision was taken to review the published outcomes of all 
Australian disciplinary cases up till the end of 2013 prior to the merger. 
Accordingly, the quantitative research design involves the creation of a numerical database 
through the collection and subsequent coding of relevant parameters retrieved from publicly 
available data in the form of disciplinary cases published by the two major professional 
accounting bodies in Australia - (1) CPA Australia; and (2) Chartered Accountants of Australia 
and New Zealand (CAANZ) - between the years 1988 to 2013 inclusive, as depicted in Figure 
4.1 below. 
Figure 4.1.  A visual model for quantitative research design procedures. 
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Ideally, given the complexities and intricacies involved in understanding and making sense of 
the human psyche, it would have been preferable to follow-up with qualitative interviews of 
disciplinary committee members in order to gain insights into their collective thoughts, 
attitudes and emotions associated with the decision-making process as well as an appreciation 
of their experience of working behind the scenes of the accounting profession’s disciplinary 
process. Unfortunately, despite my repeated attempts to contact or approach both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ to organize interviews with existing and/or former members of the 
disciplinary committee, my multiple requests for interviews were officially denied by both 
CPA Australia and CAANZ with no reasons provided. As a result, given this inability to obtain 
interview data, the research design was altered to statistically test for the presence of the ‘black 
sheep effect’ by way of specific hypotheses using relevant data retrieved from the disciplinary 
cases published by both CPA Australia and CAANZ. 
4.3 Contextual background 
Since this research thesis involves retrieving data from the outcomes of disciplinary cases 
published by the professional accounting bodies, it follows that the nature and structure of the 
professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes would be an important consideration 
when analyzing and interpreting the collected data. After all, it is from within the respective 
disciplinary processes established by the professional accounting bodies that each disciplinary 
case is judged and its outcome ultimately decided and reported upon. Accordingly, this would 
represent an appropriate juncture for an introduction into the structure as well as the key 
features of the respective disciplinary processes established by the two major professional 
accounting bodies in Australia: (1) CPA Australia; and (2) Chartered Accountants of Australia 
and New Zealand (CAANZ). 
4.3.1 Professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in Australia 
As discussed previously, the existence of a system of self-regulation is a hallmark attribute that 
characterizes all professions including the accounting profession. In the context of the 
accounting profession, each professional accounting body is responsible for organizing and 
implementing its own disciplinary process that governs and regulates the behaviour of its 
members. Accordingly, the structure of the Australian accounting profession’s system of 
disciplinary procedures may vary somewhat based on which professional accounting body the 
member belongs to, although, in practice, the disciplinary processes established by the major 
Australian professional accounting bodies share strikingly similar features and characteristics.    
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4.3.1.1 Certified Practicing Accountants (CPA) Australia 
In terms of membership, CPA Australia is the largest professional accounting body in 
Australia. Founded in 1886, it is one of the world’s largest professional accounting bodies, with 
more than 150,000 members spread across 120 countries around the world (CPA Australia 
2016).  
Furthermore, as one of the major professional accounting bodies in Australia, CPA Australia 
is responsible for: (a) developing and reviewing appropriate ethical and behavioural standards 
for the Australian accounting profession through its involvement in the Accounting 
Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB); (b) enforcing the ethical and behavioural 
standards set by the APESB amongst its members; and (c) the education and training of its 
members by way of its Continuing Professional Development (CPD) program. 
Stated purpose of disciplinary process 
CPA Australia identifies its disciplinary process as an important step in ensuring that the 
obligations and standards spelt out in its Constitution, By-Laws, Code of Professional Conduct 
and Applicable Regulations are upheld by its members (CPA Australia 2016). 
Establishment of disciplinary procedures 
The power of CPA Australia to prescribe the standards of behaviour required of its members 
as well as the power to regulate the conduct of its members is provided for in its Constitution 
[CPA Australia Constitution 2012 Article 52(e)]. The Constitution also sets out the 
circumstances that trigger disciplinary proceedings against the member, with subsequent 
imposition of penalties. These circumstances include: (a) an adverse finding and/or criminal 
conviction by a Court or other relevant regulatory authority that has not been overturned on 
appeal; (b) dishonorable and/or improper conduct on the part of the member; (c) member 
conduct that is derogatory to or not in the best interests of its members; (d) becoming insolvent; 
as well as (e) the failure of the member to comply with the direction of the Board [CPA 
Australia Constitution 2012 Article 39(a)]. In addition, the Constitution also accords the Board 
with the right to publish, in any manner it sees fit, the name of the member together with the 
details of the offence as well as any penalties or costs imposed [CPA Australia Constitution 
2012 Article 39(e)]. 
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Figure 4.2. A flowchart diagram summarizing the structure of CPA Australia’s disciplinary process. 
                     Adapted from CPA Australia By-Laws 2013 Part 5: Regulation of Professional Conduct.  
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Structure of disciplinary process 
The structure of CPA Australia’s disciplinary process is summarized by the flowchart diagram 
in Figure 4.2. Both the structure of the disciplinary process as well as the procedural 
requirements associated with each stage of the disciplinary process is subject to and governed 
by CPA Australia’s By-Laws (CPA Australia By-Laws 2013 Part 5: Regulation of Professional 
Conduct).  
Stage one:     Receiving a complaint 
CPA Australia’s disciplinary process is initiated either: (1) following the receipt of a written 
complaint against the member; or (2) following a referral of the member from a Court or other 
relevant regulatory authority for dishonourable or improper conduct; or (3) by way of the 
member being the subject of an adverse finding by a Court or other relevant regulatory 
authority that has not been overturned on appeal (CPA Australia By-Laws 2013 Article 5.1).      
Stage two:     Investigation of complaint 
The General Manager Professional Conduct (GMPC) reviews the complaint and supporting 
evidence to determine whether the complaint is an ‘Unviable Complaint’ or a ‘Relevant 
Complaint’. If the GMPC assesses the complaint to be an ‘Unviable Complaint’, then no further 
action will be undertaken and the complainant will be notified accordingly. If, on the other 
hand, the GMPC assesses the complaint to be a ‘Relevant Complaint’, then the GMPC will 
allocate the complaint to the Professional Conduct Officer (PCO) for further investigation, with 
a copy of the complaint and supporting evidence sent to the member in question for a written 
response. Upon completion of investigation, the PCO prepares a report to the GMPC who will, 
in turn, make a recommendation to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as to whether or not the 
member in question has a case to answer in accordance with CPA Australia’s Constitution, By-
Laws, Code of Professional Conduct and Applicable Regulations. 
Stage three:   Assessing whether or not there is a case to answer 
Based on the GMPC’s recommendation and any relevant external advice, the CEO determines 
whether or not the member in question has a case to answer. If the CEO determines that there 
is no case to answer, then the complaint will be dismissed and both the member and the 
complainant will be notified accordingly. Alternatively, if the CEO determines that the member 
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in question has a case to answer, then charges against the member in question are prepared and 
the complaint will be referred to a formal hearing before either a Disciplinary Tribunal (for 
serious offences) or a One-Person Tribunal (for less serious offences). The choice of referral 
to either a Disciplinary Tribunal or a One-Person Tribunal is at the absolute discretion of the 
CEO. 
Stage four:    Tribunal hearing 
The Disciplinary Tribunal (or One-Person Tribunal) meets with the member in question, who 
is entitled to legal representation. In the case of a Disciplinary Tribunal hearing, the quorum is 
three persons comprising one member of the Chair Panel (who chairs the proceedings) plus 
two members of the Disciplinary Panel. At the hearing, the Disciplinary Tribunal (or One-
Person Tribunal) will determine whether or not the member is guilty of the charges brought 
against him or her as well as which penalties to impose on the member. The penalties that may 
be imposed include: (1) forfeiture of membership; (2) suspension of membership for period not 
exceeding five years; (3) a fine; (4) a reprimand; (5) cancellation or suspension of any 
certificate, privilege, right or benefit available to the member; (6) reducing the member’s status 
or specialist designation; and/or (7) ordering the member to undertake additional hours of 
training and professional development [CPA Australia Constitution 2012 Article 39(b)]. 
Additionally, the member may also be ordered to pay all or any of the costs and expenses 
incurred in the course of the disciplinary process [CPA Australia Constitution 2012 Article 
39(d)]. 
Stage five:   Appeals Tribunal hearing (optional) 
The member in question has the right to appeal against the findings and decisions of the 
Tribunal by lodging a written notice to the GMPC specifying the grounds and reasons for 
appeal. If the member chooses not to appeal, the Tribunal’s findings and decisions will be 
published accordingly. If, however, the member chooses to exercise his or her right to appeal, 
the complaint and Tribunal’s findings together with the grounds and reasons for appeal will be 
referred to a formal hearing before an Appeals Tribunal. The quorum for an Appeals Tribunal 
hearing is three persons comprising one member of the Chair Panel (who will chair the 
proceedings) plus at least two members of the Disciplinary Panel. At the hearing, the Appeals 
Tribunal has the power to uphold or overrule the charges that were originally brought against 
the member as well as the power to affirm, vary or set aside the penalties that were originally 
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imposed on the member. There is no further right of appeal from a determination by the 
Appeals Tribunal.  
Stage six:    Reporting of disciplinary outcome 
Following the outcome of the Disciplinary Tribunal (or One-Person Tribunal), or the Appeals 
Tribunal in the case of an appeal, the complainant will receive written notification of the 
Tribunal’s findings and decisions. In addition, CPA Australia’s By-Laws also mandate that the 
name of the member as well as the Tribunal’s findings and decisions be reported and 
published 6 [CPA Australia By-Laws 2013 Article 5.8(a)]. However, in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ (as determined by the relevant Tribunal), the Tribunal may order that the 
member’s name be withheld from publication [CPA Australia By-Laws 2013 Article 5.8(b)].  
4.3.1.2 Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ) 
In terms of membership, the Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ)7 
is the second-largest professional accounting body in Australia. It is one of the world’s largest 
professional accounting bodies, with more than 115,000 members globally (CAANZ 2016).  
Furthermore, as one of the major professional accounting bodies in Australia, CAANZ is 
responsible for: (a) developing and reviewing appropriate ethical and behavioural standards for 
the Australian accounting profession through its involvement in the Accounting Professional 
and Ethical Standards Board (APESB); (b) enforcing the ethical and behavioural standards set 
by the APESB amongst its members; and (c) the education and training of its members by way 
of its Continuing Professional Development (CPD) program. 
Stated purpose of disciplinary process 
CAANZ states that the principal purpose of its disciplinary process is to protect its reputation 
and that of its membership by monitoring and regulating the behaviour of its members to ensure 
their compliance with its By-Laws, Code of Ethics, Standards and Regulations. In addition, 
CAANZ also recognizes that its disciplinary process acts as a mechanism to provide feedback 
                                                          
6  In practice, the outcomes of these disciplinary cases are usually reported in CPA Australia’s official  
   publication in the form of its monthly professional journals as well as on its official website. 
 
7  The Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand (CAANZ) was formed in 2014 following   
   a merger between the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) and the New Zealand   
   Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA). 
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to its members about conduct that should be avoided (Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia Disciplinary Policy Paper 2016). 
Establishment of disciplinary procedures 
The power of CAANZ to prescribe the standards of behaviour required of its members as well 
as the power to regulate the conduct of its members is provided for in its Supplemental Royal 
Charter [Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia Supplemental Royal Charter 2007 
Article 3]. The By-Laws sets out the circumstances that trigger disciplinary proceedings against 
the member, with subsequent imposition of penalties. These circumstances include: (a) an 
adverse finding and/or criminal conviction by a Court or other relevant regulatory authority 
that has not been set aside on appeal; (b) member conduct that brings discredit upon the member 
or the profession; (c) failure of the member to observe professional care, skill or competence 
in the course of his or her professional duties; (d) becoming insolvent; as well as (e) the failure 
of the member to comply with the direction of the Board [Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Australia By-Laws 2012 Article 40]. In addition, the By-Laws also accords the Board with 
the right to publish the name of the member together with the details of the offence as well as 
any penalties or costs imposed (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia By-Laws 2012 
Article 47). 
Structure of disciplinary process 
The structure of CAANZ’s disciplinary process is summarized by the flowchart diagram in 
Figure 4.3. Both the structure of the disciplinary process as well as the procedural requirements 
associated with each stage of the disciplinary process is subject to and governed by its By-
Laws (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia By-Laws 2012 Section 5: Professional 
Conduct). 
Stage one:    Receiving a complaint 
CAANZ’s disciplinary process is initiated either: (1) following the receipt of a written 
complaint against the member; or (2) following a referral of the member from a Court or other 
relevant regulatory authority for dishonourable or improper conduct; or (3) by way of the 
member being the subject of an adverse finding by a Court or other relevant regulatory 
authority that has not been set aside on appeal (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia 
By-Laws 2012 Article 43).      
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Figure 4.3.  A flowchart diagram summarizing the structure of CAANZ’s disciplinary process.    
 Adapted from Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia By-Laws 2012 
 Section 5: Professional Conduct. 
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Stage two:     Investigation of complaint 
The Senior Advisor Professional Conduct (SAPC) reviews the complaint and supporting 
evidence to assess whether or not the complaint is within the CAANZ’s jurisdiction and 
requires further investigation. If the complaint is assessed as requiring further investigation, 
then a copy of the complaint and supporting evidence will be sent to the member in question 
for a written response. Upon receipt of the member’s response to the complaint, the SAPC will 
review all relevant material and make a recommendation to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
as to whether or not the complaint should be referred to the Professional Conduct Tribunal for 
disciplinary action. 
Stage three:   Referral to Professional Conduct Tribunal 
Based on the SAPC’s recommendation, the CEO determines whether or not the complaint 
should be referred to the Professional Conduct Tribunal for disciplinary action. If the CEO 
decides not to refer the complaint to the Professional Conduct Tribunal, then the complaint will 
be dismissed and both the member and the complainant will be notified accordingly. 
Alternatively, if the CEO decides to refer the complaint to the Professional Conduct Tribunal, 
then the CEO must provide the member in question with a Notice of Disciplinary Action that 
sets outs the alleged charges against the member.  
Stage four:   Professional Conduct Tribunal hearing 
The Professional Conduct Tribunal meets with the member in question, who is entitled to legal 
representation. The quorum for the Professional Conduct Tribunal is four persons, a majority 
of whom must be individual members of at least ten years’ standing and, of whom, at least one 
must be a non-accountant. At the hearing, the Professional Conduct Tribunal will determine 
whether the allegations contained in the Notice of Disciplinary Action are established as well 
as which penalties to impose on the member. The penalties that may be imposed include: (1) 
exclusion of membership; (2) cancellation of membership for period not exceeding five years; 
(3) a fine not exceeding $100,000; (4) a reprimand; (5) cancellation of certificate of public 
practice; (6) removal of the member’s fellowship status; (7) ordering the member to pay all or 
any of the costs and expenses incurred in the course of the disciplinary process; and/or (8) 
ordering the member to undertake additional hours of training and professional development 
(Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia By-Laws 2012 Article 45).  
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Stage five:   Appeals Tribunal hearing (optional) 
The member in question has the right to appeal against the findings and decisions of the 
Professional Conduct Tribunal by lodging a written notice to the CEO specifying the grounds 
and reasons for appeal. If the member chooses not to appeal, the Tribunal’s findings and 
decisions will be published accordingly. If, however, the member chooses to exercise his or 
her right to appeal, the complaint and the Professional Conduct Tribunal’s findings together 
with the grounds and reasons for appeal will be referred to a formal hearing before an Appeals 
Tribunal. The quorum for an Appeals Tribunal hearing is five persons, a majority of whom 
must be individual members of at least ten years’ standing who have served on the Professional 
Conduct Tribunal and, of whom, at least one must be a non-accountant. At the hearing, the 
Appeals Tribunal has the power to uphold or overrule the charges that were originally brought 
against the member as well as the power to affirm, vary or set aside the penalties that were 
originally imposed on the member. There is no further right of appeal from a determination by 
the Appeals Tribunal.  
Stage six:    Reporting of disciplinary outcome 
Following the outcome of the Professional Conduct Tribunal, or the Appeals Tribunal in the 
case of an appeal, the complainant will receive written notification of the Tribunal’s findings 
and decisions. In addition, CAANZ’s By-Laws also mandate that the name of the member 
together with the Tribunal’s findings and decisions be reported in its official publication as 
well as on its official website (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia By-Laws Article 
47)8. 
In summary, apart from the different labels and titles assigned to each stage of the disciplinary 
process, it is evident that the disciplinary processes of both CPA Australia and CAANZ share 
similar features and characteristics. However, having said this, the disciplinary process of CPA 
Australia differs from that of CAANZ in three distinct ways:  
(a)   the CEO of CPA Australia has the choice of referring a complaint to either a  
       Disciplinary Tribunal or a One-Person Tribunal whereas the CEO of CAANZ has no  
       such option, since the One-Person Tribunal does not exist within the context of CAANZ; 
                                                          
8  As with CPA Australia, the outcomes of these disciplinary cases are usually reported in CAANZ’s  
   official publication in the form of its monthly professional journals as well as on its official website. 
112 
 
(b)  while CAANZ’s By-Laws stipulate that both its Professional Conduct Tribunal and its  
       Appeals Tribunal must comprise at least one non-accountant, there is no similar  
       provision in CPA Australia’s Constitution for a non-accountant to serve on both its  
       Disciplinary Tribunal as well as its Appeals Tribunal; and 
(c)  CPA Australia’s By-Laws provides for the member’s name to be withheld from  
       publication in “exceptional circumstances” whereas there is no such equivalent provision  
       in CAANZ’s By-Laws. 
 
4.4 Quantitative data collection 
The degree or extent to which disciplinary procedures are prescribed and acted upon as well as 
the manner of their actual execution provides valuable insight into the public interest and 
private interest roles of professional ethical codes. Accordingly, based on the disciplinary 
outcomes reported in the monthly professional journals published by both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ (and where appropriate, their respective websites), relevant data was retrieved from 
all disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and CAANZ from 1988 to 2013 inclusive.  
Specific data recorded for each disciplinary case include (a) the professional accounting body 
involved (CPA Australia or CAANZ); (b) the date of hearing; (c) the division where the hearing 
was held; (d) the type of hearing; (e) the residence status of the member (Australian-based or 
overseas-based); (f) whether or not the member’s name was disclosed; (g) gender of the 
member (where disclosed); (h) published details of the offence(s) and breach(es); as well as (i) 
corresponding details of the penalties imposed. In addition, data on (j) whether or not the 
member chose to exercise his or her right to appeal, and if so, (k) whether or not the original 
decision was overturned, as well as (l) whether or not there was any variation in the penalties 
imposed post-appeal, were also recorded for each disciplinary case over the period of 
investigation from 1988 to 2013 [See appendix for typical examples of published reports for 
disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and CAANZ]. 
4.5 Quantitative data analysis  
All recorded data was subsequently coded and manually entered into a Microsoft Excel 
database that formed the basis for statistical analysis using IBM’s Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 22 software. 
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4.5.1 Coding of variables 
All variables used in statistical analysis are related to the offences and outcomes for the 
disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and CAANZ over the period of investigation, 
which were manually coded as follows: 
4.5.1.1 Category of major offence 
As with Loeb (1972), Parker (1994) as well as Canning and O’Dwyer (2001), the major offence 
for each disciplinary case was categorized into either one of seven distinct and non-overlapping 
categories based on the published details of the offence(s) and the breach(es) cited for each 
disciplinary case. The seven possible categories of major offence are as follows:  
(1) Adverse finding involves the member being the subject of either an adverse finding, an 
adverse judgement or a negative comment by any Court, professional body, statutory 
or regulatory authority in any jurisdiction. This includes all criminal convictions and 
civil offences (excluding traffic infringements); 
(2) Bankruptcy involves the member filing for bankruptcy or becoming a bankrupt; 
(3) Administrative offence involves the member breaching the rules and procedures related 
to the efficient administration and proper governance of the professional body. This 
includes all examination-related offences as well as offences related to professional 
licensing and continuing professional development (CPD);     
(4) Substandard professional practice involves the member breaching relevant standards 
for professional care, skill and/or competence including issues of confidentiality, 
independence and professional integrity; 
(5) Unprofessional conduct involves the member exhibiting behaviour that is deemed to be 
dishonourable and derogatory to the accounting profession (i.e. ‘conduct unbecoming’ 
of a professional accountant); 
(6) Failure to respond and/or cooperate with investigation involves the member failing to 
respond to official correspondence by the professional body in a timely manner and/or 
failing to cooperate with an investigation by the professional body in relation to a 
complaint made against the member; and 
(7) Failure to comply with directive involves the member failing to observe, perform or 
otherwise comply with the specific findings and/or directives made by the professional 
body within the stipulated timeframe. 
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For those disciplinary cases involving two or more offences with multiple breaches cited in a 
single case, judgement was used to determine the most serious and potentially most significant 
offence based on the published details of the case, which, in turn, formed the basis for 
subsequent categorization into one of the seven possible categories described above. In cases 
where the major offence was not obvious, additional opinions were sought from PhD 
supervisors followed by mutual discussions until a consensus was reached. As a result, there is 
only one category of major offence for each disciplinary case over the period of investigation. 
 
4.5.1.2 Offence subcategories9 
Since ‘adverse finding’ offence, ‘administrative offence’ and ‘substandard professional 
practice’ offence each encompass a rather wide range of possible sub-offences, the decision 
was taken to subcategorize these major offences so as to gain better insight into the profile of 
these offences. Accordingly, all disciplinary cases with major offences categorized as either 
‘adverse finding’, ‘administrative offence’ or ‘substandard professional practice’ were further 
subcategorized as follows: 
4.5.1.2.1 Adverse finding offence 
All disciplinary cases whose major offence was categorized as ‘adverse finding’ were 
subcategorized into either one of the following three offence subcategories:  
(i)    criminal conviction;  
(ii)   civil offence; or  
(iii)  adverse criticism which includes any adverse findings, adverse judgements or          
        negative comments made by any Court, professional body, statutory or  
        regulatory authority (in any jurisdiction) that applies to the offending member. 
4.5.1.2.2 Administrative offence 
Similarly, each disciplinary case categorized as ‘administrative offence’ were subcategorized 
into either one of the following nine offence subcategories: 
(i)      No Public Practice Certificate (PPC) and/or incorrect professional registration  
          or designation; 
                                                          
9   Note that offence subcategories only apply to major offences categorized as either ‘adverse  
    finding’, ‘administrative offence’ or ‘substandard professional practice’. All other categories of  
    major offence were not subcategorized. 
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(ii)     No current Professional Indemnity Insurance cover; 
(iii)    Non-compliance with Quality Control review requirements; 
(iv)    Non-member partners (< 75% majority); 
(v)     Solicitation of clients; 
(vi)    Examination-related offence; 
(vii)   Non-compliance with Continuing Professional Development (CPD)  
          requirements; 
(viii)  Failure to lodge audit reports for trust accounts; or 
(ix)    Miscellaneous/ others. 
 
4.5.1.2.3 Substandard professional practice offence 
Finally, all disciplinary cases whose major offence was categorized as ‘substandard 
professional practice’ were subcategorized into either one of the following nine offence 
subcategories: 
(i)       Breach of independence rules; 
(ii)      Contingent fees and/or undisclosed commissions; 
(iii)     Non-compliance with professional/ technical standards; 
(iv)     Breach of client confidentiality; 
(v)      Misappropriation and/or misapplication of client funds; 
(vi)     Failure to obtain written authority/ signature from client; 
(vii)    Failure to maintain and/or audit trust accounts; 
(viii)   No communication and/or cooperation with accountant (existing or former); 
(ix)     Miscellaneous/ others. 
 
4.5.1.3 Nature of offence 
Given the category of major offence for each disciplinary case, it is possible to classify the 
nature of offence for each disciplinary case as either a ‘public interest offence’ or a ‘private 
interest offence’ based on Parker’s (1994) definitions of public interest and private interest as 
described earlier. Furthermore, Bédard (2001) also elaborated on the application of Parker’s 
(1994) definitions of public interest and private interest based on specific issues that relate to 
the type of ethical rule violated.  
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Accordingly, by using Parker’s (1994) definitions as well as Bédard’s (2001) system of 
classification for public interest versus private interest offences10, I classified all disciplinary 
cases with major offences categorized as ‘adverse finding’ and ‘substandard professional 
practice’ as ‘public interest offences’. Conversely, I classified the remaining disciplinary cases 
with major offences categorized as ‘bankruptcy’, ‘administrative offence’, ‘unprofessional 
conduct’, ‘failure to respond and/or cooperate with investigation’ as well as ‘failure to comply 
with directive’ as ‘private interest offences’. 
Having said this, however, given that the published disciplinary cases do not state the motives 
or rationale of the disciplinary committee members when imposing penalty outcomes, it is 
often difficult to clearly distinguish between the ‘public interest’ versus ‘private interest’ nature 
of offence for each disciplinary case. As a consequence, the classification between the ‘public 
interest’ versus ‘private interest’ nature of offence for each case is somewhat subjective and is 
thus, to a large extent, necessarily reliant on the professional judgement of the researcher. 
4.5.1.4 Offence visibility 
Parker (1994) highlighted the possible relationship between the (public) visibility of offences 
and the severity of disciplinary sanctions imposed and termed this phenomenon ‘offence 
visibility’. Loeb (1972) had a similar notion in mind when he suggested that the severity of the 
punishment received was related to the amount of publicity accorded to an offence – a 
phenomenon termed as the ‘notoriety’ of an offence which he defined as “the presence of one 
or both of some record of public inquiry and coverage in the mass media” (Loeb 1972, p. 8). 
Since the ‘visibility’ (Parker 1994) and the ‘notoriety’ (Loeb 1972) of an offence refer to the 
same underlying phenomenon, it follows that Loeb’s (1972) definition can thus be used to 
determine the (public) visibility of an offence. Therefore, by applying Loeb’s (1972) definition, 
an offence is deemed to be ‘visible’ when it involves the presence of some record of public 
inquiry whereas an offence is deemed to be ‘non-visible’ when it involves the absence of some 
record of public inquiry.  
                                                          
10  Specifically, Bédard’s (2001, pp. 417-418) system of classification is as follows: (a) ethical rules  
     related to issues such as compliance with standards, association with erroneous information,  
     integrity, independence or conflict of interest, or having been found guilty by another tribunal  
     were classified as ‘public interest offences’; whereas (b) ethical rules related to issues such as  
     filing for bankruptcy, non-cooperation with professional body, solicitation, advertising, fees and  
     practice organization were classified as ‘private interest offences’. 
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Accordingly, since major offences categorized as ‘adverse finding’ and ‘bankruptcy’ typically 
involve the presence of some record of public inquiry, I classified all disciplinary cases with 
such offences as ‘visible offences’. Conversely, since there is typically an absence of some 
record of public inquiry for major offences categorized as ‘administrative offence’, 
‘substandard professional practice’, ‘unprofessional conduct’, ‘failure to respond and/or 
cooperate with investigation’ as well as ‘failure to comply with directive’, I classified all 
disciplinary cases with such offences as ‘non-visible offences’.  
Figure 4.4 summarizes the relationship between the ‘category of major offence’ and its 
corresponding ‘nature of offence’ (in terms of public interest versus private interest) as well as 
its ‘offence visibility’.  
 
Category of Major Offence  Nature of Offence  Offence Visibility 
     
Adverse finding  PUBLIC INTEREST  VISIBLE 
Bankruptcy  PRIVATE INTEREST  VISIBLE 
Administrative offence  PRIVATE INTEREST  NON-VISIBLE 
Substandard professional practice  PUBLIC INTEREST  NON-VISIBLE 
Unprofessional conduct  PRIVATE INTEREST  NON-VISIBLE 
Failure to respond and/or   PRIVATE INTEREST  NON-VISIBLE 
cooperate with investigation     
Failure to comply with directive  PRIVATE INTEREST  NON-VISIBLE 
Figure 4.4.  Diagram summarizing the relationship between the three offence-related variables:                 
                      (a) category of major offence; (b) nature of offence; and (c) offence visibility. 
 
 
4.5.1.5 Category of penalties 
Following Parker (1994), Bédard (2001) and Canning and O’Dwyer (2001), the various types 
of penalties imposed for each disciplinary case were categorized based on the published details 
of the case. The categories of penalties include: (a) penalties focused on rehabilitation of the 
offending member; and (b) penalties focused on future monitoring and/or supervision of the 
offending member, as introduced and described by Mescall et al. (2017). Accordingly, the 
various penalties imposed for each disciplinary case were categorized into either one of ten 
possible categories that are described as follows:  
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(1)  Penalty involving rehabilitation measures aimed at improving the substandard 
 competencies of the member (e.g. ordering the member to undertake additional hours   
 of training and professional development);  
(2)  Penalty involving future monitoring measures where the member is subject to   
 ongoing supervision and subsequent reinvestigation (e.g. ordering the member to  
 undergo and complete a Quality Control review); 
(3)  Reprimand which serves as a form of non-monetary warning and encompasses   
 reprimand, severe reprimand, admonishment and censure; 
(4)  Costs which involves ordering the member to pay all or any of the costs and expenses  
 reasonably incurred by the professional body in investigating the complaint and in  
 instituting disciplinary proceedings against the member; 
(5)  Fine which involves ordering the member to pay a specified sum and serves as a  
 form of monetary warning; 
(6)  Suspension of Public Practice Certificate (PPC) which involves the member   
 suffering a temporary loss in the ability to provide public accounting services for a  
 specified period of time; 
(7)  Suspension of membership which involves a temporary halt of membership and the  
 member losing access to all the privileges associated with full membership of the   
 professional body for a specified period of time, with automatic resumption of  
 membership thereafter; 
(8)  Temporary exclusion from membership which involves a temporary cancellation of  
 membership and the member losing access to all the privileges associated with full  
 membership of the professional body for a specified period of time, with subsequent  
 reinstatement of membership conditional upon having fulfilled certain stipulated   
 conditions at the time of reapplication of membership (i.e. no automatic resumption  
 of membership); 
(9)  Cancellation of Public Practice Certificate (PPC) which involves the member  
       suffering a permanent loss in the ability to provide public accounting services for an  
       indefinite period of time; and 
     (10) Permanent exclusion from membership which involves a permanent cancellation of  
             membership and the member losing access to all the privileges associated with full  
             membership of the professional body for an indefinite period of time, with the  
             member having no recourse to reapply for membership. 
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4.5.1.6 Nature of penalties11 
Since there were typically multiple penalties imposed for each disciplinary case, I classified 
the collective effect of the various penalties imposed for each disciplinary case into either one 
of three distinct bands according to the overall nature of penalties as follows: 
(1) No penalties defined as the absence of all ten possible categories of penalties; 
(2) Light penalties defined as the presence of one or more of the lower-level penalties 
categorized as ‘Rehabilitation’, ‘Future monitoring’, ‘Reprimand’, and ‘Fine’ together 
with the absence of either one of the higher-level penalties categorized as ‘Suspension 
of Public Practice Certificate (PPC)’, ‘Suspension of membership’, ‘Temporary 
exclusion from membership’, ‘Cancellation of Public Practice Certificate (PPC)’ and 
‘Permanent exclusion from membership’; and 
(3) Severe penalties defined as the presence of one or more of the higher-level penalties 
categorized as ‘Suspension of Public Practice Certificate (PPC)’, ‘Suspension of 
membership’, ‘Temporary exclusion from membership’, ‘Cancellation of Public 
Practice Certificate (PPC)’ and ‘Permanent exclusion from membership’. 
 
4.5.1.7 Severity of penalties12 
The ‘nature of penalties’ described above represents a categorical variable that measures the 
collective effect of the various types of penalties for each disciplinary case in terms of its 
overall nature (i.e. ‘no penalties’ versus ‘light penalties’ versus ‘severe penalties’). On the other 
hand, the ‘severity of penalties’ represents a seven-level ordinal variable that measures and 
ranks the collective effect of the various types of penalties for each disciplinary case in terms 
of its overall severity using a rank order scale from 1 to 7 numbered in ascending order of 
severity as depicted in Figure 4.5 (i.e. a minimum rank of 1 corresponds to no penalties and a 
maximum rank of 7 corresponds to the most severe form of penalties imposed for each 
disciplinary case). 
                                                          
11  Since ‘Costs’ was imposed as a penalty for virtually all disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA 
    Australia and CAANZ over the period of investigation, for ease of analysis, the decision was taken  
    to exclude ‘costs’ from consideration when determining the ‘nature of penalties’ variable for each  
    disciplinary case. 
12  Again, as with the ‘nature of penalties’ variable, ‘costs’ was also excluded from consideration  
     when determining the ‘severity of penalties’ variable for each disciplinary case. 
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Following the terminology used by Mescall et al. (2017), a penalty is defined as involving 
rehabilitation if the sanction is in the form of mandated continuous professional education. On 
the other hand, a penalty is defined as involving future monitoring if the sanction is in the form 
of mandated practice reviews and/or practice supervision in the future. Given that a ‘penalty 
involving rehabilitation’ is aimed at educating the offending member to inculcate a sense of 
self-control whereas a ‘penalty involving future monitoring’ is aimed at limiting the 
professional autonomy of the offending member in order to allow for supervision or review of 
his or her work in the future, it follows that a ‘penalty involving future monitoring’ represents 
a more severe sanction than a ‘penalty involving rehabilitation’(in this case, assigned rank 
numbers of 2 and 1 respectively). Furthermore, since a ‘reprimand’ encompasses reprimand, 
severe reprimand, admonishment and censure, it follows that a ‘reprimand’, in this case, 
represents a more severe sanction than a ‘penalty involving future monitoring’ and is hence 
assigned rank number 3 on the rank order scale. 
 
Rank  Category of Penalties 
   
1 = No penalties 
2 = Penalty involving rehabilitation 
3 = Penalty involving future monitoring  OR  Penalty involving future monitoring & rehabilitation 
4 = Reprimand  OR  Reprimand plus other lower-ranked penalties 
5 = Fine  OR  Fine plus other lower-ranked penalties 
6 = Suspension of PPC and/or Membership suspension and/or Temporary membership exclusion   OR 
  Suspension of PPC and/or Membership suspension and/or Temporary membership exclusion plus other lower-ranked penalties 
7 = Cancellation of PPC and/or Permanent membership exclusion  OR 
  Cancellation of PPC and/or Permanent membership exclusion plus other lower-ranked penalties 
   
Note:  Rank is numbered in ascending order of severity. 
Figure 4.5.  Classification and ranking of the severity of penalties variable according to the category  
                      of penalties imposed for each disciplinary case.  
 
 
4.5.1.8 Member name disclosure 
As mentioned previously, Parker’s (1994) study revealed that almost half of the disciplinary 
cases he investigated involved suppression of the offending member’s name, thus providing 
evidence of a phenomenon he termed professional insulation.  
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Since all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases publish details on whether or not the 
member’s name was disclosed, it is possible to investigate the extent to which professional 
insulation is practised by the Australian accounting profession with respect to member name 
disclosure. Accordingly, the presence or absence of member name disclosure for each 
disciplinary case is determined and classified as follows: 
(1) Non-disclosure of member name involves an order by the professional body to withhold 
the member’s name (for whatever reason); and 
(2) Disclosure of member name represents the default position of the professional body, 
with full disclosure of details of the member’s name. 
 
4.5.2 Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive analysis involves univariate analysis of the three offence-related variables - 
category of major offence, nature of offence, offence visibility - followed by univariate analysis 
of the three outcome-related variables - nature of penalties, severity of penalties, member name 
disclosure. 
4.5.2.1.1 Offence-related variables 
Firstly, I compiled the frequencies and proportions for each of the seven possible ‘category of 
major offence’ for the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample, and compared this with 
the corresponding frequencies and proportions for (a) the CPA Australia sample; and (b) the 
CAANZ sample, respectively. Next, I compiled the frequencies and proportions for the ‘nature 
of offence’ (in terms of public interest versus private interest offences) for the combined CPA 
Australia and CAANZ sample, and compared this with the corresponding frequencies and 
proportions for (a) the CPA Australia sample; and (b) the CAANZ sample, respectively. 
Finally, I compiled the frequencies and proportions for ‘offence visibility’ (in terms of non-
visible versus visible offences) for the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample, and 
compared this with the corresponding frequencies and proportions for (a) the CPA Australia 
sample; and (b) the CAANZ sample, respectively.  
Taken together, the frequencies and proportions for the three offence-related variables - 
category of major offence, nature of offence, offence visibility - provides a general picture of 
the relative distribution of major offences for the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian 
accounting profession over the period of investigation. 
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4.5.2.1.2 Outcome-related variables 
Similarly, the identical process was repeated for the three outcome-related variables. Firstly, I 
compiled the frequencies and proportions for the ‘nature of penalties’ (in terms of no penalties 
versus light penalties versus severe penalties) for the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ 
sample, and compared this with the corresponding frequencies and proportions for (a) the CPA 
Australia sample; and (b) the CAANZ sample, respectively. Next, I compiled the frequencies 
and proportions for each of the seven possible ranks of ‘severity of penalties’ for the combined 
CPA Australia and CAANZ sample, and compared this with the corresponding frequencies and 
proportions for (a) the CPA Australia sample; and (b) the CAANZ sample, respectively. 
Finally, I compiled the frequencies and proportions for ‘member name disclosure’ (in terms of 
non-disclosure versus disclosure of member name) for the combined CPA Australia and 
CAANZ sample, and compared this with the corresponding frequencies and proportions for (a) 
the CPA Australia sample; and (b) the CAANZ sample, respectively.  
Taken together, the frequencies and proportions for the three outcome-related variables - nature 
of penalties, severity of penalties, member name disclosure - provides a general picture of the 
relative distribution of penalty outcomes for the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian 
accounting profession over the period of investigation. In turn, the results from descriptive 
analysis of the three offence-related variables (category of major offence, nature of offence, 
offence visibility) coupled with that from the three outcome-related variables (nature of 
penalties, severity of penalties, member name disclosure) provide the basis for answering 
subsidiary research question 1:  
• What offences and outcomes are associated with the disciplinary cases dealt with by 
the Australian accounting profession during the period from 1988 to 2013 inclusive? 
 
 
4.5.3 Inferential analysis 
Except for the ‘severity of penalties’ variable, inferential analysis of all other variables involves 
cross-tabulation analyses of a pair of variables comprising one offence-related variable and one 
outcome-related variable, followed by the Chi-square test of independence to establish whether 
or not a statistically significant relationship exists between the pair of variables in question. 
For inferential analysis involving the ‘severity of penalties’ variable, the Mann-Whitney U test 
was used to test for statistically significant differences between the mean severity of penalties 
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for relevant groups categorized according to the offence-related variable in question. 
Accordingly, the following pairs of variables were analyzed in this manner: 
 
4.5.3.1.1 Pair one:  nature of offence  vs  nature of penalties 
Both Loeb (1972) and Bédard (2001) revealed evidence that suggested public interest offences 
result in more severe penalties than private interest offences. However, Parker (1994) found 
that the opposite was true: public interest offences result in less severe penalties than private 
interest offences.  
Therefore, in order to investigate if and how the public interest versus private interest nature 
of offence affects the nature of penalties imposed, I performed a cross-tabulation analysis 
between ‘nature of offence’ (in terms of public interest versus private interest offences) and 
‘nature of penalties’ (in terms of no penalties versus light penalties versus severe penalties) for 
the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample. This was followed by a Chi-square test of 
independence to establish the statistical significance of the relationship between both variables. 
4.5.3.1.2 Pair two:  nature of offence  vs  severity of penalties 
In order to investigate whether the public interest versus private interest nature of an offence 
has any bearing or influence on the severity of penalties imposed for the disciplinary cases 
dealt with by CPA Australia and CAANZ, I performed a Mann-Whitney U test between ‘nature 
of offence’ and ‘severity of penalties’ for the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample to 
establish the statistical significance of the difference between the mean severity of penalties 
for public interest offences as compared to the mean severity of penalties for private interest 
offences. 
4.5.3.1.3 Pair three:  offence visibility  vs  nature of penalties 
Abbott (1983, cited in Parker 1994, p. 517) argued that “formal prosecution under professional 
ethics rules is largely a function of the public visibility of the offence”. Indeed, both Loeb 
(1972) and Lesage et al. (2016) found evidence suggesting that (publicly) visible offences (i.e. 
offences that receive notoriety) result in more severe penalties than non-visible offences. 
However, Bédard (2001) revealed contradictory evidence indicating that the severity of 
penalties is not affected by the public visibility (or notoriety) of the offence. 
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Therefore, in order to investigate this phenomenon of offence visibility, I performed a cross-
tabulation analysis between ‘offence visibility’ (in terms of non-visible versus visible offences) 
and ‘nature of penalties’ (in terms of no penalties versus light penalties versus severe penalties) 
for the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample. This was followed by a Chi-square test 
of independence to establish the statistical significance of the relationship between both 
variables. 
4.5.3.1.4 Pair four:  offence visibility  vs  severity of penalties 
In order to investigate whether the public visibility of an offence has any impact on the severity 
of penalties imposed for the disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and CAANZ, I 
performed a Mann-Whitney U test between ‘offence visibility’ and  ‘severity of penalties’ for 
the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample to establish the statistical significance of the 
difference between the mean severity of penalties for non-visible offences as compared to the 
mean severity of penalties for (publicly) visible offences. 
4.5.3.1.5 Pair five:  nature of offence  vs  member name disclosure 
Parker (1994, p. 520) found evidence of professional insulation and concluded that there was 
“significant reluctance to adopt complete disclosure” on the part of the Australian accounting 
profession. Naturally, this begs the question: is this phenomenon of professional insulation 
influenced by the public interest versus private interest nature of offence?  
In an attempt to answer this question, I performed a cross-tabulation analysis between ‘nature 
of offence’ (in terms of public interest versus private interest offences) and ‘member name 
disclosure’ (in terms of non-disclosure versus disclosure of member name) for the combined 
CPA Australia and CAANZ sample. This was followed by a Chi-square test of independence 
to establish the statistical significance of the relationship between both variables. 
4.5.3.1.6 Pair six:  offence visibility  vs  member name disclosure 
Pursuing the issue of professional insulation further, a natural line of inquiry would be this: is 
the phenomenon of professional insulation influenced by the public visibility of an offence? 
Accordingly, in an attempt to shed further light on this issue, I performed a cross-tabulation 
analysis between ‘offence visibility’ (in terms of non-visible versus visible offences) and 
‘member name disclosure’ (in terms of non-disclosure versus disclosure of member name) for 
the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample. This was followed by a Chi-square test of 
independence to establish the statistical significance of the relationship between both variables. 
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Taken together, the results of inferential analysis derived from statistical analyses of the 
abovementioned six pairs of offence-related variables (nature of offence, offence visibility) and 
outcome-related variables (nature of penalties, severity of penalties, member name disclosure) 
provide the basis for answering subsidiary research question 2: 
• Is there a relationship between the offences and outcomes for the disciplinary cases 
dealt with by the Australian accounting profession during the period from 1988 to 2013 
inclusive? 
 
4.5.4 Event analysis 
Prior research on the enforcement of professional ethical codes has found that the degree and 
manner of enforcement of professional ethical codes by professional accounting bodies seemed 
to change and vary when the accounting profession is threatened. This is evidenced by changes 
to penalty outcomes for disciplinary cases involving professional misconduct. Therefore, in 
order to further explore the premise that the accounting profession uses the enforcement of 
professional ethical codes (by way of the operation of its disciplinary process) as a means of 
reacting and responding to increased public scrutiny and external threats, Fisher et al. (2001), 
Jenkins et al. (2016) and Mescall et al. (2017) each performed separate event analyses that 
compared the offences and penalties imposed for disciplinary cases before and after a specific 
event that threatened the accounting profession.  
 
4.5.4.1 Hypotheses 
For the purposes of this research thesis, event analysis involves a comparison of the outcomes 
for disciplinary cases before and after major past external events that threatened the legitimacy 
and reputation of the Australian accounting profession in order to test for the presence of the 
‘black sheep effect’. Specifically, for each selected past external event, event analysis involves 
statistical testing of hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 in order to establish whether or not the occurrence 
of the specific event has had a statistically significant influence on the severity of penalties 
imposed for the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting profession (i.e. the 
presence of the ‘black sheep effect’). 
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4.5.4.1.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1):  severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
The ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ predicts that disciplinary 
committee members will adopt a social identity and thus become motivated by their desire to 
sustain the accounting profession’s overall positive distinctiveness as well as legitimize its 
relative superiority over other occupational groups. Furthermore, the ‘black sheep effect’ 
together with the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ predict that, in order to actively defend 
and affirm the subjective validity of the accounting profession’s ethical codes that, in turn, 
determines and maintains the overall positive distinctiveness of the accounting profession, 
disciplinary committee members will assert control to enforce professional ethical codes 
through disciplinary actions that punish those deviant members who violate or otherwise failed 
to comply with the accounting profession’s ethical codes.  
Fisher et al. (2001) provided initial confirmatory evidence when they documented a statistically 
significant increase in the number of disciplinary cases following an external threat to the 
professional status of the British accounting profession from the introduction of the Companies 
Act in the United Kingdom. Further confirmatory evidence was provided when Jenkins et al. 
(2016) found a lower proportion of admonishments but a higher proportion of terminations for 
disciplinary cases involving professional misconduct following the onset of the Great 
Recession in the United States. This was further reinforced by Mescall et al. (2017) who 
discovered that the disciplinary sanctions administered by the Canadian accounting profession 
were significantly more severe in the period of heightened public scrutiny following the 
establishment of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB).  
As such, both theory and empirical evidence leads me to hypothesize that, when encountered 
with a major external event that threatens the legitimacy and authority of the accounting 
profession, disciplinary committee members would increase the severity of penalties imposed 
for disciplinary cases involving professional misconduct in a concerted attempt to restore the 
accounting profession’s group positivity and overall group distinctiveness, thereby legitimizing 
its relative superiority over other occupational groups. The greater severity of penalties would 
serve to psychologically exclude deviant members from representation of the accounting 
profession and thus effectively separate them from the rest of the profession. 
H1:    The severity of penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences involving professional  
           misconduct is greater in the period after the event occurred as compared to the period    
           before the event occurred. 
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4.5.4.1.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  severity of penalties for private interest offences 
The ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ posits that group members evaluate deviant 
members as a function of whether they validate or undermine important group norms, with 
their reactions shaped by their collective desire to enhance or maintain this subjective validity. 
Accordingly, when encountered with a major external event that threatens the legitimacy and 
authority of the accounting profession, I would expect disciplinary committee members to be 
psychologically preoccupied and emotionally concerned with disciplinary cases involving 
private interest offences that undermine and adversely affect the subjective validity of the 
accounting profession’s ethical codes.  
However, here, the empirical evidence from prior research is not entirely conclusive. Although 
earlier research studies on the enforcement of professional ethical codes suggests a 
phenomenon of ‘disciplinary symbolism’ with the operation of professional accounting bodies’ 
disciplinary processes driven by the accounting profession’s emphasis on protecting its private 
interest rather than the public interest, subsequent research studies tend to portray a mixed 
picture, with the operation of professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes driven by 
an emphasis on the protection of both the public interest as well as the private interest of the 
accounting profession. Specifically, Fisher et al. (2001) found that, while there was a 
statistically significant increase in the number of disciplinary cases following an external threat 
to the professional status of the British accounting profession, there was, however, no evidence 
of a disproportionate increase in the number of private interest offences as compared to public 
interest offences. This finding was further reinforced by Mescall et al. (2017) who discovered 
that, although there was a significant increase in the severity of disciplinary sanctions 
administered by the Canadian accounting profession in the period of heightened public scrutiny 
following the establishment of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB), this 
increase in severity of penalties occurred across both private interest and public interest 
offences. 
Nevertheless, based on theory as well as Fisher et al.’s (2001) and Mescall et al.’s (2017) 
hypothesized, but unsupported, difference in severity of penalties for private interest versus 
public interest offences, I hypothesize that disciplinary committee members would 
discriminate against private interest offences by imposing greater severity of penalties for 
disciplinary cases involving private interest offences. The greater severity of penalties imposed 
on private interest offences would serve to validate and affirm the accounting profession’s 
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ethical codes, thus effectively preserving the cohesiveness and solidarity of its members and 
maintaining the accounting profession’s ability to function as a group to achieve its desired 
goals.  
H2:   The severity of penalties imposed for disciplinary cases involving private interest      
          offences is greater in the period after the event occurred as compared to the period   
          before the event occurred. 
 
4.5.4.1.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  severity of penalties for public interest offences: 
Conversely, when encountered with a major external event that threatens the legitimacy and 
authority of the accounting profession, I would expect disciplinary committee members to be 
psychologically and emotionally indifferent to disciplinary cases involving public interest 
offences that have little or no adverse effect on the subjective validity of the accounting 
profession’s ethical codes. Therefore, again, based on theory as well as Fisher et al.’s (2001) 
and Mescall et al.’s (2017) hypothesized, but unsupported, difference in severity of penalties 
for private interest versus public interest offences, I hypothesize that disciplinary committee 
members would not discriminate against public interest offences and would, in fact, maintain 
their pre-existing psychological predisposition towards ingroup bias and ingroup favouritism, 
thus resulting in no change in  severity of penalties for disciplinary cases involving public 
interest offences.   
H3:   There is no change in the severity of penalties imposed for disciplinary cases involving 
          public interest offences in the period after the event occurred as compared to the period  
          before the event occurred. 
 
 
4.5.4.2 External events 
For the purposes of the event analyses, major past external events were selected based on the 
perceived role and potential significance the specific event may have had in threatening or 
challenging the legitimacy and reputation of the Australian accounting profession. 
Accordingly, the following six major past external events were identified and used for event 
analyses over the period of investigation from 1988 to 2013 as depicted in Figure 4.6.  
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Figure 4.6.  Chronological timeline of the six major past external events used for event analysis over  
                      the period of investigation from 1988 to 2013 inclusive.  
 
4.5.4.2.1 Event  one:   1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
The ‘1997 Asian Financial Crisis’ refers to the period of economic crisis that gripped much of 
East Asia following a series of currency devaluations that was triggered by the devaluation and 
collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997. As the crisis spread, the majority of Southeast Asian 
nations together with South Korea witnessed slumping currencies, devalued share prices and 
deflated asset prices as well as a precipitous rise in national and private debt. The faltering 
Asian economic growth and sharp currency devaluations led to a general slowdown in 
Australia’s exports as reflected by the decline in Australia’s export volume growth as well as 
lower export prices. This was so despite the gradual depreciation of the Australian dollar which 
had undoubtedly helped to partially offset the slowdown in Australia’s exports (Makin 1999). 
The crisis finally abated following high-profile financial bailouts of several Asian nations by 
the International Monetary Fund such that, by late 1999, most of the nations affected by the 
crisis had begun to show signs of economic recovery.  
Accordingly, for the purposes of event analysis, the ‘Pre-Asian Financial Crisis’ (Pre-AsianFC) 
period is defined as between the years 1995 to 1997 inclusive, with the ‘Post-Asian Financial 
Crisis’ (Post-AsianFC) period defined as between the years 1998 to 2000 inclusive. 
4.5.4.2.2 Event two:   Introduction of CLERP 1 Legislation 
The CLERP 1 legislation is officially known as the ‘Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
Act 1999’ which was enacted by the Australian Parliament in October 1999. The ‘Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999’ (commonly known as CLERP 1) represents the 
YEAR 
1997 
1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis 
(July 1997) 
Introduction of 
CLERP 1 Legislation 
(October 1999) 
1999 
Demise of Arthur 
Andersen 
(August 2002) 
2002 
2004 
Introduction of 
CLERP 9 Legislation 
(July 2004) 
2006 
Introduction of APES 110 Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants 
(June 2006) 
2008 
2008 Global 
Financial Crisis 
(September 2008) 
130 
 
first of a series of nine prospective legislative amendments to the provisions of the Corporations 
Law in Australia. Specifically, the CLERP 1 legislation 13 : (a) made compliance with 
accounting standards legally enforceable; (b) reconstituted the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB) by severing it from control by the Australian professional accounting 
bodies; and (c) established a new statutory board called the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
that became responsible for overseeing the process of accounting standards setting in Australia 
through the setting of the AASB’s priorities as well as the monitoring of its activities (Dean & 
Clarke 2011). As such, the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation had arguably transformed the 
landscape for the Australian accounting profession especially in regards to accounting 
standards setting in Australia.  
Accordingly, for the purposes of event analysis, the ‘Pre-CLERP 1’ (Pre-CLERP1) period is 
defined as between the years 1997 to 1999 inclusive, with the ‘Post-CLERP 1’ (Post-CLERP1) 
period defined as between the years 2000 to 2002 inclusive. 
4.5.4.2.3 Event three:   Demise of Arthur Andersen 
Arthur Andersen was formerly one of the ‘Big Five’ public accounting firms that provided 
auditing, tax and consulting services to major corporations around the globe. Following the 
bankruptcy and collapse of Enron in December 2001, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission opened a criminal investigation into Arthur Andersen – the accounting 
firm that handled Enron’s audits. The company was subsequently charged and convicted for 
obstruction of justice in June 2002 for shredding files and documents as well as deleting 
electronic mails related to its audit of Enron. Although its conviction was later overturned by 
the United States Supreme Court, by that time, the damage to Arthur Andersen’s business 
reputation was so severe that the company lost the majority of its customers and subsequently 
surrendered its licence to practice, thereby ceasing its business operations in August 2002.  
Coincidentally, around the time of Enron’s collapse in the United States, Arthur Andersen was 
also implicated in the bankruptcy and collapse of Australia’s second-largest insurance company 
- HIH Insurance. As with Enron, Arthur Andersen was also the accounting firm that handled 
                                                          
13  As with the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the United  
    States, the establishment of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in Australia has arguably  
    signalled an end of the Australian accounting profession’s era of self-regulation while at the same  
    time heralding the transition to a system of co-regulation similar to that found in the United States     
    and several European nations. 
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the audit for HIH Insurance, which was subsequently placed into provisional liquidation in 
March 2001. The collapse of HIH Insurance represented the largest corporate collapse in 
Australia’s history and became the subject of a Royal Commission that was appointed by the 
Australian government in August 2001. The recommendations that arose from the HIH Royal 
Commission provided a powerful backdrop for subsequent introduction of the so-called 
CLERP 9 legislation in Australia.  
As such, the demise of Arthur Andersen had arguably resulted in a radically changed landscape 
for the accounting profession around the world including Australia. In fact, the collapse of 
Enron (in the United States) and HIH Insurance (in Australia) coupled with the subsequent 
demise of Arthur Andersen served as direct triggers for subsequent enactment of two major 
legislative reforms, namely (1) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the United States; and (2) the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 
(or CLERP 9) in Australia. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of event analysis, the ‘Pre-Demise of Arthur Andersen’ (Pre-
Arthur Andersen Demise) period is defined as between the years 2000 to 2002 inclusive, with 
the ‘Post-Demise of Arthur Andersen’ (Post-Arthur Andersen Demise) period defined as 
between the years 2003 to 2005 inclusive. 
4.5.4.2.4 Event four:   Introduction of CLERP 9 Legislation 
The CLERP 9 legislation is officially known as the ‘Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004’ which was enacted by the Australian 
Parliament in July 2004. The ‘Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004’ (commonly known as CLERP 9) represents the last of a series 
of nine legislative amendments to the provisions of the Corporations Law in Australia and it 
was introduced against a backdrop of extensive accounting and auditing scandals that resulted 
in several corporate collapses in the United States (e.g. Enron, Worldcom and Waste 
Management) as well as in Australia (e.g. HIH Insurance and One Tel.). Specifically, the 
CLERP 9 legislation14: (a) made compliance with auditing standards legally enforceable; (b) 
                                                          
14   Arguably, the act of making the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) responsible for overseeing the  
     process of auditing standards setting in Australia serves as a strong signal of the Australian  
     Government’s intention and continued determination to march towards a system of co-regulation  
     similar to that found in the United States and several European nations. 
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reconstituted the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) by severing it from 
control by the Australian professional accounting bodies; (c) expanded the responsibilities of 
the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to include oversight of the process of auditing standards 
setting in Australia through the setting of the AUASB’s priorities as well as the monitoring of 
its activities; (d) established new provisions on audit reform15 such as auditor rotation, auditor 
independence, auditor oversight and a moratorium on ex-auditor employment by ex-clients; (e) 
introduced changes to the offence provisions of the continuous disclosure regime; and (f) 
introduced changes to financial reporting including written declarations by the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) (Dean & Clarke 2011). As such, the 
introduction of CLERP 9 legislation had arguably transformed the landscape for the Australian 
accounting profession especially with respect to audit practice and auditing standards setting 
in Australia.  
Accordingly, for the purposes of event analysis, the ‘Pre-CLERP 9’ (Pre-CLERP9) period is 
defined as between the years 2002 to 2004 inclusive, with the ‘Post-CLERP 9’ (Post-CLERP9) 
period defined as between the years 2005 to 2007 inclusive. 
 
4.5.4.2.5 Event five:   Introduction of APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
The ‘APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants’ (APES110) is issued by the 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB) and sets out the mandatory 
requirements and guidelines for all members of the Australian accounting profession when 
providing professional services. It was first issued in June 2006 and is comprised of 
fundamental principles as well as detailed guidelines that govern the professional behaviour of 
all members (Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 2013). The ‘APES 110 
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants’ (APES110) applies to all members of the 
Australian accounting profession and is purportedly enforced by all major Australian 
professional accounting bodies by way of the respective disciplinary process established by 
each Australian professional accounting body.  
                                                          
15  Interestingly, since the provisions on audit reform contained in the CLERP 9 legislation closely  
     resemble similar provisions contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 enacted in the United  
     States, many political observers regard the CLERP 9 legislation as the Australian equivalent of the  
     Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 that was passed by the United States Congress in July 2002.     
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Accordingly, for the purposes of event analysis, the ‘Pre-APES 110’ (Pre-APES110) period is 
defined as between the years 2004 to 2006 inclusive, with the ‘Post-APES 110’ (Post-
APES110) period defined as between the years 2007 to 2009 inclusive. 
 
4.5.4.2.6 Event six:   2008 Global Financial Crisis 
The ‘2008 Global Financial Crisis’ (GFC) refers to the period of extreme stress in global 
financial markets and is considered by many economists to be the worst economic disaster 
since the 1929 Great Depression. It began with a crisis in the subprime mortgage market in the 
United States in mid-2007 and developed into a full-blown global banking crisis that ultimately 
culminated in the collapse of the major Wall Street investment bank Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008. This was followed by a global economic downturn known as the Great 
Recession that resulted in the freezing of global credit markets and was accompanied by 
precipitous falls in share prices and property values as well as a sudden collapse of business 
and consumer confidence around the world.  
The sudden tightening of global credit markets led to a substantial decline in share prices on 
the Australian Stock Exchange as well as a sharp depreciation of the Australian dollar (Tiernan 
2010). Unlike most developed nations around the world, the Australian government did not 
provide financial bailouts for its banking institutions directly. It did, however, engage in a series 
of monetary and fiscal policy responses in a bid to support and restore confidence in Australia’s 
financial markets. This included significant cuts to interest rates, providing guarantees for all 
bank deposits and wholesale funds, and implementing large government stimulus packages in 
the form of cash handouts to households as well as expenditures on infrastructure development 
(Tiernan 2010). Although both the Australian and global economy appears to have somewhat 
recovered from the economic abyss of the Global Financial Crisis, its economic consequences 
and political aftermath still lingers to this day. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of event analysis, the ‘Pre-Global Financial Crisis’ (Pre-GFC) 
period is defined as between the years 2006 to 2008 inclusive, with the ‘Post-Global Financial 
Crisis’ (Post-GFC) period defined as between the years 2009 to 2011 inclusive. 
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4.5.4.3 Statistical testing 
4.5.4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1):  severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
Hypothesis 1 was statistically tested for each external event using the Mann-Whitney U test to 
establish the statistical significance of the difference between the mean severity of penalties 
imposed for all disciplinary offences in the period before the event occurred as compared to 
the mean severity of penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences in the period after the event 
occurred. This statistical significance, in turn, provides an indication of the strength of evidence 
to either support or reject hypothesis 1.      
4.5.4.3.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  severity of penalties for private interest offences 
Similarly, hypothesis 2 was statistically tested for each external event using the Mann-Whitney 
U test to establish the statistical significance of the difference between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for private interest offences in the period before the event occurred as 
compared to the mean severity of penalties imposed for private interest offences in the period 
after the event occurred. This statistical significance, in turn, provides an indication of the 
strength of evidence to either support or reject hypothesis 2.      
4.5.4.3.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  severity of penalties for public interest offences  
Finally, hypothesis 3 was statistically tested for each external event using the Mann-Whitney 
U test to establish the statistical significance of the difference between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for public interest offences in the period before the event occurred as 
compared to the mean severity of penalties imposed for public interest offences in the period 
after the event occurred. This statistical significance, in turn, provides an indication of the 
strength of evidence to either support or reject hypothesis 3.      
Taken together, the conclusions derived from separate event analyses of all six external events 
regarding the validity (or otherwise) of hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 with respect to the severity of 
penalties imposed for the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting profession 
provide the basis for answering subsidiary research question 3: 
• What influence (if any) did major past external events that threatened the accounting 
profession’s legitimacy and authority have on the outcomes for the disciplinary cases 
dealt with by the Australian accounting profession during the period from 1988 to 2013 
inclusive? 
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4.6 Interpretation of quantitative results 
As Figure 4.7 illustrates, the answers to subsidiary research questions 1, 2 and 3, in turn, 
facilitate an overall conclusion as to whether professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary 
processes collectively fulfil a predominantly public interest or private interest role, thus, in 
effect, answering the primary research question: do professional accounting bodies’ 
disciplinary processes serve the interests of the public or the private interests of the accounting 
profession? 
 
Figure 4.7.     A visual model illustrating the link between research methodology and  
                         research questions. 
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4.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter described the research design and detailed the research methods to explain how 
the stated research questions are answered and how the stated research objective is achieved. 
Specifically, this research thesis employs a quantitative research design involving the creation 
of a numerical database by recording relevant data retrieved from the outcomes for all 
disciplinary cases published by both CPA Australia and CAANZ between the years 1988 to 
2013 inclusive. Where applicable, relevant offence-related variables (category of major 
offence, nature of offence and offence visibility) as well as outcome-related variables (nature 
of penalties, severity of penalties and member name disclosure) are analyzed using:           
(1)  descriptive analysis to provide a general picture of the offences and outcomes associated    
       with the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting profession over the  
       period of investigation;  
 
(2)  inferential analysis to establish whether or not a relationship exists between the offences  
       and outcomes for the disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting  
       profession over the period of investigation; and  
(3)  event analysis to establish whether or not the severity of penalties imposed for the  
       disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting profession were significantly  
       influenced by major past external events that threatened the legitimacy and authority of  
       the Australian accounting profession.  
 
Finally, the collective results and findings derived from each analysis, in turn, form the basis 
for an overall conclusion as to whether professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes 
actually fulfil a predominantly public interest or private interest role, thus achieving the 
research objective.   
 
 
 
 
137 
 
5 CHAPTER FIVE:   DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter is divided into three sections: the first section describes the data source and sample 
size together with the procedures for dealing with missing data; the second section presents the 
results for descriptive analysis in terms of the major offences and outcomes for the disciplinary 
cases dealt with by CPA Australia and CAANZ as well as discusses the findings; and the final 
section presents the results for inferential analysis of the six pairs of offence-related variables 
versus outcome-related variables for the disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and 
CAANZ followed by a discussion of the findings. 
5.2 Sample 
Data for the sample was retrieved from all disciplinary cases published by CPA Australia and 
CAANZ over the period from February 1988 to December 2013 inclusive. 
5.2.1 Data source 
Data for all CPA Australia disciplinary cases from February 1988 to December 2004 inclusive 
were retrieved from the monthly professional journals published by CPA Australia whereas 
data for the remaining CPA Australia disciplinary cases from February 2005 to December 2013 
inclusive was retrieved from the official website of CPA Australia (see Appendix A and 
Appendix B for samples of CPA Australia disciplinary cases). Similarly, data for all CAANZ 
disciplinary cases from February 1988 to December 2010 inclusive was retrieved from the 
monthly professional journals published by CAANZ whereas data for the remaining CAANZ 
disciplinary cases from February 2011 to December 2013 inclusive was retrieved from the 
official website of CAANZ (see Appendix C and Appendix D for samples of CAANZ 
disciplinary cases). 
5.2.2 Sample size 
There was a total of 848 CPA Australia disciplinary cases and 707 CAANZ disciplinary cases 
over the period of investigation from February 1988 to December 2013. However, since seven 
CPA Australia disciplinary cases and one CAANZ disciplinary case involved the member’s 
resignation as part of the penalties imposed by the Disciplinary Tribunal (in the case of CPA 
Australia) or Professional Conduct Tribunal (in the case of CAANZ), the decision was taken 
138 
 
to exclude these eight disciplinary cases from analysis. Consequently, after excluding the eight 
disciplinary cases involving member’s resignation as a form of penalty, my final sample 
comprised 841 CPA Australia disciplinary cases and 706 CAANZ disciplinary cases, thus 
making a grand total of 1,547 combined CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases over 
the period of investigation from February 1988 to December 2013 inclusive. 
5.2.3 Missing data 
Thirteen CPA Australia disciplinary cases and one CAANZ disciplinary case lacked details on 
the category of penalties imposed by the Disciplinary Tribunal (in the case of CPA Australia) 
or Professional Conduct Tribunal (in the case of CAANZ). The members of all these fourteen 
disciplinary cases had chosen to appeal the findings and penalties imposed by the Disciplinary 
Tribunal/ Professional Conduct Tribunal and their cases were thus referred to the relevant 
Appeals Tribunal for hearing and determination. Consequently, while the publications of these 
fourteen disciplinary cases contained details on the findings and penalties imposed by the 
Appeals Tribunal, there was no details provided on the initial findings and initial penalties 
imposed by the Disciplinary Tribunal/ Professional Conduct Tribunal. Therefore, given the 
lack of details regarding the category of penalties imposed by the Disciplinary Tribunal/ 
Professional Conduct Tribunal, the decision was taken to exclude these fourteen disciplinary 
cases from analysis but only when the analysis involves either the nature of penalties or the 
severity of penalties variables. This accounts for the reason why N = 1,533 for both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ combined (i.e. N = 828 for CPA Australia plus N = 705 for CAANZ) 
when the analysis involves either nature of penalties or severity of penalties, but N = 1,547 for 
both CPA Australia and CAANZ combined (i.e. N = 841 for CPA Australia plus N = 706 for 
CAANZ) when the analysis involves all other variables (category of major offence, nature of 
offence, offence visibility and member name disclosure). 
 
5.3 Results of descriptive analysis 
The major offences and outcomes for all disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and 
CAANZ from 1988 to 2013 inclusive are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 
5.3.1 Category of major offence 
Table 1 Panel A provides a side-by-side comparison between the frequencies and proportions 
for each of the category of major offence for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
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cases combined, and the corresponding frequencies and proportions for: (1) CPA Australia 
disciplinary cases only; followed by (2) CAANZ disciplinary cases only. From Table 1 Panel 
A, it is apparent that the top four most common categories of major offence for the combined 
CPA Australia and CAANZ sample were ‘adverse finding’ (29%), ‘substandard professional 
practice’ (25.8%), ‘administrative offence’ (17.7%) and ‘bankruptcy’ (17.4%) respectively. 
Together, they accounted for 90% of all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases.  
5.3.2 Offence subcategories 
Table 1 Panel B, Panel C and Panel D provide break-down statistics for the various offence 
subcategories for ‘adverse finding’ offence, ‘administrative offence’ and ‘substandard 
professional practice’ offence respectively. Specifically, each panel provides a side-by-side 
comparison between the frequencies and proportions for each offence subcategory for either 
‘adverse finding’ offence, ‘administrative offence’ or ‘substandard professional practice’ 
offence for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined, and the 
corresponding frequencies and proportions for: (1) CPA Australia disciplinary cases only; 
followed by (2) CAANZ disciplinary cases only.  
5.3.2.1 Adverse finding offence 
Table 1 Panel B shows that ‘adverse criticism’ is by far the most common subcategory for 
‘adverse finding’ offence, accounting for 57.5% of all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases involving an adverse finding offence. This is followed by ‘criminal conviction’ and ‘civil 
offence’ which accounted for 25.1% and 17.4% of all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases involving an adverse finding offence respectively. 
5.3.2.2 Administrative offence 
From Table 1 Panel C, it is apparent that the two most frequent subcategories for administrative 
offence for the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample were ‘non-compliance with 
Quality Control review’ (31.8%) and ‘no Professional Practice Certificate (PPC)/ incorrect 
professional registration or designation’ (28.1%) respectively. Together, both offence 
subcategories accounted for almost 60% of all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases 
involving an administrative offence. 
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Table 1.   Summary of major offences for published disciplinary cases from 1988 to 2013 inclusive. 
            
Panel A:    Distribution of major offences for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases combined (N = 1,547)  compared with 
                   CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 841) and CAANZ disciplinary cases only (N = 706) respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &     
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
 (N = 1547)  (N = 841)  (N = 706) 
 Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
Adverse finding 449  29.0  235  27.9  214  30.3 
Bankruptcy 269  17.4  101  12.0  168  23.8 
Administrative offence 274  17.7  204  24.3  70  10.0 
Substandard professional practice 399  25.8  197  23.4  202  28.6 
Unprofessional conduct/ "Conduct unbecoming" 57  3.7  39  4.6  18  2.5 
Failure to respond and/or cooperate with investigation 78  5.0  51  6.1  27  3.8 
Failure to comply with directive 21  1.4  14  1.7  7  1.0 
 1547  100.0  841  100.0  706  100.0 
            
Panel B:   Distribution of subcategories for 'Adverse Finding' offences for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases combined (N = 449)  
                  compared with CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 235) and CAANZ disciplinary cases only (N = 214) respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &     
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
 (N = 449)  (N = 235)  (N = 214) 
 Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
Criminal conviction 113  25.1  89  37.8  24  11.2 
Civil offence 78  17.4  34  14.5  44  20.6 
Adverse criticism 258  57.5  112  47.7  146  68.2 
 449  100.0  235  100.0  214  100.0 
            
Panel C:   Distribution of subcategories for 'Administrative Offences' for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases combined (N = 274)  
                  compared with CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 204) and CAANZ disciplinary cases only (N = 70) respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &     
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
 (N = 274)  (N = 204)  (N = 70) 
 Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
No PPC/ incorrect professional registration or designation 77  28.1  68  33.3  9  12.9 
No current Professional Indemnity Insurance cover 30  10.9  18  8.8  12  17.1 
Non-compliance with Quality Control review 87  31.8  73  35.8  14  20.0 
Non-member partners (< 75% majority) 6  2.2  6  3.0  0  0.0 
Solicitation of clients 2  0.7  1  0.4  1  1.4 
Examination-related offence 20  7.3  17  8.3  3  4.3 
Non-compliance with CPD requirements 28  10.2  6  3.0  22  31.4 
Failure to lodge audit reports for trust accounts 15  5.5  9  4.4  6  8.6 
Miscellaneous/ others 9  3.3  6  3.0  3  4.3 
 274  100.0  204  100.0  70  100.0 
 
PPC  =  Professional Practice Certificate;  
CPD  =  Continuing Professional Development.            
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Table 1.  Summary of major offences for published disciplinary cases from 1988 to 2013 inclusive (cont'd). 
            
Panel D:    Distribution of subcategories for 'Substandard Professional Practice' offences for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases 
                   combined (N = 399)  compared with CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 197) and CAANZ disciplinary cases only 
                   (N = 202) respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &     
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
 (N = 399)  (N = 197)  (N = 202) 
 Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
Breach of independence rules 50  12.5  22  11.2  28  13.8 
Contingent fees and/or undisclosed commissions 8  2.0  6  3.0  2  1.0 
Non-compliance with professional/ technical standards 169  42.3  66  33.5  103  51.0 
Breach of client confidentiality 10  2.5  7  3.6  3  1.5 
Misappropriation and/or misapplication of client funds 60  15.0  32  16.2  28  13.8 
Failure to obtain written authority/ signature from client 37  9.3  32  16.2  5  2.5 
Failure to maintain and/or audit trust accounts 25  6.3  18  9.1  7  3.5 
No communication/ cooperation with accountant 27  6.8  7  3.6  20  9.9 
Miscellaneous/ others 13  3.3  7  3.6  6  3.0 
 399  100.0  197  100.0  202  100.0 
            
Panel E:   Frequency and proportion of nature of offence for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases combined (N = 1,547)  compared with 
                  CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 841) and CAANZ disciplinary cases only (N = 706) respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &     
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
 (N = 1547)  (N = 841)  (N = 706) 
 Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
Public interest nature of offence 848  54.8  432  51.4  416  58.9 
Private interest nature of offence 699  45.2  409  48.6  290  41.1 
 1547  100.0  841  100.0  706  100.0 
            
Panel F:   Frequency and proportion of offence visibility for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases combined (N = 1,547) compared with 
                  CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 841) and CAANZ disciplinary cases only (N = 706) respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &     
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
 (N = 1547)  (N = 841)  (N = 706) 
 Count  % of Total    Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
        Non-visible offences 
                    
829  53.6      505  60.0  
 
 324  
 
  45.9 
        Visible offences 718  46.4  336            40.0   382       54.1 
 1547  100.0  841         100.0   706  
 
   100.0 
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5.3.2.3 Substandard professional practice offence 
Table 1 Panel D shows that ‘non-compliance with professional/ technical standards’ is by far 
the most common subcategory for ‘substandard professional practice’ offence, comprising 
42.3% of all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases involving a substandard 
professional practice offence. 
5.3.3 Public interest versus private interest nature of offence 
Table 1 Panel E presents a side-by-side comparison between the frequencies and proportions 
for nature of offence in terms of public interest versus private interest offences for both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined, and the corresponding frequencies and 
proportions for: (1) CPA Australia disciplinary cases only; followed by (2) CAANZ 
disciplinary cases only. It shows that nearly 55% of all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases involved public interest offences, while the remaining 45% involved private interest 
offences.  
5.3.4 Offence visibility 
Similarly, Table 1 Panel F allows for a side-by-side comparison between the frequencies and 
proportions for offence visibility in terms of non-visible versus visible offences for both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined, and the corresponding frequencies and 
proportions for: (1) CPA Australia disciplinary cases only; followed by (2) CAANZ 
disciplinary cases only. The data shows that about 46.5% of all CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases involved visible offences, while the remaining 53.5% involved non-visible 
offences.  
5.3.5 Nature of penalties 
Table 2 Panel A presents a side-by-side comparison between the frequencies and proportions 
for nature of penalties for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined, and 
the corresponding frequencies and proportions for: (1) CPA Australia disciplinary cases only; 
followed by (2) CAANZ disciplinary cases only. It shows that while severe penalties (in the 
form of membership suspensions or temporary or permanent exclusion from membership 
and/or PPC suspensions or cancellations) were imposed for nearly 35% of all CPA Australia 
and CAANZ disciplinary cases, almost 60% of all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases had light penalties (in the form of rehabilitation, future monitoring, reprimands and/or 
fines) imposed, with the remaining 5% involving no penalties at all.  
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Table 2.   Summary of disciplinary outcomes for published disciplinary cases from 1988 to 2013 inclusive. 
            
Panel A:   Distribution of nature of penalties for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases combined (N = 1,533)  compared with  
                  CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 828) and CAANZ disciplinary cases only (N = 705) respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &         
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
 (N = 1533)  (N = 828)  (N = 705) 
 Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
No penalties 88  5.7  41  5.0  47  6.7 
Light penalties (reprimands, costs and/or fines) 912  59.5  433  52.3  479  67.9 
Severe penalties  533  34.8  354  42.7  179  25.4 
(suspension, temp and/or perm exclusion from membership) 1533  100.0  828  100.0  705  100.0 
            
Panel B:   Distribution of severity of penalties according to the numbered ranks for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases combined 
                  (N = 1,533)  compared with CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 828) and  CAANZ disciplinary cases only (N = 705) 
                  respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &         
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
Rank (N = 1533)  (N = 828)  (N = 705) 
 Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
1 152  9.9  68  8.2  84  11.9 
2 6  0.4  6  0.7  0  0.0 
3 19  1.2  16  1.9  3  0.4 
4 539  35.2  258  31.2  281  39.9 
5 252  16.4  112  13.5  140  19.9 
6 326  21.3  206  24.9  120  17.0 
7 239  15.6  162  19.6  77  10.9 
 1533  100.0  828  100.0  705  100.0 
            
Panel C:   Frequency and proportion of member name disclosure for CPA Australia & CAANZ disciplinary cases combined (N = 1,547) 
                  compared with CPA Australia disciplinary cases only (N = 841) and CAANZ disciplinary cases only (N = 706) respectively. 
            
 CPA Australia &         
 CAANZ cases combined  CPA Australia cases only  CAANZ cases only 
 (N = 1547)  (N = 841)  (N = 706) 
 Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total  Count  % of Total 
Non-disclosure of member name 567  36.7  343  40.8  224  31.7 
Disclosure of member name 980  63.3  498  59.2  482  68.3 
 1547  100.0  841  100.0  706  100.0 
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5.3.6 Severity of penalties 
Table 2 Panel B provides a side-by-side comparison between the frequencies and proportions 
for each of the numbered ranks involving the severity of penalties for both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ disciplinary cases combined, and the corresponding frequencies and proportions for: 
(1) CPA Australia disciplinary cases only; followed by (2) CAANZ disciplinary cases only. 
From the table, it is evident that by far the most frequently numbered rank for severity of 
penalties for the combined CPA Australia and CAANZ sample was rank number 4 which 
corresponds to ‘reprimand with or without other lower-ranked penalties’, accounting for 35.2% 
of all CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases. 
5.3.7 Member name disclosure 
Table 2 Panel C represents a side-by-side comparison between the frequencies and proportions 
for member name disclosure for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined, 
and the corresponding frequencies and proportions for: (1) CPA Australia disciplinary cases 
only; followed by (2) CAANZ disciplinary cases only. It shows that just over 63% of all CPA 
Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases involved disclosure of member name, while the 
remaining 37% involved non-disclosure of member name.  
5.3.8 Discussion 
Predominance of public interest offences 
The results for descriptive analysis indicate a predominance of public interest offences for the 
Australian accounting profession, with adverse finding and substandard professional practice 
the most frequently cited offences for the disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and 
CAANZ. This complements the finding by Jenkins et al. (2016), but is contrary to the findings 
of Loeb (1972), Parker (1994) and Lesage et al. (2016), all of whom documented a 
predominance of private interest offences. There are two possible explanations for this 
discrepancy. Firstly, it is possible that both CPA Australia and CAANZ received relatively 
more complaints related to issues of public interest than for private interest. As Bédard (2001) 
noted, the number of complaints relating to issues of public interest versus private interest 
received by each professional accounting body is a function of the number and type of ethical 
code violations, the detection rate (proportion of violations detected) and the reporting rate 
(proportion of detected violations for which a complaint is lodged to each professional 
accounting body). Secondly, it is also possible that both CPA Australia and  
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CAANZ, after having adequately investigated each member complaint, decided to charge and 
prosecute more cases related to issues of public interest than for private interest. This second 
point, if true, reflects the accounting profession’s emphasis on investigating and prosecuting 
members for ethical code violations relating to the public interest, which, in turn, implies that 
the Australian accounting profession is operating its disciplinary process according to a public 
interest rationale (at least in the initial complaint and inquiry phases).  
However, since both CPA Australia and CAANZ do not report information on the number of 
complaints received nor the relative charge rate (or disposal rate) for all complaints received at 
the initial stages of the disciplinary process, it is difficult to tell (with any confidence) which 
of the two possible scenarios applies to the Australian accounting profession in this case. 
Nevertheless, the offence subcategories for the two most frequent categories of major offence 
– ‘adverse finding’ and ‘substandard professional practice’ – provide an important clue in this 
regard. The finding that (i) ‘adverse criticism’ accounts for the large majority (57.5%) of all 
adverse finding offences; and (ii) ‘non-compliance with professional/ technical standards’ 
accounts for just under half (42.3%) of all substandard professional practice offences strongly 
indicate external parties as the source of member complaints for the majority of public interest 
offences disciplined by both CPA Australia and CAANZ. As stipulated in the By-Laws of both 
CPA Australia and CAANZ, one way to initiate the accounting profession’s disciplinary 
process is to action a referral by a Court or other regulatory authority. Accordingly, it is 
probable that the Australian regulatory authorities had undertaken a higher level of surveillance 
activity (arguably as a result of the transition to a co-regulatory system) which led to the 
detection and consequent referral of a greater number of cases relating to issues of public 
interest to both CPA Australia and CAANZ. This would result in both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ receiving relatively more member complaints relating to issues of public interest, 
which would, in turn, account for the predominance of public interest offences for the 
Australian accounting profession. As such, the predominance of public interest offences for the 
Australian accounting profession can be attributed to the referral of a greater number of cases 
relating to issues of public interest by the Australian regulatory authorities (which may 
arguably be a reflection of the Australian system of co-regulation), which, in turn, obliges the 
Australian accounting profession to initiate its disciplinary process to prosecute and discipline 
these cases accordingly. 
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Predominance of light penalties 
The results for descriptive analysis indicate a predominance of light penalties for the Australian 
accounting profession, with reprimands the most frequently imposed penalty for the 
disciplinary cases dealt with by both CPA Australia and CAANZ. This is consistent with 
Parker’s (1994) finding, but is contrary to the finding of Jenkins et al. (2016) who documented 
a predominance of severe penalties (in the form of membership terminations and suspensions) 
for the US accounting profession. However, there is a simple explanation for this discrepancy. 
As Jenkins et al. (2016) explained, the US accounting profession is unique in that it has the 
option not to conduct its own tribunal hearing but to instead automatically impose the same 
penalty as the regulatory authority that referred the case provided the regulatory authority 
belongs to an approved list of governmental agencies and state organizations. Unlike the US 
accounting profession, both CPA Australia and CAANZ have no such option and are thus 
obliged to conduct their own tribunal hearing for the disciplinary cases referred by the 
Australian regulatory authorities. However, at the tribunal hearing, both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ have full discretion when it comes to deciding what penalties to impose. So given this 
discretion in deciding and allocating penalty outcomes, how has the Australian accounting 
profession chosen to deal with the disciplinary cases referred by the Australian regulatory 
authorities? From the results, it appears that, for the majority of such disciplinary cases, both 
CPA Australia and CAANZ have chosen to impose only light penalties predominantly in the 
form of reprimands. The predominance of light penalties despite the predominance of public 
interest offences for the Australian accounting profession implies that the Australian 
accounting profession is operating its disciplinary process according to a predominantly private 
interest rationale, where penalties are allocated with a view to preserving the socio-economic 
status of its members.   
Predominance of member name disclosure 
The results for descriptive analysis indicate that the majority of disciplinary cases dealt with 
by the Australian accounting profession involve disclosure of member name (63.3%). 
Compared to Parker’s (1994) finding where almost half of disciplinary cases involved 
suppression of the offending member’s name, this represents a significant development in 
member name disclosure. However, this may be partially attributed to the fact that there was a 
change in CAANZ’s reporting policy (as reflected by a change in its By-Laws) that made it 
mandatory for CAANZ to publish the offending member’s name together with all relevant  
147 
 
findings and penalty outcomes for all its disciplinary cases. By contrast, there was no similar 
change in CPA Australia’s reporting policy. In fact, CPA Australia’s By-Laws specifically 
allow for the offending member’s name to be withheld from publication in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ as determined by the relevant disciplinary committees.       
5.4 Results of inferential analysis 
The relevant statistics for the six pairs of offence-related variables (nature of offence, offence 
visibility) versus outcome-related variables (nature of penalties, severity of penalties, member 
name disclosure) for all disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and CAANZ from 1988 
to 2013 inclusive are summarized in Table 3 to Table 6. This is followed by Table 7 which 
presents a collective summary of the key findings derived from inferential analysis. 
5.4.1 Pair one:  nature of offence vs  nature of penalties 
Table 3 Panel A shows the results of a cross-tabulation analysis between nature of offence (in 
terms of public interest versus private interest offences) and nature of penalties (in terms of no 
versus light versus severe penalties) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases 
combined (N = 1,533). It shows that a greater proportion of public interest offences are 
associated with light penalties (in the form of rehabilitation, future monitoring, reprimands 
and/or fines) than private interest offences (61.4% of public interest offences vs 52.5% of 
private interest offences), while a greater proportion of private interest offences are associated 
with severe penalties (in the form of membership suspensions or temporary or permanent 
exclusion from membership and/or PPC suspensions or cancellations) than public interest 
offences (42.9% of private interest offences vs 31.9% of public interest offences). This is 
supported by the results of a Chi-square test of independence which found a statistically 
significant relationship between nature of offence and nature of penalties for both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [χ² = 20.78; df = 2; p < 0.001]. 
5.4.2 Pair two:  nature of offence vs  severity of penalties 
Table 3 Panel B shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for public interest offences and the mean severity of penalties imposed for 
private interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined         
(N = 1,533). Table 3 Panel B shows that the mean severity of penalties for private interest 
offences (M = 4.89; SD = 1.61; n = 699) is greater than the mean severity of penalties for public 
interest offences (M = 4.62; SD = 1.71; n = 834). This is supported by the results of a Mann-
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Whitney U test which found a statistically significant difference in the mean severity of 
penalties for private interest offences (mean rank = 809.95) and the mean severity of penalties 
for public interest offences (mean rank = 731.00) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined [z = -3.591; p < 0.001]. 
Table 3.   Distribution of penalties according to public interest versus private interest nature of offence.  
             
Panel A:   Nature of penalties according to public interest versus private interest nature of offence.   (N = 1,533)  
             
 Nature of Offence      
 Public interest  Private interest  TOTAL  
 Count  % of Column  Count  % of Column  Count  % of Total  
No penalties 56  6.7  32  4.6  88  5.7  
Light penalties 512  61.4  367  52.5  879  57.3  
Severe penalties 266  31.9  300  42.9  566  36.9  
n 834  100.0  699  100.0  1533  100.0  
Pearson X² test statistic (df = 2) 20.780  
p-value < 0.001  
             
Panel B:   Severity of penalties according to public interest versus private interest nature of offence.   (N = 1,533)  
             
 Nature of Offence      
 Public interest  Private interest      
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.62  4.89      
Standard Deviation 1.71  1.61      
Mean Rank 731.00  809.95      
n 834  699      
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -3.591      
p-value < 0.001      
             
5.4.3 Pair three:  offence visibility  vs  nature of penalties 
Table 4 Panel A shows the results of a cross-tabulation analysis between offence visibility (in 
terms of non-visible versus visible offences) and nature of penalties (in terms of no versus light 
versus severe penalties) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined (N 
= 1,533). It shows that a greater proportion of non-visible offences are associated with light 
penalties (in the form of rehabilitation, future monitoring, reprimands, and/or fines) than visible 
offences (71.1% of non-visible offences vs 45.8% of visible offences), while a greater 
proportion of visible offences are associated with severe penalties (in the form of membership 
suspensions or temporary or permanent exclusion from membership and/or PPC suspensions 
or cancellations) than non-visible offences (47.2% of visible offences vs 24.2% of non-visible 
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offences). This is supported by the results of a Chi-square test of independence which found a 
statistically significant relationship between offence visibility and nature of penalties for both 
CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [χ² = 102.70; df = 2; p < 0.001]. 
5.4.4 Pair four:  offence visibility  vs  severity of penalties 
Table 4 Panel B shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for non-visible offences and the mean severity of penalties imposed for 
visible offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined                        
(N = 1,533). Table 4 Panel B shows that the mean severity of penalties for visible offences      
(M = 4.86; SD = 1.79; n = 705) is greater than the mean severity of penalties for non-visible 
offences (M = 4.64; SD = 1.56; n = 828). This is supported by the results of a Mann-Whitney 
U test which found a statistically significant difference in the mean severity of penalties for 
visible offences (mean rank = 813.03) and the mean severity of penalties for non-visible 
offences (mean rank = 727.81) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases 
combined [z = -3.879; p < 0.001]. 
Table 4.   Distribution of penalties according to offence visibility.  
             
Panel A:   Nature of penalties according to offence visibility.   (N = 1,533)  
             
 Offence Visibility      
 Non-visible  Visible  TOTAL  
 Count  % of Column  Count  % of Column  Count  % of Total  
No penalties 39  4.7  49  7.0  88  5.7  
Light penalties 589  71.1  323  45.8  912  59.5  
Severe penalties 200  24.2  333  47.2  533  34.8  
n 828  100.0  705  100.0  1533  100.0  
Pearson X² test statistic (df = 2) 102.700  
p-value < 0.001  
             
Panel B:   Severity of penalties according to offence visibility.   (N = 1,533)  
             
 Offence Visibility      
 Non-visible  Visible      
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.64  4.86      
Standard Deviation 1.56  1.79      
Mean Rank 727.81  813.03      
n 828  705      
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -3.879      
p-value < 0.001      
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5.4.5 Pair five:  nature of offence  vs  member name disclosure 
Table 5 shows the results of a cross-tabulation analysis between nature of offence (in terms of 
public interest versus private interest offences) and member name disclosure (in terms of non-
disclosure versus disclosure of member name) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined (N = 1,547). The table shows no difference between the proportion 
of public interest offences associated with non-disclosure of member name as compared to the 
proportion of private interest offences associated with non-disclosure of member name (36.7% 
of public interest offences vs 36.6% of private interest offences). The converse is also true - 
there is no difference between the proportion of public interest offences associated with 
disclosure of member name as compared to the proportion of private interest offences 
associated with disclosure of member name (63.3% of public interest offences vs 63.4% of 
private interest offences). This is supported by the results of a Chi-square test of independence 
which found no statistically significant relationship between nature of offence and member 
name disclosure for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [χ² = 0.005; 
df = 1; p = 0.944]. 
Table 5.   Member name disclosure according to public interest versus private interest nature of offence.   
                  (N = 1,547)  
             
 Nature of Offence      
 Public interest  Private interest  TOTAL  
 Count  % of Column  Count  % of Column  Count  % of Total  
Non-disclosure of member name 310  36.7  257  36.6  567  36.7  
Disclosure of member name 534  63.3  446  63.4  980  63.3  
n 844  100.0  703  100.0  1547  100.0  
Pearson X² test statistic (df = 1) 0.005  
p-value 0.944  
             
5.4.6 Pair six:  offence visibility  vs  member name disclosure 
Table 6 shows the results of a cross-tabulation analysis between offence visibility (in terms of 
non-visible versus visible offences) and member name disclosure (in terms of non-disclosure 
versus disclosure of member name) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases 
combined (N = 1,547). The table shows that a greater proportion of non-visible offences are 
associated with non-disclosure of member name than visible offences (46.1% of non-visible 
offences vs 25.5% of visible offences), while a greater proportion of visible offences are 
associated with disclosure of member name than non-visible offences (74.5% of visible 
offences vs 53.9% of non-visible offences). This is supported by the results of a Chi-square 
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test of independence which found a statistically significant relationship between offence 
visibility and member name disclosure for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases 
combined [χ² = 69.74; df = 1; p < 0.001]. 
 
Table 6.   Member name disclosure according to offence visibility.   (N = 1,547)  
             
 Offence Visibility      
 Non-visible  Visible  TOTAL  
 Count  % of Column  Count  % of Column  Count  % of Total  
Non-disclosure of member name 386  46.1  181  25.5  567  36.7  
Disclosure of member name 452  53.9  528  74.5  980  63.3  
n 838  100.0  709  100.0  1547  100.0  
Pearson X² test statistic (df = 1) 69.740  
p-value < 0.001  
             
 
 
5.4.7 Discussion 
Table 7 summarizes the key findings derived from inferential analysis of the six pairs of 
offence-related variables versus outcome-related variables.  
 
 Table 7.   Summary of key findings derived from inferential analysis of the six pairs of  
                  offence-related variables versus outcome-related variables.   
         
 INFERENTIAL ANALYSIS  
         
 Pair   
Offence-related 
variable   
Outcome-related 
variable   
Relationship 
exists?  
 One  Nature of offence vs Nature of penalties  YES (√)  
 Two  Nature of offence vs Severity of penalties  YES (√)  
 Three  Offence visibility vs Nature of penalties  YES (√)  
 Four  Offence visibility vs Severity of penalties  YES (√)  
 Five  Nature of offence vs Member name disclosure  NO (Χ)  
 Six  Offence visibility vs Member name disclosure  YES (√)  
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Public interest versus private interest offences 
The results for inferential analysis indicate that the public interest versus private interest nature 
of offence affects both the nature and severity of penalties imposed on disciplinary cases dealt 
with by both CPA Australia and CAANZ. Specifically, the results suggest that private interest 
offences result in more severe penalties than public interest offences. This complements 
Parker’s (1994) finding that a greater proportion of private interest offences were subjected to 
the severest sanctions of membership suspension and exclusion, but runs contrary to both 
Loeb’s (1972) and Bédard’s (2001) findings that public interest offences result in heavier 
penalties than private interest offences. This discrepancy may be explained by the high levels 
of regulation and public participation that exist within the US and Canadian professional 
accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes. In the case of Loeb (1972), his results included 
disciplinary outcomes from a US State Board of Accountancy - a regulatory agency that 
operates independently of the US accounting profession and is responsible for the licensing of 
US public accountants. Similarly, in the case of Bédard (2001), his results are based on the 
disciplinary outcomes of the Québec’s Chartered Accountants’ association (OCAQ) located in 
the Canadian province of Québec – a jurisdiction characterized by high levels of State 
government and public involvement in the management and operation of professional 
accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes. As a result of the relatively high levels of regulation 
and public participation that exist within the US and Canadian professional accounting bodies’ 
disciplinary processes, one would expect public interest offences to be poorly tolerated and 
thus dealt with more severely than private interest offences. 
The finding that private interest offences result in more severe penalties than public interest 
offences can also be explained from a theoretical perspective. The ‘black sheep effect’ 
highlights the disapproval of deviant behaviour, with deviant members subjected to derogation 
and punishment by group members. The ‘model of subjective group dynamics’ further states 
that group members evaluate deviant members as a function of whether they validate or 
undermine important group norms, with group members driven by their collective desire to 
enhance or maintain this subjective validity. Therefore, it follows that both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ most probably perceive private interest offences as a greater threat or challenge to the 
subjective validity of their professional ethical codes than public interest offences, which would 
account for the reason why the Australian accounting profession punishes private interest 
offences more severely than public interest offences. This implies that the Australian 
accounting profession is operating its disciplinary process according to a predominantly private 
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interest rationale, with disciplinary committee members adopting a social identity that 
emphasizes the punishment of members for ethical code violations relating to its private interest 
rather than for ethical code violations relating to the public interest. 
Offence visibility 
Additionally, the results for inferential analysis indicate that the public visibility of offence 
affects both the nature and severity of penalties imposed on disciplinary cases dealt with by 
both CPA Australia and CAANZ. Specifically, the results suggest that publicly visible offences 
result in more severe penalties than non-visible offences. This is consistent with the findings 
of both Loeb (1972) and Lesage et al. (2016), but is contrary to Bédard’s (2001) finding that 
the severity of penalties is not affected by the public visibility of offence. Again, this 
discrepancy may be explained by the high levels of regulation and public participation that 
exist within the Canadian professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes. As a result 
of the relatively high levels of regulation and public participation that exist within the Canadian 
professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes, one would expect the public visibility 
of offence to have no bearing or influence on the severity of penalties. 
Similarly, the finding that publicly visible offences result in more severe penalties than non-
visible offences can also be explained from a theoretical perspective. By applying both the 
‘black sheep effect’ and the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’, it is evident that both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ perceive publicly visible offences as a greater threat or challenge to the 
subjective validity of their professional ethical codes than non-visible offences, which would 
explain why the Australian accounting profession punishes publicly visible offences more 
severely than non-visible offences. Again, this implies that the Australian accounting 
profession is operating its disciplinary process according to a predominantly private interest 
rationale, with disciplinary committee members adopting a social identity that emphasizes the 
punishment of members for ethical code violations that are publicly visible rather than for 
ethical code violations relating to the public interest. 
Member name disclosure 
Finally, the results for inferential analysis also indicate that, although the public interest versus 
private interest nature of offence has no bearing or influence on the likelihood of member name 
disclosure, the public visibility of offence does, however, affect the likelihood of member name 
disclosure. Specifically, the results suggest that publicly visible offences result in a greater 
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likelihood of member name disclosure than non-visible offences. Obviously, this finding can 
only apply to CPA Australia since, according to its By-Laws, CAANZ no longer has the option 
to withhold the offending member’s name from publication. In any case, the evidence supports 
the suggestion of professional insulation at work within the Australian accounting profession, 
particularly for CPA Australia. For CPA Australia, it seems that the public visibility of offence 
is a major factor that disciplinary committee members take into consideration when weighing 
up whether to withhold the offending member’s name from publication. This implies that CPA 
Australia is operating its disciplinary process according to a predominantly private interest 
rationale, where disciplinary decisions are made with a view of avoiding the potentially 
negative reputational connotations and adverse financial repercussions associated with 
disciplinary action. Needless to say, this goes against the spirit of transparency and the concept 
of impartiality advocated by the public interest. 
 
5.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter presents the results and findings for descriptive analysis and inferential analysis. 
Collectively, the results for both descriptive and inferential analyses provide strong evidence 
of the Australian accounting profession operating its disciplinary process according to a 
predominantly private interest rationale. This is evidenced by: 
(1)  the predominance of light penalties (mainly in the form of reprimands) despite the  
       predominance of public interest offences for the Australian accounting profession, thus  
       suggesting that disciplinary penalties are being allocated with a view to preserving the  
       socio-economic status of its members;  
(2)  private interest offences resulting in more severe penalties than public interest offences,  
       thus suggesting an emphasis on punishing members for ethical code violations relating to  
       the private interest of the Australian accounting profession; 
(3)  publicly visible offences resulting in more severe penalties than non-visible offences,  
       thus suggesting an emphasis on punishing members for ethical code violations that are  
       publicly visible; and   
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(4)  publicly visible offences resulting in a greater likelihood of member name disclosure than     
       non-visible offences, thus suggesting that disciplinary decisions are made with a view of  
       avoiding the potentially negative reputational connotations and adverse financial  
       repercussions associated with disciplinary action.  
This emphasis by the Australian accounting profession on protecting its private interest at the 
expense of the public interest is consistent with earlier research studies by Loeb (1972), Parker 
(1994), Mitchell et al. (1994), Chandler et al. (2008) as well as Canning and O’Dwyer (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
6 CHAPTER SIX:   EVENT ANALYSIS 
6.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter presents the results for event analysis of the six major past external events:                     
(1) 1997 Asian Financial Crisis; (2) introduction of CLERP 1 legislation; (3) demise of Arthur 
Andersen; (4) introduction of CLERP 9 legislation; (5) introduction of APES 110 Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants; and (6) 2008 Global Financial Crisis. This is followed by 
a discussion of the collective findings for the event analyses of all six major past external 
events. 
6.2 Results of event analysis 
The relevant statistics and results for event analysis of each of the six major past external events 
are presented in Table 8 to Table 13 respectively. This is followed by Table 14 which presents 
a collective summary of the key findings derived from event analysis. 
6.2.1 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
 
6.2.1.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1):  severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
Table 8 Panel A shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 1995 to 1997 inclusive (i.e. before the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 1998 to 2000 inclusive (i.e. after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis) (N = 372). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties 
for all disciplinary offences after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (M = 4.69; SD = 1.59;                   
n = 181) seems to be somewhat lesser than the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary 
offences before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (M = 4.74; SD = 1.68; n = 191), the results of 
the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant difference between the mean 
severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (mean 
rank = 181.53) and the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences before the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis (mean rank = 191.21) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined [z = -0.908; p = 0.364]. 
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6.2.1.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  severity of penalties for private interest offences 
Table 8 Panel B shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for private interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 1995 to 1997 inclusive (i.e. before the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for private interest offences for both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 1998 to 2000 inclusive (i.e. after the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis) (N = 170). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties 
for private interest offences after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (M = 4.84; SD = 1.50;                  
n = 75) appears to have increased as compared to the mean severity of penalties for private 
interest offences before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (M = 4.69; SD = 1.70; n = 95), the 
results of the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant difference between the 
mean severity of penalties for private interest offences after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
(mean rank = 85.63) and the mean severity of penalties for private interest offences before the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis (mean rank = 85.39) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined [z = -0.033; p = 0.974]. 
 
6.2.1.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  severity of penalties for public interest offences 
Table 8 Panel C shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined from 1995 to 1997 inclusive (i.e. before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis) and 
the mean severity of penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 1998 to 2000 inclusive (i.e. after the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis) (N = 202). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties for public 
interest offences after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (M = 4.58; SD = 1.64; n = 106) looks to 
have decreased as compared to the mean severity of penalties for public interest offences before 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (M = 4.78; SD = 1.66; n = 96), the results of the Mann-Whitney 
U test found no statistically significant difference between the mean severity of penalties for 
public interest offences after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (mean rank = 97.10) and the mean 
severity of penalties for public interest offences before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (mean 
rank = 106.35) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [z = -1.182; 
p = 0.237]. 
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Table 8.    Summary of statistics with respect to severity of penalties imposed for both  
                  CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases pre-Asian Financial Crisis                                      
                  compared to post-Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
         
Panel A:   Severity of penalties pre-Asian Financial Crisis  (n = 191)  compared to post-Asian Financial Crisis   
                  (n = 181)  for all disciplinary offences.   (N = 372)  
         
 Pre-AsianFC  Post-AsianFC  
 (1995 to 1997)  (1998 to 2000)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.74  4.69  
Standard Deviation 1.68  1.59  
Mean Rank 191.21  181.53  
n 191  181  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -0.908  
p-value 0.364  
         
Panel B:   Severity of penalties pre-Asian Financial Crisis  (n = 95)  compared to post-Asian Financial Crisis  
                  (n = 75)  for private interest offences only.   (N = 170) 
         
 Pre-AsianFC  Post-AsianFC  
 (1995 to 1997)  (1998 to 2000)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.69  4.84  
Standard Deviation 1.70  1.50  
Mean Rank 85.39  85.63  
n 95  75  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -0.033  
p-value 0.974  
         
Panel C:   Severity of penalties pre-Asian Financial Crisis  (n = 96)  compared to post-Asian Financial Crisis 
                  (n = 106)  for public interest offences only.   (N = 202) 
         
 Pre-AsianFC  Post-AsianFC  
 (1995 to 1997)  (1998 to 2000)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.78  4.58  
Standard Deviation 1.66  1.64  
Mean Rank 106.35  97.10  
n 96  106  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.182  
p-value 0.237  
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6.2.2 Introduction of CLERP 1 legislation 
 
6.2.2.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1):  severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
Table 9 Panel A shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 1997 to 1999 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of 
CLERP 1 legislation) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences 
for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2000 to 2002 inclusive 
(i.e. after the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation) (N = 406). It shows that, although the mean 
severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences after the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation 
(M = 4.35; SD = 1.71; n = 228) seems to be somewhat lesser than the mean severity of penalties 
for all disciplinary offences before the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation (M = 4.61;                              
SD = 1.67; n = 178), the results of the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant 
difference between the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences after the 
introduction of CLERP 1 legislation (mean rank = 194.05) and the mean severity of penalties 
for all disciplinary offences before the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation                                                   
(mean rank = 215.60) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined                             
[z = -1.920; p = 0.055]. 
 
6.2.2.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  severity of penalties for private interest offences 
Table 9 Panel B shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for private interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 1997 to 1999 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of 
CLERP 1 legislation) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for private interest offences 
for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2000 to 2002 inclusive 
(i.e. after the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation) (N = 184). It shows that, although the mean 
severity of penalties for private interest offences after the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation 
(M = 4.46; SD = 1.68; n = 101) appears to have decreased as compared to the mean severity of 
penalties for private interest offences before the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation                                
(M = 4.61; SD = 1.75; n = 83), the results of the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically 
significant difference between the mean severity of penalties for private interest offences after 
the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation (mean rank = 89.32) and the mean severity of penalties 
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for private interest offences before the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation (mean rank = 96.37) 
for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [z = -0.921; p = 0.357]. 
 
6.2.2.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  severity of penalties for public interest offences 
Table 9 Panel C shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined from 1997 to 1999 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of CLERP 1 
legislation) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for public interest offences for both 
CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2000 to 2002 inclusive (i.e. after 
the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation) (N = 222). It shows that, although the mean severity 
of penalties for public interest offences after the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation                              
(M = 4.26; SD = 1.74; n = 127) looks to have decreased as compared to the mean severity of 
penalties for public interest offences before the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation (M = 4.60; 
SD = 1.61; n = 95), the results of the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant 
difference between the mean severity of penalties for public interest offences after the 
introduction of CLERP 1 legislation (mean rank = 105.18) and the mean severity of penalties 
for public interest offences before the introduction of CLERP 1 legislation                                                    
(mean rank = 119.95) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined                             
[z = -1.805; p = 0.071]. 
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Table 9.   Summary of statistics with respect to severity of penalties imposed for both                                                
                 CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases pre-CLERP 1 legislation                                                
                 compared to post-CLERP 1 legislation. 
 
         
Panel A:   Severity of penalties pre-CLERP 1 legislation  (n = 178)  compared to post-CLERP 1 legislation 
                  (n = 228)  for all disciplinary offences.   (N = 406)  
         
 Pre-CLERP1  Post-CLERP1  
 (1997 to 1999)  (2000 to 2002)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.61  4.35  
Standard Deviation 1.67  1.71  
Mean Rank 215.60  194.05  
n 178  228  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.920  
p-value   0.055  
         
Panel B:    Severity of penalties pre-CLERP 1 legislation  (n = 83)  compared to post-CLERP 1 legislation 
                   (n = 101)  for private interest offences only.   (N = 184) 
         
 Pre-CLERP1  Post-CLERP1  
 (1997 to 1999)  (2000 to 2002)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.61  4.46  
Standard Deviation 1.75  1.68  
Mean Rank 96.37  89.32  
n 83  101  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -0.921  
p-value  0.357  
         
Panel C:    Severity of penalties pre-CLERP 1 legislation (n = 95)  compared to post-CLERP 1 legislation 
                   (n = 127)  for public interest offences only.    (N = 222) 
         
 Pre-CLERP1  Post-CLERP1  
 (1997 to 1999)  (2000 to 2002)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.60  4.26  
Standard Deviation 1.61  1.74  
Mean Rank 119.95  105.18  
n 95  127  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.805  
p-value   0.071  
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6.2.3 Demise of Arthur Andersen 
 
6.2.3.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1):  severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
Table 10 Panel A shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 2000 to 2002 inclusive (i.e. before the demise of Arthur 
Andersen) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both 
CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2003 to 2005 inclusive (i.e. after 
the demise of Arthur Andersen) (N = 407). It shows that there is no difference between the 
mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences after the demise of Arthur Andersen                  
(M = 4.33; SD = 1.88; n = 179) and the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
before the demise of Arthur Andersen (M = 4.35; SD = 1.71; n = 228). This is supported by 
the results of a Mann-Whitney U test which found no statistically significant difference 
between the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences after the demise of Arthur 
Andersen (mean rank = 207.21) and the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
before the demise of Arthur Andersen (mean rank = 201.48) for both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [z = -0.507; p = 0.612]. 
6.2.3.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  severity of penalties for private interest offences 
Table 10 Panel B shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for private interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 2000 to 2002 inclusive (i.e. before the demise of Arthur 
Andersen) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for private interest offences for both 
CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2003 to 2005 inclusive (i.e. after 
the demise of Arthur Andersen) (N = 165). It shows that, although the mean severity of 
penalties for private interest offences after the demise of Arthur Andersen (M = 4.86;                    
SD = 1.85; n = 64) appears to have somewhat increased as compared to the mean severity of 
penalties for private interest offences before the demise of Arthur Andersen (M = 4.46;                          
SD = 1.68; n = 101), the results of the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant 
difference between the mean severity of penalties for private interest offences after the demise 
of Arthur Andersen (mean rank = 91.69) and the mean severity of penalties for private interest 
offences before the demise of Arthur Andersen (mean rank = 77.50) for both CPA Australia 
and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [z = -1.896; p = 0.058]. 
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6.2.3.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  severity of penalties for public interest offences 
Table 10 Panel C shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined from 2000 to 2002 inclusive (i.e. before the demise of Arthur Andersen) and 
the mean severity of penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2003 to 2005 inclusive (i.e. after the demise of 
Arthur Andersen) (N = 242). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties for public 
interest offences after the demise of Arthur Andersen (M = 4.03; SD = 1.83; n = 115) looks to 
have somewhat decreased as compared to the mean severity of penalties for public interest 
offences before the demise of Arthur Andersen (M = 4.26; SD = 1.74; n = 127), the results of 
the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant difference between the mean 
severity of penalties for public interest offences after the demise of Arthur Andersen (mean 
rank = 118.68) and the mean severity of penalties for public interest offences before the demise 
of Arthur Andersen (mean rank = 124.05) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined [z = -0.637; p = 0.524]. 
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Table 10.    Summary of statistics with respect to severity of penalties imposed for both                                         
                    CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases pre-Arthur Andersen demise                                       
                    compared to post-Arthur Andersen demise.  
                     
         
Panel A:    Severity of penalties pre-Arthur Andersen demise  (n = 228)  compared to post-Arthur Andersen demise  
                   (n = 179)  for all disciplinary offences.   (N = 407)   
         
 
Pre-Arthur 
Andersen Demise  
Post-Arthur 
Andersen Demise  
 (2000 to 2002)  (2003 to 2005)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.35  4.33  
Standard Deviation 1.71  1.88  
Mean Rank 201.48  207.21  
n 228  179  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -0.507  
p-value  0.612  
         
Panel B:    Severity of penalties pre-Arthur Andersen demise  (n = 101)  compared to post-Arthur Andersen demise  
                   (n = 64)  for private interest offences only.   (N = 165)   
         
 
Pre-Arthur 
Andersen Demise  
Post-Arthur 
Andersen Demise  
 (2000 to 2002)  (2003 to 2005)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.46  4.86  
Standard Deviation 1.68  1.85  
Mean Rank 77.50  91.69  
n 101  64  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.896  
p-value  0.058  
         
Panel C:    Severity of penalties pre-Arthur Andersen demise  (n = 127)  compared to post-Arthur Andersen demise  
                   (n = 115)  for public interest offences only.   (N = 242)   
         
 
Pre-Arthur 
Andersen Demise  
Post-Arthur 
Andersen Demise  
 (2000 to 2002)  (2003 to 2005)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.26  4.03  
Standard Deviation 1.74  1.83  
Mean Rank 124.05  118.68  
n 127  115  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -0.637  
p-value  0.524  
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6.2.4 Introduction of CLERP 9 legislation 
6.2.4.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1):  severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
Table 11 Panel A shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 2002 to 2004 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of 
CLERP 9 legislation) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences 
for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2005 to 2007 inclusive 
(i.e. after the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation) (N = 375). It shows that the mean severity 
of penalties for all disciplinary offences after the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation                             
(M = 4.70; SD = 1.64; n = 162) is significantly greater than the mean severity of penalties for 
all disciplinary offences before the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (M = 4.16; SD = 1.84; 
n = 213). This is supported by the results of a Mann-Whitney U test which found a statistically 
significant difference between the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences after 
the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (mean rank = 205.67) and the mean severity of 
penalties for all disciplinary offences before the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (mean 
rank = 174.56) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [z = -2.845; 
p = 0.004]. 
 
6.2.4.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  severity of penalties for private interest offences 
Table 11 Panel B shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for private interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 2002 to 2004 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of 
CLERP 9 legislation) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for private interest offences 
for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2005 to 2007 inclusive 
(i.e. after the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation) (N = 147). It shows that the mean severity 
of penalties for private interest offences after the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation                            
(M = 5.20; SD = 1.36; n = 60) is significantly greater than the mean severity of penalties for 
private interest offences before the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (M = 4.54; SD = 1.77; 
n = 87). This is supported by the results of a Mann-Whitney U test which found a statistically 
significant difference between the mean severity of penalties for private interest offences after 
the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (mean rank = 83.16) and the mean severity of penalties 
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for private interest offences before the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (mean rank = 67.68) 
for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [z = -2.213; p = 0.027]. 
 
6.2.4.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  severity of penalties for public interest offences 
Table 11 Panel C shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined from 2002 to 2004 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of CLERP 9 
legislation) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for public interest offences for both 
CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2005 to 2007 inclusive (i.e. after 
the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation) (N = 228). It shows that the mean severity of penalties 
for public interest offences after the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (M = 4.41; SD = 1.72; 
n = 102) is significantly greater than the mean severity of penalties for public interest offences 
before the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (M = 3.90; SD = 1.85; n = 126). This is 
supported by the results of a Mann-Whitney U test which found a statistically significant 
difference between the mean severity of penalties for public interest offences after the 
introduction of CLERP 9 legislation (mean rank = 123.62) and the mean severity of penalties 
for public interest offences before the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation                                                 
(mean rank = 107.12) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined                          
[z = -1.981; p = 0.048]. 
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Table 11.   Summary of statistics with respect to severity of penalties imposed for both                             
                   CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases pre-CLERP 9 legislation                                                                   
                   compared to post-CLERP 9 legislation. 
 
         
Panel A:     Severity of penalties pre-CLERP 9 legislation  (n = 213)  compared to post-CLERP 9 legislation 
                    (n = 162)   for all disciplinary offences.   (N = 375)  
         
 Pre-CLERP9  Post-CLERP9  
 (2002 to 2004)  (2005 to 2007)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.16  4.70  
Standard Deviation 1.84  1.64  
Mean Rank 174.56  205.67  
n 213  162  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -2.845  
p-value  0.004  
         
Panel B:    Severity of penalties pre-CLERP 9 legislation  (n = 87)  compared to post-CLERP 9 legislation 
                   (n = 60)  for private interest offences only.   (N = 147) 
         
 Pre-CLERP9  Post-CLERP9  
 (2002 to 2004)  (2005 to 2007)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.54  5.20  
Standard Deviation 1.77  1.36  
Mean Rank 67.68  83.16  
n 87  60  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -2.213  
p-value  0.027  
         
Panel C:    Severity of penalties pre-CLERP 9 legislation (n = 126)  compared to post-CLERP 9 legislation  
                   (n = 102)  for public interest offences only.  (N = 228) 
         
 Pre-CLERP9  Post-CLERP9  
 (2002 to 2004)  (2005 to 2007)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 3.90  4.41  
Standard Deviation 1.85  1.72  
Mean Rank 107.12  123.62  
n 126  102  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.981  
p-value  0.048  
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6.2.5 Introduction of APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
 
6.2.5.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1):  severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
Table 12 Panel A shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 2004 to 2006 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of                   
APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants) and the mean severity of penalties 
imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases 
combined from 2007 to 2009 inclusive (i.e. after the introduction of APES 110 Code of Ethics 
for Professional Accountants) (N = 306). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties 
for all disciplinary offences after the introduction of APES 110 (M = 4.85; SD = 1.40; n = 154) 
seems to be greater than the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences before the 
introduction of APES 110 (M = 4.44; SD = 1.80; n = 152), the results of the Mann-Whitney U 
test found no statistically significant difference between the mean severity of penalties for all 
disciplinary offences after the introduction of APES 110 (mean rank = 160.44) and the mean 
severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences before the introduction of APES 110 (mean 
rank = 146.47) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined [z = -1.440; 
p = 0.150]. 
 
6.2.5.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  severity of penalties for private interest offences 
Table 12 Panel B shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for private interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 2004 to 2006 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of                    
APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants) and the mean severity of penalties 
imposed for private interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases 
combined from 2007 to 2009 inclusive (i.e. after the introduction of APES 110 Code of Ethics 
for Professional Accountants) (N = 111). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties 
for private interest offences after the introduction of APES 110 (M = 5.09; SD = 1.26; n = 54) 
appears to have somewhat increased as compared to the mean severity of penalties for private 
interest offences before the introduction of APES 110 (M = 4.93; SD = 1.81; n = 57), the results 
of the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant difference between the mean 
severity of penalties for private interest offences after the introduction of APES 110 (mean 
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rank = 55.65) and the mean severity of penalties for private interest offences before the 
introduction of APES 110 (mean rank = 56.33) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined [z = -0.116; p = 0.908].  
 
6.2.5.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  severity of penalties for public interest offences 
Table 12 Panel C shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined from 2004 to 2006 inclusive (i.e. before the introduction of APES 110 Code 
of Ethics for Professional Accountants) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for public 
interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2007 
to 2009 inclusive (i.e. after the introduction of APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants) (N = 195). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties for public 
interest offences after the introduction of APES 110 (M = 4.72; SD = 1.46; n = 100) looks to 
have increased as compared to the mean severity of penalties for public interest offences before 
the introduction of APES 110 (M = 4.15; SD = 1.74; n = 95), the results of the                                              
Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant difference between the mean severity 
of penalties for public interest offences after the introduction of APES 110                                                 
(mean rank = 105.15) and the mean severity of penalties for public interest offences before the 
introduction of APES 110 (mean rank = 90.47) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined [z = -1.935; p = 0.053]. 
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Table 12.   Summary of statistics with respect to severity of penalties imposed for both                              
                   CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases pre-APES 110 Code of Ethics                                                                                                            
                   compared to post-APES 110 Code of Ethics. 
                    
                 
         
Panel A:    Severity of penalties pre-APES 110 Code of Ethics  (n = 152)  compared to post-APES 110 Code of Ethics 
                    (n = 154)  for all disciplinary offences.   (N = 306)  
         
 Pre-APES110  Post-APES110  
 (2004 to 2006)  (2007 to 2009)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.44  4.85  
Standard Deviation 1.80  1.40  
Mean Rank 146.47  160.44  
n 152  154  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.440  
p-value  0.150  
         
Panel B:    Severity of penalties pre-APES 110 Code of Ethics  (n = 57)  compared to post-APES 110 Code of Ethics 
                   (n = 54)  for private interest offences only.   (N = 111) 
         
 Pre-APES110  Post-APES110  
 (2004 to 2006)  (2007 to 2009)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.93  5.09  
Standard Deviation 1.81  1.26  
Mean Rank 56.33  55.65  
n 57  54  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -0.116  
p-value  0.908  
         
Panel C:   Severity of penalties pre-APES 110 Code of Ethics  (n = 95)  compared to post-APES 110 Code of Ethics 
                  (n = 100)  for public interest offences only.   (N = 195) 
         
 Pre-APES110  Post-APES110  
 (2004 to 2006)  (2007 to 2009)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.15  4.72  
Standard Deviation 1.74  1.46  
Mean Rank 90.47  105.15  
n 95  100  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.935  
p-value  0.053  
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6.2.6 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
6.2.6.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1):  severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences 
Table 13 Panel A shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 2006 to 2008 inclusive (i.e. before the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for all disciplinary offences for both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2009 to 2011 inclusive (i.e. after the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis) (N = 304). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties 
for all disciplinary offences after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (M = 5.09; SD = 1.25;                  
n = 136) seems to be somewhat greater than the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary 
offences before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (M = 4.76; SD = 1.57; n = 168), the results of 
the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant difference between the mean 
severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (mean 
rank = 160.04) and the mean severity of penalties for all disciplinary offences before the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis (mean rank = 146.39) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined [z = -1.408; p = 0.159]. 
 
6.2.6.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2):  severity of penalties for private interest offences 
Table 13 Panel B shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for private interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined from 2006 to 2008 inclusive (i.e. before the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis) and the mean severity of penalties imposed for private interest offences for both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2009 to 2011 inclusive (i.e. after the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis) (N = 118). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties 
for private interest offences after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (M = 5.31; SD = 1.48;                          
n = 51) appears to have somewhat increased as compared to the mean severity of penalties for 
private interest offences before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (M = 4.99; SD = 1.39; n = 67), 
the results of the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant difference between the 
mean severity of penalties for private interest offences after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(mean rank = 65.82) and the mean severity of penalties for private interest offences before the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis (mean rank = 54.69) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
disciplinary cases combined [z = -1.838; p = 0.066]. 
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6.2.6.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3):  severity of penalties for public interest offences 
Table 13 Panel C shows the results of a comparison analysis between the mean severity of 
penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined from 2006 to 2008 inclusive (i.e. before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis) and 
the mean severity of penalties imposed for public interest offences for both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ disciplinary cases combined from 2009 to 2011 inclusive (i.e. after the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis) (N = 186). It shows that, although the mean severity of penalties for public 
interest offences after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (M = 4.95; SD = 1.08; n = 85) looks to 
have somewhat increased as compared to the mean severity of penalties for public interest 
offences before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (M = 4.61; SD = 1.67; n = 101), the results of 
the Mann-Whitney U test found no statistically significant difference between the mean 
severity of penalties for public interest offences after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (mean 
rank = 97.19) and the mean severity of penalties for public interest offences before the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis (mean rank = 90.39) for both CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary 
cases combined [z = -0.913; p = 0.361]. 
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Table 13.   Summary of statistics with respect to severity of penalties imposed for both                               
                   CPA Australia and CAANZ disciplinary cases pre-Global Financial Crisis                                                                                    
                   compared to post-Global Financial Crisis. 
                   
         
Panel A:    Severity of penalties pre-Global Financial Crisis  (n = 168) compared to post-Global Financial Crisis 
                    (n = 136)  for all disciplinary offences.   (N = 304)  
         
 Pre-GFC  Post-GFC  
 (2006 to 2008)  (2009 to 2011)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.76  5.09  
Standard Deviation 1.57  1.25  
Mean Rank 146.39  160.04  
n 168  136  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.408  
p-value   0.159  
         
Panel B:    Severity of penalties pre-Global Financial Crisis  (n = 67)  compared to post-Global Financial Crisis  
                   (n = 51)  for private interest offences only.   (N = 118) 
         
 Pre-GFC  Post-GFC  
 (2006 to 2008)  (2009 to 2011)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.99  5.31  
Standard Deviation 1.39  1.48  
Mean Rank 54.69  65.82  
n 67  51  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -1.838  
p-value   0.066  
         
Panel C:    Severity of penalties pre-Global Financial Crisis  (n = 101)  compared to post-Global Financial Crisis 
                   (n = 85)  for public interest offences only.   (N = 186) 
         
 Pre-GFC  Post-GFC  
 (2006 to 2008)  (2009 to 2011)  
Mean Severity of Penalties 4.61  4.95  
Standard Deviation 1.67  1.08  
Mean Rank 90.39  97.19  
n 101  85  
Mann-Whitney test  z statistic -0.913  
p-value   0.361  
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6.2.7 Discussion 
Table 14 summarizes the key findings derived from event analysis of the six major past external 
events. Taken together, the results for event analysis indicate that:  
(1)  only the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation had a significant impact on the severity of      
       penalties imposed on disciplinary cases dealt with by CPA Australia and CAANZ, with 
       all other external events having had no significant impact on severity of penalties; and 
(2)  the ‘black sheep effect’ was present following the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation as  
       evidenced by the increased severity of penalties imposed on both private interest offences  
       as well as public interest offences. 
Significance and importance of CLERP 9 legislation 
The finding that the ‘black sheep effect’ was present following the introduction of CLERP 9 
legislation, but was absent for the other five events, suggests that the Australian accounting 
profession perceived the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation to be of such a serious threat to 
its legitimacy and authority that it felt compelled to react and respond by changing the manner 
in which its ethical codes are enforced. But why did the Australian accounting profession 
perceive the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation to be such a serious threat to its legitimacy 
and authority? And why was there not a similar perception for the other five external events?  
Taken from the perspective of the Australian accounting profession, the following factors can 
be inferred from the results of the event analysis and may thus be relevant in explaining and 
accounting for the relative significance and importance of the introduction of CLERP 9 
legislation vis-à-vis the other five external events: 
(a) Specific to Australia 
Firstly, for an external event to be perceived as a serious threat by the Australian accounting 
profession, it needs to be specific to Australia and have a significant impact on Australian 
society. In this respect, both the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial 
Crisis had originated outside Australia and had arguably minimal impact on Australian 
businesses and society. Although both financial crises were accompanied by a depreciation of 
the Australian dollar at the time, this proved to be transitory as the depreciation of the 
Australian dollar helped to cushion the Australian economy from the initial effects of both 
financial crises. As a result, both financial crises did not cause the Australian economy to enter  
an economic recession and as such, the growth of the Australian economy and the general
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 Table 14.   Summary of key findings derived from event analysis of the six major past external events.   
                 
 EVENT ANALYSIS  
                 
 
External Events 
  Hypothesis 1   Hypothesis 2   Hypothesis 3   Impact on   
  Outcome  Supported?  Outcome  Supported?  Outcome  Supported?  Disciplinary Penalties  
 1997 Asian Financial Crisis  Reject  NO (Χ)  Reject  NO (Χ)  Accept  YES (√)  No change  
 CLERP 1 Legislation  Reject  NO (Χ)  Reject  NO (Χ)  Accept  YES (√)  No change  
 Demise of Arthur Andersen  Reject  NO (Χ)  Reject  NO (Χ)  Accept  YES (√)  No change  
                 
 CLERP 9 Legislation  Accept  YES (√)  Accept  YES (√)  Reject  NO (Χ)  Increased severity for both  
               
public interest & private interest offences 
(i.e. presence of the ‘black sheep effect’)  
                 
 APES 110 Code of Ethics  Reject  NO (Χ)  Reject  NO (Χ)  Accept  YES (√)  No change  
 2008 Global Financial Crisis  Reject  NO (Χ)  Reject  NO (Χ)  Accept  YES (√)  No change  
                                
                 
 CLERP 1   =  Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999;    
 CLERP 9   =  Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004;    
 APES 110  =  Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards 110  Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants.    
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welfare of Australian society were never really jeopardized by both financial crises; 
(b) Specific to Australian accounting profession 
Secondly, apart from being specific to Australia, an external event also needs to be specific to 
the Australian accounting profession for it to be perceived as a serious threat by the Australian 
accounting profession. In this respect, the demise of Arthur Andersen, while newsworthy at the 
time, had its origins in the US and was thus seen by the global accounting profession as 
predominantly a ‘US problem’. Therefore, while the demise of Arthur Andersen probably had 
an adverse impact on the reputation of the US accounting profession, it did not really have a 
significant impact on the reputation of the Australian accounting profession. This was so even 
though Arthur Andersen had been initially implicated in the financial collapse of HIH 
Insurance in Australia. As the HIH Royal Commission later established, the collapse of HIH 
Insurance in Australia was caused by financial mismanagement and poor corporate governance 
on the part of the company’s Board of Directors rather than malfeasance on the part of the 
Australian accounting profession. Therefore, since the Australian accounting profession was 
not really blamed for the collapse of HIH Insurance, its reputation remained intact and as such, 
the demise of Arthur Andersen did not really pose a serious threat to the legitimacy and 
authority of the Australian accounting profession; 
(c) Legislation specific to Australian accounting profession 
Thirdly, for an external event to be perceived as a serious threat by the Australian accounting 
profession, it needs to take the form of legislation that specifically applies to the Australian 
accounting profession. In this respect, since the ‘APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants’ merely represents a benchmark standard that was voluntarily adopted by the 
Australian accounting profession as opposed to government legislation imposed on the 
Australian accounting profession, its implementation by both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
proved not to be a serious threat to the Australian accounting profession as both CPA Australia 
and CAANZ had direct control over its enforcement. By contrast, the CLERP 1 and CLERP 9 
legislations both contained legal provisions that specifically apply to the Australian accounting 
profession (albeit to varying extents). As such, the Australian Government’s enactment and 
subsequent implementation of both CLERP 1 and CLERP 9 legislations arguably represented 
potentially serious threats to the legitimacy and authority of the Australian accounting 
profession; and 
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(d) Onerousness of legislative requirements on the Australian accounting profession 
Finally, for an external event to be perceived as a serious threat by the Australian accounting 
profession, it needs to not only take the form of legislation that specifically applies to the 
Australian accounting profession but also impose onerous legislative requirements on the 
Australian accounting profession. In this respect, the legal provisions contained in the CLERP 
9 legislation imposes significantly more onerous requirements on the Australian accounting 
profession than those contained in the CLERP 1 legislation introduced several years earlier. 
Specifically, the CLERP 9 legislation contained new provisions on audit reform such as auditor 
rotation, auditor independence, auditor oversight and a moratorium on ex-auditor employment 
by ex-clients that effectively necessitate a radical change in audit practice together with a 
substantial curtailment of the privileges enjoyed by auditors. Furthermore, the introduction of 
CLERP 9 legislation also continued the Australian Government’s encroachment on the 
traditional domain of the accounting profession by making the Financial Reporting Council 
responsible for overseeing the process of auditing standards setting in Australia (this 
encroachment on the accounting profession had begun several years earlier, with the Australian 
Government’s introduction of CLERP 1 legislation that made the Financial Reporting Council 
responsible for overseeing the process of accounting standards setting in Australia). Therefore, 
arguably, the reason why the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation was perceived as such a 
serious threat by the Australian accounting profession is probably because it signalled the 
Australian Government’s intention and continued determination to move towards a system of 
co-regulation that would effectively put an end to the autonomy and self-regulatory privileges 
enjoyed by the Australian accounting profession. This may account for the reason why the 
Australian Government’s introduction of CLERP 9 legislation was perceived by the Australian 
accounting profession as a serious threat to its legitimacy and authority whereas the Australian 
Government’s introduction of CLERP 1 legislation several years earlier was not. 
Obviously, these four factors identified above are purely hypothetical and will thus require 
further substantiation from future research involving interviews with disciplinary committee 
members in order to provide evidence that either supports or refutes the validity of these four 
hypothesized factors. Nevertheless, as it stands, these four factors remain useful as they serve 
as valuable food for thought that could potentially provide important clues for future research 
directions.  
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Private interest versus public interest offences 
So having perceived the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation as a serious threat to its legitimacy 
and authority, how had the Australian accounting profession reacted and responded to this 
perceived threat? The results for the CLERP 9 legislation event analysis indicate that, following 
the Australian Government’s introduction of CLERP 9 legislation, disciplinary committee 
members from both CPA Australia and CAANZ responded by increasing the severity of 
penalties for both private interest offences as well as public interest offences. This finding 
supports Hypothesis 1 and provides support for the ‘black sheep effect’ at work within the 
Australian accounting profession.  
Furthermore, the finding of a greater severity of penalties imposed on private interest offences 
following the Australian Government’s introduction of CLERP 9 legislation supports 
Hypothesis 2 and is consistent with both theory as well as Fisher et al.’s (2001) and Mescall et 
al.’s (2017) findings. It is apparent that the Australian accounting profession perceived the 
Australian Government’s introduction of CLERP 9 legislation as a serious threat to its 
legitimacy and authority. This rendered disciplinary committee members from both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ emotionally insecure and placed them in a state of heightened sensitivity 
to deviant behaviour that may potentially further erode the legitimacy and authority of the 
Australian accounting profession. Since private interest offences undermine the subjective 
validity of professional ethical codes that sustain the legitimacy and authority of the Australian 
accounting profession, disciplinary committee members from both CPA Australia and CAANZ 
respond by imposing greater severity of penalties for private interest offences in a concerted 
attempt to preserve the Australian accounting profession’s legitimacy and authority in the face 
of an external threat. Accordingly, the finding of a greater severity of penalties for private 
interest offences implies that the Australian accounting profession is operating its disciplinary 
process according to a predominantly private interest rationale, with disciplinary committee 
members adopting a social identity that emphasizes the punishment of members for ethical 
code violations that threaten its legitimacy and authority rather than for ethical code violations 
relating to the public interest. 
However, the finding of an increased severity of penalties imposed on public interest offences 
following the Australian Government’s introduction of CLERP 9 legislation is unexpected. It 
does not support Hypothesis 3 (as derived from theory which suggests no change in severity of 
penalties for public interest offences) and yet it complements the findings of Fisher et al. (2001) 
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and Mescall et al. (2017). So what does this mean? From a theoretical perspective, the fact that 
greater severity of penalties were imposed on public interest offences suggests that, besides 
private interest offences, disciplinary committee members from both CPA Australia and 
CAANZ are also psychologically preoccupied and emotionally concerned with public interest 
offences, at least following the Australian Government’s introduction of CLERP 9 legislation 
which the Australian accounting profession perceived as a serious threat to its legitimacy and 
authority. Accordingly, the finding of an increased severity of penalties for public interest 
offences implies that the Australian accounting profession is also operating its disciplinary 
process according to a public interest rationale, with disciplinary committee members adopting 
a human identity that emphasizes the punishment of members for ethical code violations 
relating to the public interest. 
Taken together, the presence of the ‘black sheep effect’ as evidenced by the greater severity of 
penalties imposed on both private interest offences as well as public interest offences following 
the Australian Government’s introduction of CLERP 9 legislation suggests that, in the face of 
an external threat to its legitimacy and authority, the Australian accounting profession reacts 
and responds by changing the manner in which its ethical codes are enforced such that its 
disciplinary process is now operated according to both private interest and public interest 
rationales. This simultaneous emphasis on the protection of both the public interest as well as 
the private interest of the accounting profession is consistent with subsequent research studies 
by Bédard (2001), Fisher et al. (2001), Lesage et al. (2016), Jenkins et al. (2016) and Mescall 
et al. (2017). 
 
 
6.3 Chapter summary 
This chapter presents the results and findings for event analyses of the six major past external 
events. Collectively, the results for event analysis indicate that the ‘black sheep effect’ was 
present following the Australian Government’s introduction of CLERP 9 legislation, with the 
Australian accounting profession imposing a greater severity of penalties on both private 
interest offences and public interest offences. This suggests a simultaneous emphasis on 
punishing members for: (i) ethical code violations that threaten its legitimacy and authority; as 
well as (ii) ethical code violations relating to the public interest.  
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Additionally, the results derived from event analysis also indicate that only the introduction of 
CLERP 9 legislation had a significant impact on the severity of penalties imposed on 
disciplinary cases dealt with by the Australian accounting profession, with the other five 
external events having had no significant impact on severity of penalties. Taken from the 
perspective of the Australian accounting profession, the following factors may be relevant in 
explaining and accounting for the relative significance and importance of the introduction of 
CLERP 9 legislation vis-à-vis the other five external events:  
(a)  Specific to Australia 
      Firstly, for an external event to be perceived as a serious threat by the Australian  
      accounting profession, it needs to be specific to Australia and have a significant impact  
      on Australian society;  
(b)  Specific to Australian accounting profession 
      Secondly, apart from being specific to Australia, an external event also needs to be    
      specific to the Australian accounting profession for it to be perceived as a serious threat  
      by the Australian accounting profession; 
(c)  Legislation specific to Australia accounting profession 
      Thirdly, for an external event to be perceived as a serious threat by the Australian  
      accounting profession, it needs to take the form of legislation that specifically applies to  
      the Australian accounting profession; and 
(d)  Onerousness of legislative requirements on the Australian accounting profession  
      Finally, for an external event to be perceived as a serious threat by the Australian  
      accounting profession, it needs to not only take the form of legislation that specifically  
      applies to the Australian accounting profession but also impose onerous legislative   
      requirements on the Australian accounting profession. 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN:   CONCLUSION  
7.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter synthesizes the results and findings from the descriptive, inferential and event 
analyses and provides an overall conclusion for the primary research question. This is followed 
by a discussion of the research contributions together with the theoretical implications for 
scholars and researchers as well as the practical implications for governments and 
policymakers. This chapter concludes with an explanation of the research limitations together 
with some suggestions for future research. 
7.2 Synthesis of results and findings 
The results for both descriptive and inferential analyses indicate that the Australian accounting 
profession appears to be operating its disciplinary process according to a predominantly private 
interest rationale. This is evidenced by: (a) the predominance of light penalties (mainly in the 
form of reprimands) despite the predominance of public interest offences for the Australian 
accounting profession, which suggests that disciplinary penalties are allocated with a view to 
preserving the socio-economic status of its members; (b) private interest offences resulting in 
more severe penalties than public interest offences, which suggests an emphasis on punishing 
members for ethical code violations relating to the private interest of the Australian accounting 
profession; (c) publicly visible offences resulting in more severe penalties than non-visible 
offences, which suggests an emphasis on punishing members for ethical code violations that 
are publicly visible; and (d) publicly visible offences resulting in a greater likelihood of 
member name disclosure than non-visible offences, which suggests that disciplinary decisions 
are made with a view of avoiding the potentially negative reputational connotations and adverse 
financial repercussions associated with disciplinary action. This emphasis by the Australian 
accounting profession on protecting its private interest at the expense of the public interest is 
supportive of earlier research studies by Loeb (1972), Parker (1994), Mitchell et al. (1994), 
Chandler et al. (2008) as well as Canning and O’Dwyer (2001, 2006, 2008). 
However, the results for event analysis portray a mixed picture, with the Australian accounting 
profession operating its disciplinary process according to both private interest and public 
interest rationales following a perceived external threat to its legitimacy and authority. This is 
evidenced by a greater severity of penalties imposed on both private interest offences as well 
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as public interest offences (i.e. the ‘black sheep effect’) following the perceived external threat 
to its legitimacy and authority, which suggests a simultaneous emphasis on punishing members 
for: (i) ethical code violations that threaten its legitimacy and authority; as well as (ii) ethical 
code violations relating to the public interest. This simultaneous emphasis by the Australian 
accounting profession on protecting both its private interest as well as the public interest is 
supportive of subsequent research studies by Bédard (2001), Fisher et al. (2001), Lesage et al. 
(2016), Jenkins et al. (2016) and Mescall et al. (2017). 
Taken together, the results for descriptive, inferential and event analyses suggest that, in the 
absence of perceived external threats, the Australian accounting profession operates its 
disciplinary process according to a predominantly private interest rationale, with emphasis on 
protecting its private interest at the expense of the public interest. However, when the 
Australian accounting profession perceives the presence of an external threat to its legitimacy 
and authority, it reacts and responds by changing the manner in which its ethical codes are 
enforced such that its disciplinary process is now operated according to both private interest 
and public interest rationales. In other words, the empirical evidence suggests that, in the face 
of an external threat to its legitimacy and authority, disciplinary committee members become 
psychologically preoccupied and emotionally concerned with protecting both the private 
interest of the accounting profession as well as the interests of the public and thus respond by 
imposing greater severity of penalties on members for ethical code violations relating to both 
its private interest as well as the public interest. In addition, the results from event analysis also 
suggest that, only when the external event is: (a) specific to Australia; (b) specific to the 
Australian accounting profession; (c) takes the form of government legislation that specifically 
applies to the Australian accounting profession; and (d) imposes onerous legislative 
requirements on the Australian accounting profession, does the Australian accounting 
profession perceive it to be of such a serious threat to its legitimacy and authority as to 
necessitate a change in the manner in which its ethical codes are enforced. 
 
7.3 Research contributions 
This research thesis contributes to the academic literature in four important ways. Firstly, it 
provides an updated account of changes in the public interest and private interest roles of 
professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in light of the crisis of public confidence 
afflicting the accounting profession. In this respect, the research findings indicate that, despite 
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the crisis of public confidence afflicting the accounting profession, the Australian accounting 
profession appears to be operating its disciplinary process according to a predominantly private 
interest rationale, with emphasis on protecting its private interest at the expense of the public 
interest.   
Secondly, this research thesis also serves as a valuable resource for cross-cultural comparisons 
of disciplinary practices within the global accounting profession. In this respect, the findings 
from this research thesis pertaining to the Australian accounting profession can be compared 
with the findings from other research studies pertaining to accounting professions in foreign 
jurisdictions. For example, the findings from Lesage et al. (2016) suggests that the accounting 
profession in a code law country such as France operates its disciplinary process according to 
both private interest and public interest rationales whereas the accounting profession in a 
common law country such as Australia appears to be operating its disciplinary process 
according to a predominantly private interest rationale, with emphasis on protecting its private 
interest at the expense of the public interest.   
Thirdly, in addition to analyzing the disciplinary outcomes resulting from internal enforcement 
of professional ethical codes by the accounting profession, this research thesis also analyzes 
and documents the accounting profession’s response (in terms of its enforcement of 
professional ethical codes) to both significant historical events as well as significant recent 
events. In this respect, the research findings derived from event analysis indicates that, in the 
absence of perceived external threats, the Australian accounting profession operates its 
disciplinary process according to a predominantly private interest rationale. However, when 
the Australian accounting profession perceives the presence of an external threat to its 
legitimacy and authority, it reacts and responds by changing the manner in which its ethical 
codes are enforced such that its disciplinary process now operates according to both private 
interest and public interest rationales, with disciplinary committee members imposing greater 
severity of penalties on members for ethical code violations relating to both its private interest 
as well as the public interest (i.e. the ‘black sheep effect’). Furthermore, the research findings 
also identified factors that may be relevant in explaining why certain external events elicit a 
change in the manner in which the Australian accounting profession enforces its ethical codes 
while other events do not.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this research thesis breaks new ground by employing 
an alternative theoretical framework based on the ‘social identity perspective of professional 
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ethical codes’ to conceptualize and interpret the motives and rationale that underpin the 
operation of professional ethical codes within the disciplinary architecture established by the 
professional accounting bodies. Specifically, by applying the concepts and principles espoused 
by Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory together with the research evidence 
pertaining to the ‘black sheep effect’ and the ‘model of subjective group dynamics’, this 
research thesis fills an important void in the academic literature on professional discipline by 
demonstrating how the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ represents a 
coherent framework that not only predicts disciplinary outcomes for statistical testing of 
specific hypotheses but also facilitates interpretation of the statistical results and research 
findings as well as proffering possible reasons that might potentially account for the observed 
findings. 
7.4 Research implications  
This research thesis provides research evidence that has profound theoretical implications for 
scholars and researchers as well as important practical implications for governments and 
policymakers alike.  
7.4.1 Theoretical implications  
Prior accounting research on professional discipline has been largely devoid of a theoretical 
framework and relies instead on the simplistic notion of self-interest to interpret and explain 
disciplinary outcomes. Accordingly, this research thesis fills an important void in the academic 
literature on professional discipline by employing an alternative theoretical framework based 
on the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ to conceptualize and interpret 
the motives and rationale that underpin the operation of professional ethical codes within the 
disciplinary architecture established by the professional accounting bodies.  
Specifically, the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ focuses exclusively 
on the collective psychology of members of the disciplinary committee tasked with 
enforcement of professional ethical codes within the disciplinary architecture established by 
the accounting profession. By applying the concepts and principles espoused by Social Identity 
Theory and Self-Categorization Theory together with the research evidence pertaining to the 
‘black sheep effect’ and ‘the model of subjective group dynamics’, the ‘social identity 
perspective of professional ethical codes’ is able to identify the possible motives as well as 
expound the specific psychological mechanisms that subconsciously occur within the minds of 
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the disciplinary committee members in circumstances where social identity is salient (i.e. the 
private interest argument).  
Accordingly, this helps researchers to understand how and why the operation of the accounting 
profession’s disciplinary process actually serves to protect its private interest. Importantly, by 
allowing researchers to truly appreciate what it means when the accounting profession is said 
to be protecting its private interest, the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical 
codes’ renders it possible for researchers to interpret and predict disciplinary outcomes based 
on the expected behaviour of disciplinary committee members in circumstances where social 
identity is salient (i.e. the private interest argument). This is an important implication as it forms 
the basis that allows researchers to conclude whether or not the disciplinary outcomes observed 
are consistent with the private interest argument which entails protection of the accounting 
profession’s private interest. 
In this respect, the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ has proven to be 
immensely useful and invaluable in providing a coherent framework for the interpretation as 
well as prediction of disciplinary outcomes in circumstances where social identity is salient 
(i.e. the private interest argument). Specifically, by identifying the possible motives and 
detailing the specific psychological mechanisms that subconsciously occur within the minds of 
disciplinary committee members, the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ 
allows for the interpretation and prediction of disciplinary outcomes based on the expected 
behaviour of disciplinary committee members in circumstances where social identity is salient. 
However, where the ‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’ has fallen short 
is in identifying the possible motives as well as expounding the specific psychological 
mechanisms that subconsciously occur within the minds of the disciplinary committee 
members in circumstances where human identity is salient (i.e. the public interest argument). 
As a result, this makes the interpretation and prediction of disciplinary outcomes in 
circumstances where human identity is salient extremely difficult with the implication that it is 
not possible to conclude (with any confidence) whether or not the disciplinary outcomes 
observed are consistent with the public interest argument which entails protection of the public 
interest.  
To address this, questions relating to the purpose or motive underpinning the public interest 
argument will first need to be answered. For example, what is the purpose or motive behind 
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punishing members for ethical code violations relating to the public interest (i.e. public interest 
offences)? Is it to act as a deterrent to prevent future recurrence? And if so, deterrent to whom 
– the current offender or future offenders? What about this issue of proportionality - should the 
severity of the penalty imposed be commensurate with features of the underlying offence? And 
if so, which features should be considered and prioritized? Therefore, until such time these 
questions are answered and these issues resolved, it is unlikely that researchers will truly 
appreciate and understand what it means when the accounting profession is said to be 
protecting the public interest. 
7.4.2 Practical implications 
Besides the theoretical implications for scholars and researchers, this research thesis also has 
several important practical implications for governments and policymakers. Firstly, it is 
apparent that, despite the crisis of public confidence afflicting the accounting profession, the 
Australian accounting profession is still operating its disciplinary process according to a 
predominantly private interest rationale, with emphasis on protecting its private interest at the 
expense of the public interest. Notwithstanding all the rhetoric and public proclamations of its 
commitment to act in the public interest, the research evidence for the Australian accounting 
profession is damning - it appears that it is ‘business as usual’ for the Australian accounting 
profession, with both Australian professional accounting bodies feeling no impetus or necessity 
to change the manner in which their ethical codes are enforced. This is despite the fact that 
CAANZ’s By-Laws provide for at least one lay person or non-accountant to serve on its 
disciplinary committees (there is no such equivalent provision in CPA Australia’s By-Laws). 
Suffice to say, the research evidence only serves to question the value and wisdom of 
appointing lay persons to serve on the disciplinary committees of professional accounting 
bodies (as is the practice in some North American and European nations).    
Secondly, from the research evidence, it seems that the only time the Australian accounting 
profession feels the impetus and necessity to change the manner in which its ethical codes are 
enforced is when it perceives the presence of a serious threat to its legitimacy and authority. 
Specifically, the research evidence suggests that, only when the external event is: (a) specific 
to Australia; (b) specific to the Australian accounting profession; (c) takes the form of 
government legislation that specifically applies to the Australian accounting profession; and 
(d) imposes onerous legislative requirements on the Australian accounting profession, does the 
Australian accounting profession perceive it to be of such a serious threat to its legitimacy and 
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authority as to necessitate a change in the manner in which its ethical codes are enforced. 
Obviously, from the perspective of policymakers, this represents a very high bar or standard to 
overcome to elicit a change in the manner in which the Australian accounting profession 
enforces its ethical codes.  
Finally, even after overcoming this high bar and eliciting a change in the manner in which the 
Australian accounting profession enforces its ethical codes, the research evidence indicates 
that, all the Australian accounting profession merely does is to switch from operating its 
disciplinary process according to a predominantly private interest rationale to one that operates 
according to both private interest and public interest rationales (as opposed to one that operates 
according to a predominantly public interest rationale which would clearly be the preference 
of choice!). In other words, even after an external event occurs that is: (a) specific to Australia; 
(b) specific to the Australian accounting profession; (c) takes the form of government 
legislation that specifically applies to the Australian accounting profession; and (d) imposes 
onerous legislative requirements on the Australian accounting profession, the private interest 
of the accounting profession still features strongly in the operation of its disciplinary process 
(albeit to a lesser extent than prior to the occurrence of the said external event). 
Taken together, the research evidence does not bode well for the public interest. The private 
interest is so well-entrenched and pervasive within the accounting profession’s disciplinary 
process such that even when its legitimacy and authority is threatened, the private interest of 
the accounting profession still features strongly in the operation of its disciplinary process. 
Accordingly, there is an urgent need to rethink the current institutional arrangement where 
professional accountants are regulated by professional accounting bodies that enforce 
professional ethical codes by way of their respective disciplinary processes. As long as the 
disciplinary process remains in the hands and under the control of the accounting profession, 
the private interest of the accounting profession will be omnipresent and thus feature strongly 
in all activities of the accounting profession including the operation of its disciplinary process.     
So given this realization, what should governments and policymakers do to overcome the 
pervasiveness of the private interest within the accounting profession and provide the public 
interest with an opportunity to thrive and flourish? To my mind, there is only one solution - a 
complete separation of duties and powers between the government and the accounting 
profession. Similar to the Westminster system adopted by democratic governments around the 
world where there is complete separation of powers between the legislative, executive and 
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judicial branches of the government, my recommendation is for policymakers to move away 
from the current self-regulatory or co-regulatory system and move towards instituting a system 
of direct government regulation instead. This system of direct government regulation would 
necessarily involve the establishment of a new statutory authority that is independent of the 
accounting profession and whose sole mandate is to regulate and police the accounting 
profession to ensure the protection of the public interest. This new statutory authority will be 
tasked with the responsibility of regulating all activities related to the accounting profession 
including enforcement of the accounting profession’s ethical codes. Understandably, this 
measure would represent quite a radical departure from the status quo, especially given the 
current institutional arrangement in Australia where the Australian accounting profession 
enjoys full discretion and complete control over the development as well as enforcement of its 
ethical standards. However, the establishment of a new independent statutory authority is 
arguably the most effective and definitive way to eliminate the private interest of the 
accounting profession altogether, thus ensuring that the process for enforcement of the 
accounting profession’s ethical codes is always operated in and according to the public interest. 
After all, to my mind, as members of society, we deserve nothing less.     
7.5 Research limitations 
The results and findings of this research thesis are subject to several limitations. First, because 
of the lack of information regarding the number and type of complaints received by both CPA 
Australia and CAANZ at the initial complaint stage as well as the relative charge rate (or 
disposal rate) for all complaints received by both CPA Australia and CAANZ at the subsequent 
inquiry stage, the analysis of the disciplinary cases is necessarily limited to the final output of 
the accounting profession’s disciplinary process in the form of reported findings and penalty 
outcomes from the disciplinary committees of both CPA Australia and CAANZ. It is therefore 
possible that the predominance of public interest offences for the Australian accounting 
profession might conceivably reflect a predominance of public interest offences reaching the 
disciplinary committees of both CPA Australia and CAANZ. 
Second, due to the inability to interview existing and/or former members of the disciplinary 
committees from both CPA Australia and CAANZ, it is not possible to obtain insights into 
their collective psychology that would, in turn, allow for a critical examination of the ‘social 
identity perspective of professional ethical codes’. Nevertheless, the ‘social identity 
perspective of professional ethical codes’ has been useful in providing the basis for the 
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interpretation and prediction of disciplinary outcomes based on the expected behaviour of 
disciplinary committee members in circumstances where social identity is salient. Additionally, 
without evidence from interviews to substantiate, the factors presented to explain the relative 
significance and importance of the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation from the perspective 
of the Australian accounting profession remain purely hypothetical.  
Third, since the published disciplinary cases do not state the motives or rationale of disciplinary 
committee members when imposing disciplinary penalties, it is often difficult to clearly 
distinguish between the ‘public interest’ versus ‘private interest’ nature of offence for each 
disciplinary case. Consequently, care has to be taken when interpreting the results as the 
classification between the ‘public interest’ versus ‘private interest’ nature of offence for each 
disciplinary case is somewhat subjective, and thus is, to a large extent, reliant on the 
professional judgement of the researcher. 
Fourth, the results and findings for event analysis are derived from analyzing each of the six 
external events in isolation assuming that each event is independent of one another. Since the 
six external events occur in chronological sequence, this may not necessarily be an accurate 
assumption nor an accurate reflection of reality. For example, an argument could probably be 
made that the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation is related to the introduction of CLERP 1 
legislation several years earlier, as both events were part of a series of legislative amendments 
to the provisions of the Corporations Law in Australia.   
Fifth, the research design does not allow for making causal claims. Therefore, it is not my 
contention that the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation caused more severe penalties for both 
private interest offences and public interest offences. Rather, the introduction of CLERP 9 
legislation is likely to have been perceived by disciplinary committee members as a serious 
threat to the legitimacy and authority of the Australian accounting profession who, in turn, 
responded by increasing the severity of penalties for both private interest offences and public 
interest offences. 
7.6 Suggestions for future research  
In order to address the research limitations highlighted, there are several areas where future 
research could focus on. Firstly, future research could focus on professional accounting bodies 
located in jurisdictions where information regarding the number and type of complaints 
received at the initial complaint stage as well as the relative charge rate (or disposal rate) for 
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all complaints received at the subsequent inquiry stage is made available. The availability of 
such information would allow for the analysis of the disciplinary process in its entirety from 
the initial complaint stage to the final reporting stage, which would, in turn, shed further light 
on the underlying motivation and latent rationale that underpins the accounting profession’s 
ethical codes and its disciplinary process. Furthermore, apart from analyzing changes in 
severity of penalties imposed by disciplinary committee members before and after the 
occurrence of a significant event, event analysis could also analyze changes in the relative 
proportions of public interest offences versus private interest offences before and after the 
occurrence of a significant event to discover how the accounting profession responds in terms 
of the prosecution of public interest offences versus private interest offences. 
Secondly, future research could also interview existing and/or former members of the 
disciplinary committees tasked with enforcement of professional ethical codes to gain insights 
into their collective psychology that would, in turn, allow for a critical examination of the 
‘social identity perspective of professional ethical codes’. Furthermore, structured interviews 
could also be conducted with disciplinary committee members to gather relevant evidence that 
will help to either support or refute the validity of the hypothesized factors that were presented 
to explain the relative significance and importance of the introduction of CLERP 9 legislation 
from the perspective of the Australian accounting profession.  
Thirdly, future research is also needed to explore the notion of human identity as well as 
establish the purpose or motive underpinning the public interest argument. Hopefully, this 
research will go some way towards helping researchers appreciate and understand what it 
means when the accounting profession is said to be protecting the public interest. 
7.7 Summary and conclusion 
This research thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the underlying motivation and 
latent rationale that underpins the accounting profession’s ethical codes and its disciplinary 
process. Specifically, it sets out to investigate how and to what extent professional ethical codes 
are enforced by professional accounting bodies’ disciplinary processes in protecting the public 
interest as compared to protecting their private interest. By analyzing data retrieved from the 
outcomes for all disciplinary cases published by CPA Australia and CAANZ from 1988 to 
2013 inclusive, the research evidence indicates that, in the absence of perceived external 
threats, the Australian accounting profession operates its disciplinary process according to a 
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predominantly private interest rationale, with emphasis on protecting its private interest at the 
expense of the public interest. However, when disciplinary committee members perceive an 
external threat to the Australian accounting profession’s legitimacy and authority, they become 
psychologically preoccupied and emotionally concerned with protecting both the private 
interest of the accounting profession as well as the interests of the public and thus respond by 
imposing greater severity of penalties on both private interest offences and public interest 
offences (i.e. the ‘black sheep effect’).  
Additionally, the research evidence also suggests that, only when the external event is:                           
(a) specific to Australia; (b) specific to the Australian accounting profession; (c) takes the form 
of government legislation that specifically applies to the Australian accounting profession; and 
(d) imposes onerous legislative requirements on the Australian accounting profession, does the 
Australian accounting profession perceive it to be of such a serious threat to its legitimacy and 
authority as to necessitate a change in the manner in which its ethical codes are enforced. Taken 
together, the research evidence does not bode well for the public interest. The private interest 
is so well-entrenched and pervasive within the accounting profession’s disciplinary process 
such that even when its legitimacy and authority is threatened, the private interest of the 
accounting profession still features strongly in the operation of its disciplinary process.  
In light of the research evidence, it is my recommendation that policymakers move towards 
instituting a system of direct government regulation, with the establishment of a new statutory 
authority that is independent of the accounting profession and whose sole mandate is to regulate 
and police the accounting profession to ensure the protection of the public interest. This new 
statutory authority will be responsible for all regulatory activities related to the accounting 
profession including enforcement of the accounting profession’s ethical codes. 
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9 APPENDICES 
9.1 APPENDIX A 
A typical report of the outcomes for disciplinary cases published in CPA Australia’s monthly 
professional journal Intheblack.   
 
Source: CPA Australia (Intheblack July 2009, p. 61). 
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9.2 APPENDIX B 
A typical report of the outcome for a disciplinary case published on CPA Australia’s official 
website.   
 
Member Discipline 
 
 
Member's name:   NAME NOT DISCLOSED 
 
Date of hearing:  22 July 2009 
 
Division: New South Wales 
 
Tribunal type:   Disciplinary Committee 
 
 
On 22 July 2009 the Disciplinary Committee found a Member breached Clause 27(1)(f) of the 
Constitution in that the Member "became Insolvent" on 22 September 2008 . 
 
Penalties and Costs 
 
The Disciplinary Committee imposed the penalty of forfeiture of Membership pursuant to  
Clause 27(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
 
The Disciplinary Committee determined that in the circumstances, CPA Australia's costs of $612  
be waived, but stressed this was on the basis of exceptional circumstances. 
 
In addition, the Disciplinary Committee ordered publication of the Determination including the 
Charge sustained and any penalty imposed, but due to extensive mitigating circumstances, 
ordered that the Member's name not be published. 
 
Appeal 
 
CPA Australia did not receive an application from the Member to appeal the Determination of  
  the Disciplinary Committee. 
 
 
 
 
Date of Notice: 22 August 2009 
Reference: 6005 
 
Source: CPA Australia website.  
<https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/about-us/member-conduct-and-discipline/outcome-of- 
  disciplinary-hearings/outcome-of-disciplinary-hearings-2009> 
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9.3 APPENDIX C 
A typical report of the outcomes for disciplinary cases published in the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia’s (ICAA) monthly professional journal Charter.   
 
Source: Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (Charter June 2010, p. 80). 
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9.4 APPENDIX D 
A typical report of the outcome of a disciplinary case published on the Chartered Accountants 
of Australia and New Zealand’s (CAANZ) official website.   
 
 John William Ashton CA of Queensland 
 Professional Conduct Tribunal - 27 September 2011 
 
 On his own admission the Tribunal found a case established that Ashton was liable to disciplinary action  
 in accordance with By-law 40(a) , in that as the auditor of five companies, he failed to observe a proper     
 standard of professional care, skill or competence in the course of carrying out his professional duties,  
 in that following a review by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ('ASIC') it contended    
 that he had acted in breach of various auditing standards , as a consequence of which on 16 June 2010,  
 in order to address concerns expressed by AS IC, Ashton entered into an enforceable undertaking  
 ('the undertaking') that, in summary: 
 
 1.  for a period of 18 months from the date of the acceptance of the undertaking by AS IC Ashton will not  
     perform the role of lead auditor or review auditor for any audits or reviews that are required under the  
     Corporations Act 2001 
 2.  for each of the first four occasions on which Ashton is engaged to conduct an audit under the Act after  
     the end of the period of suspension, he will appoint a reviewing auditor, approved in advance by ASIC  
     to review the conduct of each of these audits and provide a statement to AS IC that, in the reviewing  
     auditor's opinion, each of the audits in question has been conducted in all material respects in accordance  
      with established Australian Auditing Standards, and in accordance with the Audit Manual of the firm at  
      which he is practising as at the date of the audit in question 
 3.  Ashton will complete, in addition to the minimum of 120 hours of training and development over a    
      three year period required by the Institute , at least an additional 20 hours of technical external audit  
       training during the period of suspension 
 4.  Ashton will pay an amount of $16,000 towards the costs incurred by ASIC in conducting its  
     investigation, and to pay the costs of compliance with the undertaking . 
 
 The decision of the Tribunal was that Ashton be reprimanded and required to pay $1,500 plus GST towards   
 the costs of the disciplinary action. The Tribunal had regard to the significant penalty and costs already   
 imposed and the undertakings made by Ashton. The Tribunal also noted that a quality review of Ashton's  
 practice is scheduled shortly. 
 
 The Tribunal also ordered that notification of the Tribunal's decisions be given to appropriate professional   
  bodies and regulatory authorities. 
 
 
Article last updated 14 November 2011 
 
Source: Chartered Accountants of Australia and New Zealand website.  
<http://www.charteredaccountants.com.au/The-Institute/Member-complaints-and-discipline/Tribunal- 
  decisions> 
